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Essays In Macro-Finance
Abstract
In the first chapter, I show that the long-term decrease in the nominal short rate since the 1980s
contributed to a decline in banks' supply of business loans, firm investment and new firm creation, and an
increase in banks' real estate lending. The driving force behind these relationships was the shift in banks’
funding mix from time deposits (CDs) to savings deposits, which was caused by the decrease in the
nominal rate. I show that banks finance business lending with time deposits because of their matching
interest-rate sensitivity and liquidity. A lower nominal rate reduces the spread on liquid deposits (e.g.,
savings deposits), leading households to substitute towards them and away from illiquid time deposits. In
response to an outflow of time deposits, banks cut the supply of business loans and increase their price.
The decrease in business lending leads to reduced investment at bank-dependent firms and a lower entry
rate of firms in industries that are highly reliant on external funding. I document these relationships both
in the aggregate, and in the cross-section of banks, firms and geographic areas. For identification, I exploit
cross-sectional variation in banks' market power and business credit data. I develop a general equilibrium
model which captures these relationships and shows that the transmission mechanism I document is
quantitatively important.
In the second chapter, joint with Caterina Mendicino, Kalin Nikolov, Juan Rubio-Ramirez and Javier Suarez,
we examine optimal capital requirements in a quantitative general equilibrium model with banks exposed
to non-diversifiable borrower default risk. Contrary to standard models of bank default risk, our framework
captures the limited upside but significant downside risk of loan portfolio returns. This helps to reproduce
the frequency and severity of twin defaults: simultaneously high firm and bank failures. Hence, the
optimal bank capital requirement, which trades off a lower frequency of twin defaults against restricting
credit provision, is 5pp higher than under the standard default risk models which underestimate the
impact of borrower default on bank solvency.
In the third chapter, joint with Martina Jasova and Caterina Mendicino, we show that a reduction in lender
of last resort (LOLR) policy uncertainty positively affects bank lending and propagates to investment and
employment. We exploit a unique policy that reduced uncertainty regarding the availability of future LOLR
funding for banks as a quasi-natural experiment. Using micro-level data on banks, firms and loans in
Portugal, we generate cross-sectional variation in banks' exposure to uncertainty and find that the size of
the haircut subsidy - the gap between private market and central bank security valuations - plays a key
role in the propagation of the shock to lending and the real economy.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACRO-FINANCE
Dominik Supera
Itamar Drechsler
In the first chapter, I show that the long-term decrease in the nominal short rate since
the 1980s contributed to a decline in banks’ supply of business loans, firm investment and
new firm creation, and an increase in banks’ real estate lending. The driving force behind
these relationships was the shift in banks’ funding mix from time deposits (CDs) to savings
deposits, which was caused by the decrease in the nominal rate. I show that banks finance
business lending with time deposits because of their matching interest-rate sensitivity and
liquidity. A lower nominal rate reduces the spread on liquid deposits (e.g., savings deposits),
leading households to substitute towards them and away from illiquid time deposits. In
response to an outflow of time deposits, banks cut the supply of business loans and increase
their price. The decrease in business lending leads to reduced investment at bank-dependent
firms and a lower entry rate of firms in industries that are highly reliant on external funding.
I document these relationships both in the aggregate, and in the cross-section of banks,
firms and geographic areas. For identification, I exploit cross-sectional variation in banks’
market power and business credit data. I develop a general equilibrium model which captures
these relationships and shows that the transmission mechanism I document is quantitatively
important.
In the second chapter, joint with Caterina Mendicino, Kalin Nikolov, Juan Rubio-Ramirez and
Javier Suarez, we examine optimal capital requirements in a quantitative general equilibrium
model with banks exposed to non-diversifiable borrower default risk. Contrary to standard
models of bank default risk, our framework captures the limited upside but significant
downside risk of loan portfolio returns. This helps to reproduce the frequency and severity of
twin defaults: simultaneously high firm and bank failures. Hence, the optimal bank capital
iv

requirement, which trades off a lower frequency of twin defaults against restricting credit
provision, is 5pp higher than under the standard default risk models which underestimate
the impact of borrower default on bank solvency.
In the third chapter, joint with Martina Jasova and Caterina Mendicino, we show that a
reduction in lender of last resort (LOLR) policy uncertainty positively affects bank lending
and propagates to investment and employment. We exploit a unique policy that reduced
uncertainty regarding the availability of future LOLR funding for banks as a quasi-natural
experiment. Using micro-level data on banks, firms and loans in Portugal, we generate
cross-sectional variation in banks’ exposure to uncertainty and find that the size of the
haircut subsidy - the gap between private market and central bank security valuations - plays
a key role in the propagation of the shock to lending and the real economy.
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CHAPTER 1
Running Out of Time (Deposits): Falling Interest Rates and the
Decline of Business Lending, Investment and Firm Creation
The recent decades have been marked by falling interest rates hitting historical lows across
advanced economies. The potential consequences and challenges of this shifting environment
have been at the forefront of academic and policy debates (e.g., CGFS, 2018; Powell, 2017;
Rajan, 2015; Summers, 2014). According to the conventional view, lower interest rates are
stimulating for the economy. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns that declining rates
could also have negative repercussions (e.g., Asriyan et al., 2021; Liu et al., forthcoming;
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2017).
Understanding the channels through which lower interest rates affect the economy is especially
important in light of other secular trends observed over the last decades. In particular, falling
interest rates have been accompanied by a decline in investment (e.g., Crouzet and Eberly,
forthcoming; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016) and a slowdown in new firm creation (e.g.,
Decker et al., 2016). In addition, as the rates have been falling, banks have been moving
away from business lending towards real estate lending and security holdings (Figure 1.1).
These empirical patterns leave open questions. Are the long-run trends in interest rates,
bank lending to firms, investment and firm creation related? If so, what is the underlying
mechanism linking them?
In this paper, I show that the long-term decrease in the nominal short rate contributed to a
decline in business lending, firm investment and new firm creation observed over the last
four decades. I establish a causal link between the falling Fed funds rate, the outflow of
time deposits and the decline in the supply of business loans. Specifically, I show that banks
use time deposits to fund business loans due to their matching interest-rate sensitivity and
liquidity. A lower Fed funds rate induces banks to charge lower spreads on liquid deposits (e.g.,
savings deposits), and households to substitute towards them and away from illiquid time

1

deposits. In response to the loss of time deposits, banks decrease business lending. Consistent
with the supply effects, the quantity of business loans falls while the loan spreads increase. I
show that a fall in the supply of bank business lending disproportionately affects credit and
investment outcomes for bank-dependent firms that are unable to substitute to other sources
of financing. Falling rates also contribute to a lower firm entry rate, especially in industries
that are highly reliant on external financing. Finally, I present a general equilibrium model
that captures these relationships and show that the transmission mechanism of falling interest
rates to business lending through time deposits is quantitatively important.
My results are important for two reasons. First, I provide new insights into the propagation
of monetary policy to business lending and emphasize the critical role of time deposits in
the transmission mechanism. By showing that in response to lower interest rates banks lose
time deposits which triggers the contraction in lending to firms, I highlight the unintended
consequences of expansionary monetary policy. Second, I show that the fact that banks
have been running out of time deposits has important long-run macroeconomic implications.
Specifically, I document the mechanism through which falling interest rates contributed to
the secular decline of investment and firm creation observed in the U.S. over the last four
decades.
I start the analysis by providing three pieces of evidence to document that banks finance
business loans with time deposits. First, I show a striking and strong positive relationship
between aggregate time series of business loans and time deposits as a share of banking
sector total assets (Figure 1.1). Both series have been closely following a similar long-run
trend and they have been decreasing since the beginning of 1980s.1 The fall in time deposits
and business loans lines up closely with the decrease in the Fed funds rate. The strong
relationship between time deposits and business loans is also present in the cross-section of
banks. Banks with larger increase in time deposits on their balance sheets also extend more
1
Normalized by the size of bank balance sheets, time deposits decreased from more than 50% at the
beginning of the 1980s to less than 25% in the last decade. At the same time, business loans fell from around
30% in 1980s to less than 15% in the last decade.

2

business loans.2
Second, I use a removal of interest rates ceilings for small time deposits in 1978 as an
exogenous shock to the supply of time deposits. As banks started paying competitive rates
on time deposits, depositors substituted to time deposits from savings and checking deposits,
whose rates were still capped. I find that the rise of time deposits was associated with an
increase of business loans both in the aggregate time series and the cross-section of banks.
I show that banks with larger inflow of time deposits increased business lending by more.
Importantly, I do not observe similar behavior for other assets classes such as mortgages or
security holdings.
Third, I present an analysis using small business lending data. The focus on small business
loans allows me to compare credit outcomes of banks facing similar lending opportunities
within the same county. I exploit the variation in time deposits growth in the cross-section
of banks and I find that banks with a stronger growth of time deposits increase new small
business lending by more, even after controlling for county-time variation (including the
county-level changes in credit demand).
Banks finance business loans with time deposits because of interest-rate sensitivity matching
and liquidity matching. Different deposit products are associated with different levels of
liquidity and sensitivity to the short-rate (Fed funds rate) changes. While checking and
savings deposits are demandable, time deposit are illiquid as they cannot be withdrawn
until the end of the term without penalty. Due to their lower liquidity, time deposits offer
the highest rates that are also the most sensitive to the changes in the Fed funds rate
(Drechsler et al., 2017). Business loans are floating-rate or short-term assets whose cash
flows are highly sensitive to the Fed funds rate. Business loans are also considered illiquid
regardless of their maturity because banks cannot easily dispose of them to meet liquidity
needs (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Hanson et al., 2015).
2

The relationship between business loans and other types of deposits, i.e. savings deposits, is negative
both in the aggregate time series and in the cross-section of banks. I find that banks use savings deposits to
fund real estate lending and security holdings. See Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.

3

Banks hedge interest-rate exposure by matching the Fed funds rate sensitivity of deposits and
assets. I document this strategy both in the aggregate time series and in the cross-section of
banks. In the cross-sectional analysis, I estimate the sensitivity of banks’ business loan rates
and time deposit rates to changes in the Fed funds rate and show that these two sensitivities
are high and strongly correlated. Next, I show that the interest-rate sensitivity matching
strategy allows banks to achieve a stable net interest margin which is less susceptible to
interest-rate fluctuations.3 By financing business lending with time deposits, bank also hedge
liquidity risk. I show that on the margin, banks with more illiquid time deposits also make
more illiquid loans. Using the cross-section of banks, I find a strong positive relationship
between the maturity of time deposits and the maturity of floating-rate business loans.
My main result establishes a link between monetary policy, time deposits, business lending
and firm-level outcomes. Using local projection approach, I show that when the Fed funds
rate rises, banks experience an inflow of time deposits and an outflow of savings deposits.
Consistent with the deposit channel of monetary policy in Drechsler et al. (2017), an increase
in the Fed funds rate raises the effective market power of banks and allows banks to charge
higher deposit spreads. As savings deposits become relatively more expensive, depositors
substitute away from deposits in aggregate, and critically from (liquid) savings deposits to
(illiquid) time deposits. The main focus of this paper is to examine the monetary transmission
to business lending. As banks fund business loans with time deposits, and time deposits
increase in response to the rising Fed funds rate, I establish a causal chain in which higher
interest rates lead to an increase in the supply of business lending.
While aggregate and bank-level evidence present a useful big picture, it are also subject to a
common identification challenge – time deposit supply can be responding to changes in bank
business lending opportunities rather than directly to monetary policy. If banks’ lending
opportunities increase when the Federal Reserve raises the policy rate, banks would make
3
At the same time, I also show that banks match low short-rate sensitivity by financing securities with
savings deposits. Liquid savings deposits pay lower rates and exhibit only a modest sensitivity to the monetary
policy rate. Securities (such as mortgage-backed securities and treasuries) are long-term fixed-rate assets
whose cash flows have low sensitivity to the Fed funds rate.
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more loans to firms and therefore also collect more time deposits.
I address this identification challenge in three steps. First, I exploit the variation in the bank
market power in the time deposit market. I proxy for the bank market power with Time
Deposits Spread Beta or Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) in local (county-level) deposit
markets. Time Deposit Spread Beta captures the bank-level sensitivity of time deposit spread
to the Fed funds rate changes.4 I show that banks with more market power raise the spread
on time deposits by more and attract fewer time deposits when the Fed funds rate rises. This
provides me with a variation in the supply across banks, i.e. a cross-sectional supply shifter.
By exploiting the heterogeneity in the market power in time deposits, I test the hypothesis
that when the Federal Reserve increases the rates, banks with more market power in time
deposit markets increase their business lending by less compared to banks with less market
power.
Second, I exploit more granular credit data, such as small business lending or syndicated
lending, which allow me to control for time-varying demand for credit with fixed effects. In
the small business lending analysis, I introduce county-time fixed effects to compare lending
behavior by different banks facing similar lending opportunities within the same county at the
same time. In the syndicated lending analysis, I saturate the regressions with sector-time or
even firm-time fixed effects that absorb any sector-time or firm-time variation. These settings
allow me to control for time-varying county-, sector- or firm- level demand for business credit
and compare the lending behavior of banks with different time deposits market power when
monetary policy tightens. The results exploiting the variation in time deposit market power
and controlling for time-varying demand factors corroborate the finding from the aggregate
time series. When the Fed funds rate rises, business lending increases. Furthermore, the
increase in the supply of business lending is larger for banks with less market power (low
Time Deposit Spread Beta or low HHI).
4

Time Deposit Spread Beta relates to Deposit Spread Beta presented by Drechsler et al. (2017) as a
comprehensive measure of market power in the (overall) deposit market. I specifically focus on the market
power in the time deposit market. As a result, I estimate Time Deposit Spread Beta of each bank by
regressing the change in bank’s time deposit spread on the changes in the Fed funds rate.
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Third, I examine the response of business loan spreads (prices) to monetary policy. I show
that when the Fed funds rate rises, the quantity of business loans increases while the loan
spreads fall. I document a robust inverse relationship between spread and quantity of
business loans in a range of exercises. I examine aggregate series over time and present local
projections to monetary policy shocks. I also exploit bank cross-sectional variation in the
syndicated loan market. These results are inconsistent with predictions from models with
credit demand shifts. According to the demand effects, an increase in the Fed funds rate
could shift the demand outward which would lead to both higher spreads and higher loan
volumes. Instead, the empirical evidence illustrates that higher business loan volumes are
associated with lower loan spreads which lends support to the shift in credit supply.
In addition, I present an evidence from a range of asset classes to demonstrate that other
interest-rate sensitive assets (short-term securities, adjustable-rate mortgages or other floatingrate loans) also respond positively to Fed funds rate increases. On the contrary, interest-rate
insensitive assets (long-term securities, fixed-rate mortgages or other fixed-rate loans) fall
when the Federal Reserve raises rates. These findings highlight that business loans are not
special when it comes to their response to monetary policy. Other assets, that share the
same interest-rate sensitivity characteristics, behave similarly.
What are the effects of falling interest rates on business investment? The aggregate data
shows a strong co-movement between business investment and business lending since 1960s
both in trends and cycles. In contrast, there is only a weak, negative correlation between
corporate bonds and business investment. Guided by the aggregate evidence, I examine the
effects of monetary policy on investment in the cross-section of firms. Specifically, I split
firms into two types: firms dependent only on banks (without bond market access) and firms
with bond market access. To this end, I proxy for the access to bond market financing with
the availability of firm ratings.5
5
I show that the results are robust to measuring bond market access with its previous borrowing through
bonds.
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I find that when the Fed funds rate falls, banks cut lending to both types of firms – with and
without bond market access. Firms with bond market access are able to substitute towards
bond financing. When firms do not have access to the bond market, this channel bears real
consequences. A 1 pp decrease in the Fed funds rate is associated with a 1.9% cut in firm
credit and a 1% drop in firm investment for bank-dependent firms (without access to bond
market). This is important because only a small fraction of firms in the U.S. can issue bonds
(20% within publicly traded Compustat firms).
While the banking sector sector has been running out of time deposits and reducing the
supply of business loans, the firm creation in the U.S. has also declined over the past four
decades. The contraction in business credit supply is particularly relevant for new firms as
they are particularly dependent on bank loans. I examine the role of time deposits in the
transmission mechanism of lower interest rates through bank balance sheets to firm creation.
For this purpose, I exploit county level data on new firms and analyze the effects in both
the short run and the long run. In the short run, I show that the counties exposed to banks
with stronger decline in time deposits also have lower firm entry rates. A one standard
deviation decrease in time deposits growth is associated with a 2% decline in firm creation. I
exploit additional industry-level heterogeneity and show that the effects are driven by firms
in industries with high external finance dependence, consistent with the decline in the supply
of bank financing for firms. In the long run (1995 vs. 2015), I document that a decline in
time deposits contributed to a downward trend in firm creation. Counties ex-ante more
exposed to banks with a larger decline in time deposits and counties with a higher ex-ante
dependence on time deposits in 1995, experienced the most pronounced drop in new firm
creation.
To rationalize and quantify the empirical results, I develop a quantitative macro-finance
general equilibrium model with banks exposed to liquidity and interest rate risk. In the
model, households derive utility from liquidity. They can save in four types of assets providing
different levels of liquidity services: money, savings deposits, time deposits and short-term
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bonds. While money is the most liquid asset, it pays no interest. Savings deposits are less
liquid than money but more liquid than time deposits. Both types of deposits pay deposit
rates set by banks. Short-term bonds provide no liquidity and pay nominal rate set by the
central bank.
Banks engage in liquidity and maturity transformation. They are funded by equity, savings
and time deposits. Banks have market power over their deposit markets and set the deposit
rates internalizing the differences in their liquidity among households’ assets. On the asset
side, banks face a portfolio choice between long-term loans to financially constrained firms
and long-term government bonds. Loans to firms are floating-rate and as a result their cash
flows are highly sensitive to short-rate changes. Government bonds are fixed-rate and, hence,
their cash flows exhibit low sensitivity to short-rate changes. Bank assets also differ in how
difficult they are to liquidate on a short notice. Business loans are very illiquid and selling
them rapidly is costly. Instead, the market for government bonds is deep and they can be
sold promptly without a discount.
Differences in liquidity and interest-rate sensitivity of deposits and assets are important
in light of two frictions the bank faces. First, liquid savings deposits are exposed to
a funding shock which triggers a sudden withdrawal of savings deposits by households
(e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Drechsler et al., 2018). Upon
a withdrawal shock, bank needs to rapidly liquidate their assets to satisfy the outflow of
savings deposits. While liquid government bonds can be sold at a market value, selling
illiquid business loans results in a fire-sale discount. Second, it is costly for the bank to raise
additional equity or change the dividend policy (e.g., Floyd et al., 2015; Elenev et al., 2021).
As a result, banks have an incentive to smoothen their dividends and they are averse to
variations in the net interest margin.
In equilibrium, differences in the liquidity of deposits give rise to differences in their sensitivity
to policy rate changes. Specifically, as savings deposits are more liquid than time deposits,
banks set higher prices (deposit spreads) for savings deposits. As a result, savings deposit
8

rates are lower and less volatile compared to time deposit rates. On the contrary, time
deposits protect banks against the funding shock but their rates are higher and more sensitive
to the Fed funds rate changes. In the model, banks manage interest rate and liquidity risk
by endogenously matching loans to firms with time deposits and long-term government
bonds with savings deposits. Both time deposits and business loans are illiquid and have
a high short-rate sensitivity. Savings deposits and long-term bonds are instead liquid and
exhibit low interest rate sensitivity. Hence, financing business loans with time deposits and
government bonds with savings deposits hedges bank interest-rate and liquidity risk.
The model is calibrated to match macro, banking and financial data for the U.S. economy. I
use the calibrated model to examine the effects of a decline in nominal rates from 8% (the
level of the Fed funds rate in 1985) to 0.5% (level in 2016) on equilibrium outcomes.6 In
response to lower nominal rates, the opportunity cost of holding money falls which decreases
banks’ effective market power. As a result, banks decrease the spreads on deposits. As savings
deposits are the closest substitute for money, the savings deposit spread falls by more than the
time deposit spread. In response to a fall in the relative price of savings deposits, households
substitute away from illiquid time deposits towards liquid savings deposits. Consequently,
the share of bank financing from time deposits falls significantly from 42% to 17% in line
with the patterns observed in the data. As a reaction to the decline in time deposits, banks
decrease their supply of business loans which falls from around 40% to around 22% of banks’
total assets. The model implied decline in business loans is quantitatively significant and
accounts for the entire decrease in business loans observed in the data. Consistent with
the supply effects, the business loan spread increases by 2 pp in line with the empirical
values. Finally, the fall in nominal rates induces a 16% drop in investment as a share of gross
operating surplus. Taken together, the model suggests that falling nominal rates played a
quantitatively important role in the decline of time deposits, business lending and investment.
Related literature. My work contributes to several strands of the literature. First,
6
When changing the steady-state level of nominal interest rates, inflation adjusts to keep the real rate
constant.
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I connect to a large body of work on the bank lending channel of monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Drechsler et al., 2017;
Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jimenez et al., 2012, 2014). Most closely, I relate to Drechsler et al.
(2017) by emphasizing the role of deposits in the monetary transmission. I focus on the
monetary transmission to business lending and firm-level outcomes through time deposits. I
find that the fall in the Fed funds rate is associated with an outflow of time deposits and
a subsequent decline in supply of business lending. This mechanism can help explain how
falling interest rates contributed to a decline in investment and firm creation.
The transmission through time deposits also allows me to reconcile a puzzling result in the
data that business lending rises following a contractionary monetary policy documented
by several papers (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Den Haan et al.,
2007; Greenwald et al., 2021). I show that this effect can be directly linked to my finding
that banks finance business loans with time deposits. My findings highlight that in response
to a decline in the Fed funds rate, banks experience an outflow of time deposits which due to
interest-rate sensitivity and liquidity matching of time deposits and C&I loans is associated
with a decrease in bank business lending supply.
Second, I relate to the literature on risks in the banking system (e.g., Begenau et al.,
2015;

Calomiris and Kahn,

1991;

Di Tella and Kurlat,

2021;

Diamond and Rajan,

2001; Drechsler et al., 2018, 2021a; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Gomez et al., 2021;
Hanson et al., 2015; Jermann, 2019). Banks engage in maturity transformation which exposes
them to interest rate risk (Drechsler et al., 2021a) and liquidity risk (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983). I contribute to this literature by showing that banks manage liquidity and interest
rate risk by matching interest-rate sensitive and illiquid business loans with interest-rate
sensitive and illiquid time deposits. The quantitative general equilibrium model of banks
and monetary policy I develop to rationalize and quantify my empirical findings contributes
to the macro-banking literature (e.g., Begenau, 2020; Elenev et al., 2021; Jermann, 2019;
Jermann and Xiang, 2021; Mendicino et al., 2019, 2020; Piazzesi et al., 2019).
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While

existing literature has primarily focused on the role of credit risk, I examine the role of
interest-rate and liquidity risk for banks’ asset allocation and the transmission of monetary
policy.
Third,

my

paper

is

at

the

intersection

of

the

literature

on

the

real

ef-

fects of low interest rates (e.g., Asriyan et al., 2021; Brunnermeier and Koby, 2018;
Balloch and Koby, 2019; Eggertsson et al., 2019; Kroen et al., 2021; Liu et al., forthcoming; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2017; Wang, 2018) and the literature examining the trends
and driving factors of firm entry and investment (e.g., Crouzet and Eberly, forthcoming;
Gomes, 2001; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012; Decker et al.,
2016; Gourio et al., 2016; Karahan et al., 2017; Covarrubias et al., 2020). I show that low
interest rates lead to an outflow of time deposits and as banks fund business loans with time
deposits, this causes a lower supply of business loans and higher cost of business lending.
This mechanism helps explain a decline in investment (e.g., Crouzet and Eberly, forthcoming;
Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016; Philippon, 2019) and lower firm entry (e.g., Decker et al.,
2016) observed over the recent decades. I show that falling interest rates disproportionately
harm firm without bond market access that cannot substitute a decline in bank credit supply.7
My findings also relate to the evidence in Kroen et al. (2021) who show that industry leaders
take advantage of low interest rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 summarizes the data. Section
1.2 presents the evidence that banks fund business loans with time deposits. Section 1.3
discusses the reasons behind it. Section 1.4 analyzes the role of monetary policy on time
deposits and business lending. Section 1.5 examines the role of supply and demand. Section
1.6 presents the evidence from other asset classes. Section 1.7 examines the effect on firm
investment and Section 1.8 shows the results for new firm creation. Section 1.9 presents the
model. Finally, Section 1.10 concludes.
7
A large body of literature studying the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on firm investment has
shown differential responses across firms of different risk (Ottonello and Winberry, 2020), age (Cloyne et al.,
2018), liquidity (Jeenas, 2018) and size (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
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1.1. Data
Bank-level data. I use financial data on banks from U.S. Call Reports provided by the
Federal Reserve of Chicago. The data includes quarterly bank-level information on bank
balance sheets and income statements for all commercial banks in the United States. I collect
Call Reports data from 1976 to 2015.8
Deposit data. I use the data on deposit quantities at the individual branch level from
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The data comes at an annual frequency
from 1994 to 2015. I aggregate the branch-level data to the bank-county level.
Small business lending. I complement the information from Call Reports with bankcounty-time level information on small business lending from the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC). I collect the small business lending data from 1997 to 2015.
This data allows be to examine new small lending for credit below $1 million.9
Syndicated lending. Thomson Reuters Dealscan database collects loan-level information
on syndicated credit from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, company statements, and other sources. Consistent with the large body of literature using Dealscan data, I
focus on all loans issued to non-FIRE businesses. I restrict the sample to working capital
or corporate purpose loans from 1992 to 2015. Following the approach in Chodorow-Reich
(2014), I use the information on the syndicate structure to assign loan shares to lead arrangers
and participants.
Firm-level data. I use firm-level variables from Compustat at quarterly frequency from
1992 to 2015 that provides a panel data of publicly listed firms in the U.S.. Using Compustat
8

While I exploit the Call Reports data from 1976 to 1980 to study the effects of the deregulation of
time deposits on business lending, my main analysis focuses on the period from 1986 to 2015 (excluding
the period of the Global Financial Crisis). The focus on the post-1986 period is twofold. First, the data on
a number of balance sheet and income statement components is available only after 1986. Second, I want
to avoid confounding effects related to the interaction of monetary policy with Regulation Q. As shown
by Drechsler et al. (2021b), Regulation Q, which was in place prior to 1986, affected the transmission of
monetary policy to bank balance sheets.
9
I consider the lending outcomes with at least $100,000 at the bank-county level.
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data for non-financial firms, I construct two measures of firm investments. First, I use the
book value of the tangible capital stock of a firm at the end of the quarter. Second, I compute
a share of capital expenditures (CAPX) to lagged value of capital stock.
I further add firm-level information on bond market financing from Mergent Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD). I supplement it with the information on firm credit rating from
S&P Capital IQ. This allows me to construct the measure of firm access to bond financing.
New firm creation. I collect the information on new firm created at the industry-countytime level from Quarterly Workforce Indicators, which is provided by the Census Bureau.10
I use quarterly data from 1995 to 2015. In addition, I also use the data on county-level
employment, population and salaries from County Business Patterns and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Fed funds rate data. Finally, I draw the effective Fed funds rate series from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED). In addition, I also use monetary policy surprises identified
using high frequency surprises from Gertler and Karadi (2015).

1.2. How do banks fund business loans?
1.2.1. Time-series analysis
Aggregate analysis. Figure 1.1 Panel (a) plots the aggregate trends of business C&I loans11
and time deposits (shown as a share to total assets of the banking sector). Business loans and
time deposit shares are very strongly positively related (the correlation is 89%). Both series
are closely following a similar long-run trend and are decreasing over time. Figure 1.2 Panel
(a) further shows this close relationship also holds for the evolution of real year-over-year
growth rates of time deposits and C&I loans (the correlation is 77%).
The strong positive relationship between business loans and time deposits is not only striking
10

I exclude the following industry codes from my analysis: 52 (Financials), 53 (Real Estate) to focus on
non-FIRE sectors as in the rest of the analysis.
11
A commercial and industrial (C&I) loans are loans made to businesses. Usually, C&I loans provide
funding for working capital or capital expenditures. In the remainder of this paper, I use the terms business
loans and C&I loans interchangeably.
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but it is also distinct from the relationship of C&I loans with other deposit products and
time deposits with other asset classes. For instance, the correlation between the changes in
C&I loans and savings deposits is -27%, and the correlation between the change in securities
and real estate loans vs. time deposits is -14%.
From Panels (a) of Figures 1.1 and 1.2, business loans appear to be funded with time deposits.
By contrast, Panels (b) of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 suggests that securities and real estate loans
are funded with savings deposits. Panel (b) of Figure 1.1 shows the close co-movement
between savings deposits, and security holdings and real estate loans in terms of shares to
total assets of the banking sector (correlation of 89%). Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 highlights that
changes in security holdings and real estate loans also strongly respond to savings deposit
growth rate (correlation of 58%).
Cross-sectional analysis. I corroborate the results from the aggregate time-series analysis
with a cross-sectional evidence. Figure 1.3 shows the relationship between the dynamics
of different deposit (time and savings deposits) and asset classes (C&I loans and security
holdings) in the cross-section of banks. For each of the considered deposit and asset types,
I compute a year-over-year log change in their shares to individual bank total assets (TA).
I sort banks by their time deposit dynamics (in Panels (a) and (c)) and savings deposits
dynamics (in Panels (b) and (d)) into 100 bins. For the respective bins, I compute the
average change in C&I loans (in Panels (a) and (b)) and security holdings (in Panels (c) and
(d)) and graph the bin scatter plots. The plots confirm that the strong positive relationship
between time deposits and C&I loans (Panel (a)), and savings deposits and security holdings
(Panel (d)) observed in the aggregate time series is also present in the cross-section of banks.
Panel (c) and (d) document instead a negative relationship between savings deposits and
C&I loans, and time deposits and securities, respectively. Taken together, the aggregate and
cross-sectional evidence strongly suggest that banks fund business lending with time deposits,
and long-term lending (real estate loans and security holdings) with savings deposits.
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1.2.2. Shock to the supply of time deposits
The aggregate time series analysis suggests that banks tend to fund different asset classes
with different deposit products. In what follows, I provide additional evidence by using the
deregulation of small time deposits in 1970s as an exogenous shock to the supply of time
deposits.
I use the repeal of interest rates ceilings on small time deposits which marked “the beginning
of the end for Regulation Q” (Drechsler et al., 2021b).12 Novelty of this paper is that it
uses the regulatory change as an exogenous shock to the supply of time deposits to examine
the effect on bank business lending. Specifically, I use the introduction of two deregulated
small-time deposit products: Money Market Certificate (MMC) accounts in Q3 1978 and
Small Saver Certificate (SSC) accounts in Q3 1979. MMCs had maturity of six months
and denomination of $10,000 or more. SSCs had a maturity of at least 30 months and no
minimum denomination.
First, I find that the deregulation of small time deposits in late 1970s increased the supply
of time deposits. Figure 1.4 Panel (a) illustrates that in response to the introduction of
SSC and MMC accounts, the share of time deposits to total deposits (red line) dramatically
increased from around 36% prior to the regulation repeal to 42% in Q1 1981. In dollar value,
the MMCs quickly grew to $68 billion just after one quarter, and by Q1 1981 these two new
products totalled to $557 billion.
Second, using aggregate time series, I show that the rise of time deposits is associated with
the rise of C&I loans. Figure 1.4 Panel (a) further documents a close co-movement of the
business lending and time deposits around the regulatory change. Importantly, I do not find
a similar effect for other asset types. Panel (b) plots the evolution of securities and time
deposits. The two series do not seem to co-move and if anything, the share securities to total
deposits started to decrease already prior to the regulatory changes and remained stable
12
For details about Regulation Q, see Drechsler et al. (2021b) who use the deregulation of small deposits
to provide a new explanation for the end of the Great Inflation of 1965–1982.
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since 1979. Panel (c) shows the evolution of real estate (RE) loans. The RE loan category
does not appear to be impacted by the deregulation of small time deposits. The RE loans
had been trending up already in the pre-period and the trend continued throughout the
sample period (1976–1980).
Third, I corroborate the time-series results by presenting a cross-sectional evidence. Figure
1.4 Panel (d) shows the relationship between the change in small time deposits and C&I
loans between 1977 and 1979 at the cross-section of banks. I sort banks by their small time
deposit dynamics into 100 bins and plot the average change in small time deposits and C&I
loans (normalized by total deposits in 1977) for each bin.13 The cross-sectional relationship
is consistent with the aggregate time series. Banks experiencing more pronounced growth in
small time deposits also increase their C&I loans the most.
1.2.3. Evidence using small business lending
Finally, I present an analysis using small business lending. The focus on small business
lending allows me to address the concern that the previously documented effects could be
driven by credit demand.14 Specifically, the county-bank-level credit data allows me to
implement a within-county estimation that controls for county-time variations (including
the county-level changes in demand) and compare lending outcomes of banks facing similar
lending opportunities within the same county. To this end, I estimate the following OLS
regression:
yb,c,t = αb,c + αc,t + β∆log(Time Depositsb,t−1 ) + γXb,c,t−1 + ϵb,c,t ,

(1.1)

where yb,c,t denotes the log of new lending by bank b in county c in year t. I exploit the
variation at the cross-section of banks. Specifically, ∆log(Time Depositsb,t−1 ) denotes the
13

I winsorize the data at 10% to address the effect of outliers.
A large body of literature has contributed to the importance of disentangling credit demand and credit
supply (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012; Jiménez et al., 2019). In case of the availability of
loan-level credit data, the estimation relies on the use of firm(-time) fixed effect. In the absence of granular
loan-level data, the literature has relied on the use of county(-time) fixed effects to absorb demand-side
confounding factors (e.g., Cortés et al., 2020; Drechsler et al., 2017; Luck and Zimmermann, 2020).
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log change in time deposits of bank b in year t − 1. As motivated, I introduce county-time
fixed effects (αc,t ) to absorb any county-time variation including local lending opportunities.
Bank-county fixed effect (αb,c ) absorb any time-invariant bank, county or bank-county
characteristics. Finally, I control for the lagged local deposit growth of bank b in county c
(denoted as Xb,c,t−1 ). The standard errors are clustered at the bank-time and county level.
Table 1.1 shows the results. Column (1) presents the baseline estimates, as described in
Equation 1.1. Within the same county and in the same year, banks with larger change in
time deposits supply more new business lending by more than banks with smaller change
in time deposits. The effect is statistically and economically significant at the 1% level. In
Column (2), I further control for the log change in savings deposits. It shows that while the
role of time deposits remains positive and statistically significant, the estimate of savings
deposits is negative and statistically insignificant. Taken together, these results highlight
that banks tend to fund their business loans with time deposits.

1.3. Why do banks fund business loans with time deposits?
The previous section provides evidence that banks tend to fund business loans with time
deposits. In this section, I explore the reasons behind why this is happening. I start by
focusing on key characteristics of business loans and time deposits.
Figure 1.5 plots the evolution of average effective rates for time (solid red) and savings
(dashed orange line) deposits against the movement of the Fed funds target rate. The effective
rate for time (savings) deposits is computed as a ratio of time (savings) deposits interest
expense to lagged time (savings) deposits volume.15 Different deposit products are associated
with different interest rates levels and different sensitivities to short-rate changes depending
on their liquidity. For liquid savings deposits, banks offer lower rates that are also less
responsive to the changes in the Fed funds rate. Specifically, Banks charge high savings
deposits spreads that are increasing in the While savings deposits are demandable, time
deposit are illiquid as they cannot be withdrawn until the end of the term without penalty.
15

The effective rates are computed using the Call Reports data for banks.
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As a result, time deposits not only pay higher rates than savings deposits but they are also
the most sensitive to the Fed funds rate changes.
Business loans are floating rate or short-rate assets whose cash flows are highly sensitive to
the Fed funds rate. Commercial and Industrial loans are also considered illiquid regardless
of their maturity because banks cannot easily dispose of them to meet liquidity needs
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Hanson et al., 2015).
1.3.1. Interest-rate sensitivity matching
Aggregate analysis. Figure 1.5 also plots the effective rates for two asset classes: C&I
loans and security holdings. First, I start by examining the relationship between C&I loans
and time deposits. C&I loan effective rate (solid blue) is computed as a ratio of C&I interest
income to C&I loan volume. As C&I loans are primarily floating-rate products, their rates
are very sensitive to the Fed funds rate changes. As discussed above, time deposits rates also
exhibit strong sensitivity to short-rate changes.
Figure 1.5 further shows the evolution of effective rates of security holding (dashed green)
and savings deposits (dashed orange). Both series exhibit weaker sensitivity to Fed funds
rate changes. To formally compare the differences in the interest-rate sensitivity of the all
four discussed balance sheet items, I estimate the following regression:

∆EffectiveRateyb,t

= αb +

4
X

βτy ∆Rt−τ + ϵb,t ,

(1.2)

τ =0

where ∆EffectiveRateyb,t is the change in the effective rate of a balance sheet item y of bank
b at time t. I control for time-invariant bank characteristics with bank fixed effects (αb ).
∆Rt−τ denotes the change in the Fed funds target rate from t − τ − 1 to t − τ . Similarly
to Drechsler et al. (2017), I introduce time lags to address the issues that it takes time for
some loans to update their rates and that the Call Report data is based on average deposit
expenses. As a result, for each of the assets (liability) item, I estimate the average Interest
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Income (Expense) Beta (β y ).
Table 1.2 summarizes the results. Column (1) shows that a 1 percentage point (pp) increase
in the Fed funds rate is associated with a 58 basis points increase in the effective time deposit
rate. Column (2) shows that the effect of monetary policy rate on savings deposits is much
weaker. When the Fed funds rate rises by 1pp, the savings deposit effective rate rises only
by 32 bps. This evidence is consistent with Drechsler et al. (2017) who show that banks
increase the deposit spreads (liquidity premia) when the Fed funds rate rises. As the time
deposit is less liquid than the savings deposit, banks increase time deposit rates by more.
Column (3) and (4) focus on the effect of short-rate changes on the effective rate of bank
assets. I find that the balance sheet items match each other very closely. Specifically, the
sensitivity of C&I loans effective rate is quantitatively very similar to the sensitivity of time
deposits rates (the estimates are 0.58 in Column (1) and 0.53 in Column (3)). Similarly,
the coefficient for securities has a similar magnitude as the one for savings deposits (0.29 in
Column (4) and 0.32 in Column (2)).
So far, this aggregate analysis suggests that banks choose to finance C&I loans with time
deposits, and security holdings with savings deposits as this strategy hedges them from the
interest rate risk. Such a strategy enables banks to maintain stable net interest margin (NIM)
with respect to interest rate volatility. As a next step, I examine this behavior using the
cross-section of banks.
Cross-sectional analysis. The cross-sectional analysis consists of three steps. I present
the methodology on the relationship between time deposits and C&I loans.16 Specifically, I
run the following OLS regressions:

∆EffectiveRateyb,t

= αb +

4
X

y
βb,τ
∆Rt−τ + ϵb,t .

(1.3)

τ =0
16

I repeat the same approach for the analysis of the relationship between securities and savings deposits.

19

First, I use time deposits effective rate as an outcome variable. I estimate bank-specific time
deposit interest expense sensitivity to the Fed funds rate changes and denote it as Time
Deposit Interest Expense Beta of bank b.17 Second, I repeat the same estimation procedure,
as described by Equation 1.3, using bank-level C&I effective rate as the outcome variable.
This allows be to obtain the C&I Loan Interest Income Beta. Third, I use the two beta
coefficients to investigate the relationship of interest-rate sensitivity of time deposits and
business loans at the cross-section of banks. To this end, I sort banks into 100 bins based on
their Time Deposit Interest Expense Beta and compute the average C&I Interest Income
Beta for each bin.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.6 presents the results. Consistent with the aggregate analysis, the
cross-sectional evidence highlights a very strong and positive relationship between the Time
Deposit Interest Expense Beta and C&I Loan Interest Income Beta in the cross-section of
banks. The results show that banks match the high interest exposure of time deposits with
C&I loans. In other words, financing C&I loans with time deposits hedges banks from interest
rate risk. This strategy allows banks to achieve stable net interest margin (NIM) that is
insensitive to interest rates. Next, I repeat the same approach to examine the relationship
between savings deposits and securities. Panel (b) of Figure 1.6 reports the results. Similarly
to the Panel (a), I observe a strong matching of assets and deposits with low interest-rate
sensitivity, savings deposits and securities, also at the cross-section of banks.
Finally, I turn the attention to the net interest margin (NIM) analysis. Banking literature
generally focuses on bank-level NIM and computes it as the difference between bank’s total
interest income and total interest expense. Drechsler et al. (2021a) showed that bank-level
NIM is insensitive to interest rate changes. For the purpose of my analysis, I unpack the
bank-level NIM and construct four partial NIMs based on two sources of income (C&I loans
and securities) and two sources of expense (time and savings deposits). Formally, I compute
the net interest margins for a combination of an asset class a matched with a deposit type d
17

The set-up presented in Equation 1.3 is similar to the Equation 1.2 but while Equation 1.2 examines the
average effect, Equation 1.3 allows me to estimate a bank-specific betas.
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for bank b at time t:
a
d
NIMa,d
b,t = Interest Incomeb,t − Interest Expenseb,t ,

(1.4)

where a denotes either securities or C&I loans, and d denotes either savings or time deposits.
I use the changes in the partial NIMs to analyze the interest-rate sensitivity:

∆NIMa,d
b,t = αb +

4
X

βτa,d ∆Rt−τ + ϵb,t .

(1.5)

τ =0

Table 1.3 summarizes the results. Column (1) shows that partial NIM for C&I loans and
time deposits is insensitive to short-rate changes. Therefore, financing C&I loans with time
deposits hedges banks from interest rate risk. This relates to the previous finding that both
balance sheet items exhibit similar, high interest-rate sensitivity. Column (2) instead finds
that financing C&I loans with savings deposits exposes banks to interest rate risk (beta is
0.21). As a result, if banks were to use savings deposits to finance C&I loans, their profits
would decline when Fed funds rate falls. Similarly to Column (2), Column (3) shows that
financing securities with time deposits increases NIM volatility. Finally, Column (4) finds
that the the matching of savings deposits and securities hedged banks from interest rate
risk (estimate is -0.03). Summing up, my results show that banks’ stable and interest-rate
insensitive NIM can be explained by the fact that they match assets and deposits of similar
interest-rate sensitivity. Specifically, using time deposits to fund C&I loans and savings
deposits to finance long-term fixed-rate lending (securities such as MBS and Treasuries, and
fixed-rate real estate loans) ensures banks’ NIM is unaffected by changes in interest rates.
1.3.2. Liquidity matching
Banks fund C&I loans with time deposits also due to liquidity matching motive. As time
deposits cannot be withdrawn on demand without penalty, they represent a stable source
of financing for illiquid C&I loans, whose rapid liquidation may come at the fire-sale cost
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(Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Hanson et al., 2015). If liquidity motive was important for
banks, we would observe that on the margin banks with longer-maturity time deposits will
extend longer-maturity business loans.
Figure 1.7 presents the relationship between liquidity of time deposits and loans in the crosssection of banks. Panel (a) reports the maturity for all bank loans (expect for real-estate
credit). It shows that the maturity of time deposits closely lines up with the maturity of
loans. Panel (b) exploits syndicated lending which allows me to explicitly focus on corporate
adjustable-rate loans. It shows a similar positive cross-sectional relationship between the
maturities of time deposits and business lending. Taken together, both Call report and
syndicated lending data highlight that on the margin, banks with more illiquid time deposits
also make more illiquid business loans suggesting asset-deposit liquidity matching can help
explain why banks fund C&I loans with time deposits.

1.4. Monetary policy, time deposits and business loans
How does monetary affect business lending? So far, I have established that banks fund
different assets classes with different deposit products due to interest-rate sensitivity and
maturity matching. In this section, I investigate the role of monetary policy. Specifically,
I reconcile the puzzling evidence from the existing literature that according to the data,
contractionary monetary policy increases C&I lending (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993). I
start by examining the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on different deposit products
which allows me to shed new light on the effect of monetary policy on different asset classes.
1.4.1. The response of different deposit products to monetary policy
Aggregate evidence. I begin by focusing on the time-series evolution of the nominal short
rate and the aggregate deposit volumes. Figure 1.1 presents the relationship between the
level of the Fed funds rate and the share of bank financing coming from time deposits in
Panel (a) and savings deposits in Panel (b). Time deposits share of banking sector total
assets tracks very closely the Fed funds rate both in the trend and over the cycle. As the
rates have been falling, there has been a shift in banks’ funding mix away from time deposits
22

towards savings deposits. Time (savings) deposits and Fed funds rate also strongly positively
(negatively) co-move over time in terms of growth rates. Figure 1.8 presents the relationship
between the year-over-year growth rates of different deposit products and the year-over-year
change in the effective Fed funds rate. Panel (a) illustrates a strong co-movement between
the growth of time deposits and the Fed funds rate. It shows that when the Federal Reserve
raises rates, time deposits expand. Panel (b) presents the evidence for savings deposits. It
shows that savings deposit growth rates are negatively correlated with the Fed funds rate.
Local projections. Next, I investigate the response of different deposit products to the
monetary policy using the local projections exercise.18 Following Jordà (2005), I estimate
the deposit response of banks:

yb,t+h − yb,t−1 = αb,h + βh ∆Rt + δ1 Xt−1 + δ2 Bb,t−1 + ϵb,t+h ,

(1.6)

where yb,t denotes the log of the respective (time or savings) deposit product of bank b in
time t and h = 0, 1, ..., 16 (quarters). The vector Xt−1 controls for four lags of the GDP
growth, four lags of inflation, and Bb,t−1 controls for four lags of total assets and four lags of
the growth of the outcome variable. I also saturate the specification with bank fixed effects
estimated for each time-horizon h (αb,h ).
My coefficient of interest βh captures the effect of the monetary policy on the growth
rate of time or savings deposits. In the baseline specification, I use the changes in the
Fed funds rate, ∆Rt , as a measure of monetary policy. This choice is dictated by the
mechanism of the deposits channel of monetary policy, which I explore in this paper. As
argued by Drechsler et al. (2017), in the deposits channel any rate change, both expected and
unexpected, has an impact on the economy and thus represents an act of monetary policy.
18

For the analysis of the effects of monetary policy on bank balance sheets I focus on the sample period
1986-2008. I stop my sample right before the Global Financial Crisis in order to avoid the potentially
confounding effects stemming from the unconventional monetary policy actions introduced by the Federal
Reserve in response to the crisis.
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To overcome the concerns regarding the endogeneity of the Fed funds rate, the regressions
include business cycle controls (GDP growth and CPI inflation) as in line with the Taylor-type
interest rate rule logic. This is similar in spirit to the approach in Christiano et al. (1999).
As a robustness, I also use the monetary policy shocks identified using high frequency surprises
around policy announcements by Gertler and Karadi (2015) which I denote as ∆ft .
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.9 summarize the impulse responses of time deposits and
savings deposits, respectively, to the 100 basis point increase in the Fed funds rate over h
horizons. The results from the local projection exercise at the bank level are in line with
the aggregate time-series evidence. In particular, in response to contractionary monetary
policy banks experience an inflow of time deposits (Panel (a)) and an outflow of savings
deposits (Panel (b)). The behavior of different deposit products in response to changes in the
short-rate is consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy in Drechsler et al. (2017).
Specifically, the increase in the Fed funds rate is associated with a rise in the opportunity
cost of holding cash. As a result, banks face less competition from cash(-like products) in
providing liquid savings deposits which allows them to charge higher deposit spreads. As
discussed in Section 1.3, banks increase rates on savings deposits only very modestly in
response to a rise in Fed funds rate. As time deposits are illiquid, they directly compete with
other short-term less-liquid products whose interest rates follow the Fed funds rate (e.g.,
short term treasuries or other money market instruments). Hence, when the Federal Reserve
raises rates, banks raise time deposits rates by more as shown in Section 1.3. Consequently, as
savings deposits become relatively more expensive, depositors substitute away from deposits
in aggregate, and critically from (liquid) savings deposits to (illiquid) time deposits.
The results are robust to replacing Fed funds rate changes with monetary policy shocks
identified using high frequency surprises as in Gertler and Karadi (2015). Appendix Figure
1.21 plots the response of time deposits (Panel (a)), and savings deposits (Panel (b)). In
response to contractionary monetary policy shock, banks experience an outflow of savings
deposits and an inflow of time deposits.
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Taken together, the findings presented from both (i) the aggregate time series co-movement
with the Fed funds rate, and (ii) local projections exercise, consistently highlight the special
behavior of time deposits. While contractionary monetary policy leads to an outflow of
savings deposits, time deposits move in the opposite direction. As shown, this relates to the
fact that time deposits behave less like other (demandable) deposit products and instead they
resemble less liquid short-term money market instruments or T-bills. When the Fed funds
rate rises, depositors reallocate from liquid assets (demandable deposits) to more illiquid
assets that pay higher interest rates. This is findings is similar in spirit to the evidence on
the rise of shadow banks in Xiao (2020). This paper shows that such reallocation occurs also
inside the banks’ balance sheets.
1.4.2. The effects of monetary policy on business lending
While the overwhelming body of work has documented the bank-lending channel of monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jimenez et al.,
2012; Drechsler et al., 2017), the literature has also highlighted a puzzling result
in the data that business lending tends to rise following a contractionary monetary policy (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Den Haan et al., 2007;
Greenwald et al., 2021). In the section, I replicate the counter-intuitive result on business
lending and reconcile it with the evidence on time deposits.
First, I replicate the puzzling effect of monetary policy on bank C&I lending. To this end, I
estimate the local projections in line with Equation 1.6 and use the log level of C&I lending
by bank b in time t as the outcome variable (yb,t ). Panel (c) of figure 1.9 presents the
response of bank business lending to a 100 bp increase in the Fed funds rate. In contrast to
the conventional wisdom, the results show that monetary tightening is associated with an
increase in bank C&I lending – thereby confirming the existing puzzle in the data. Panel
(d) of figure 1.9 presents the response for bank security holdings. In contrast to C&I loans,
banks reduce their security holdings in response to higher Fed funds rate. This result is
consistent with the standard view of monetary transmission through bank balance sheets.
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The results are robust to using monetary policy shocks of Gertler and Karadi (2015) instead
of changes in the Fed funds rate directly. Appendix Figure 1.21 shows that in response to a
contractionary monetary policy shock, C&I loans increase while bank security holdings fall.
Second, I look inside the cross-section of banks. I follow the approach used in Section 1.3,
previously used for the analysis of rates to now examine the effect on quantities. Formally, I
estimate the bank-specific response of a log change in the quantity of a balance sheet variable
y of bank b in time t to Fed funds rate changes by running the following OLS regression:

∆log(yb,t ) = αb +

4
X

βb,τ ∆Rt−τ + δ1 Xt−1 + δ2 Bb,t−1 + ϵb,t .

(1.7)

τ =0

where the vector Xt−1 controls for four lags of GDP growth and four lags of inflation,
and Bb,t−1 controls for four lags of bank total assets. As in the local projection exercise,
the business cycle controls are used in line with the Taylor-type interest rate rule logic to
overcome the endogeneity concerns related to setting the Fed funds rate.
I start by estimating for each bank b the response of C&I lending to monetary policy and
P
denote the sum of bank-specific beta estimates, 4τ =0 βb,τ , as a C&I Loan Beta . Next, I
repeat the procedure using the log change in time deposits as an outcome variable to obtain
the Time Deposit Beta for each bank b. Finally, I sort banks into 100 bins based on their
Time Deposit Beta, compute the average C&I Loan Beta within each bin, and present a
scatter plot of the relationship between the two betas.
Figure 1.10 Panel (a) shows a relationship between the Time Deposit Beta vs. C&I Loans
Beta. The average response to monetary policy beta coefficients are positive suggesting that
as the Fed funds rate rises, banks increase both time deposits and business lending, consistent
with the evidence shown in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2. The cross-section also demonstrates a
strong positive correlation between the two betas. In other words, banks with a stronger
time deposit response also expand business lending by more, consistent with my previous
finding that banks fund C&I loans with time deposits.
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As a next step, I repeat the cross-sectional analysis to investigate the relationship between
savings deposits and security holdings. Figure 1.10 Panel (b) presents the results. In
contrast to Panel (a), the average effects are negative: when the Fed funds rate rises, savings
deposits and security holdings contract. Similarly to Panel (a), there is a very strong positive
relationship between the Savings Deposit Beta and Securities Beta. Thus, when the Federal
Reserve raises rates, banks that face stronger outflow of savings deposits also decrease security
holdings by more, in line with my previous result showing that banks use savings deposits to
finance security holdings.

1.5. What is the role of loan demand vs. loan supply?
While the aggregate and bank-level results established so far provide a useful suggestive
evidence, they are also subject to a common identification challenge – time deposit supply
can be responding to changes in bank business lending opportunities rather than directly to
monetary policy. If banks’ lending opportunities increase when the Federal Reserve raises the
rates, banks would make more loans to firms and therefore also collect more time deposits.
In this chapter, I present three pieces of evidence in support of the loan supply rather than
loan demand effects. First, I exploit the cross-sectional evidence on bank market power in
pricing and attracting small time deposits. Second, I present small business and syndicated
lending analyses that allow me to control for time-varying demand factors. Third, I show
the effects on both loan quantities and loan spreads.
1.5.1. Monetary policy, time deposits and market power
I start by presenting a cross-sectional analysis of bank market power in pricing and attracting
retail time deposits. Specifically, I measure bank market power in two ways.
First, I proxy for bank market power with Time Deposit Spread Beta as established in
Drechsler et al. (2017).19 Time deposit spread is defined as a difference between the effective
Fed funds rate and the time deposits rate. Similarly as in the previous analyses, I estimate
19
While Drechsler et al. (2017) document the importance of Deposit Spread Beta as a comprehensive
measure of market power in the (overall) deposit market, I specifically focus on the market power in the time
deposit market.
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Time Deposit Spread Beta as the bank-level sensitivity of time deposit spread to changes in
the Fed funds rate:

∆Time Deposit Spreadb,t = αb +

4
X

βb,τ ∆Rt−τ + ϵb,t ,

(1.8)

τ =0

and compare them with Time Deposit Quantity Beta across banks. This allows me to test
the hypothesis that when monetary policy tightens, banks with less market power (lower
Time Deposit Spread Beta) increase their spreads by less and experience higher inflow of
time deposits (compared to banks with more market power.)
Second, I proxy for bank market power in time deposit market with the Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index (HHI). I use branch-level data provided by the FDIC to compute the HHI for deposit
market by squaring deposit-market shares of all banks operating in a given county in a given
year, and averaging over the time. Using the cross-sectional variation in HHI as a proxy for
market power, I test the hypothesis that an increase in the Fed funds rate is associated with
a stronger increase in time deposit quantities and smaller increase in spreads for banks with
lower HHI (compared to banks with higher HHI).
Figure 1.11 presents the cross-sectional relationship between bank market power in local
deposit markets and the response of their time deposits quantity to increases in the Fed
funds rate. In this graph, I proxy for market power with Time Deposit Spread Beta. The
plot illustrates an inverse relationship between the market power and the response of time
deposit quantity (measured with Time Deposit Quantity Beta). In other words, following
an increase in the Fed funds rate, banks with less market power obtain more time deposits
than banks with more market power. In Appendix Figure 1.22 I also proxy for bank market
power with HHI in deposit markets. The results remain robust to this alternative measure of
bank market power.
I further formally investigate the role of market power on time deposit quantity response to
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monetary policy by estimating the following OLS regression:

∆yb,t = αb + γ∆Rt + ζ(∆Rt × Market Powerb ) + δ1 Xt−1 + δ2 Bb,t−1 + ϵb,t .

(1.9)

where: Market Powerb ) is a measure of bank market power in deposit markets proxied by
either Time Deposit Spread Beta or Bank HHI. Table 1.4 reports the results. First, in
Column (1) I examine the effect on the change in time deposit spreads. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient suggests that when the Fed funds rate increases, banks
with higher HHI increase time deposits spreads by more. This evidence provides further
assurance that Time Deposit Spread Beta is indeed a consistent measure of bank market
power in time deposit markets. Column (2) presents the average response of time deposits
(quantities) to the change in the Fed funds rate. In line with the previous evidence, a rise in
the Fed funds rate is associated with an increase in time deposit volumes.
Columns (3) and (4) exploit the Time Deposit Spread Beta as a source of heterogeneity of
the bank market power. The interaction coefficient of ∆Rt and Time Deposit Spread Beta
is negative and statistically significant and the effect does not attenuate after controlling
for time fixed effects in Column (4). This suggests that when the Federal Reserve raises
rates, time deposits increase by less for banks with higher market power (proxied with high
Time Deposit Spread Beta). In Columns (5) and (6), I present the results using deposit HHI
as a measure of market power. Similarly to the first market power proxy, the negative and
statistically significant interaction coefficient demonstrates that in response to the monetary
tightening, time deposits expand by less for banks with higher HHI. Taken together, the
presented evidence supports the hypothesis that when the Fed funds rate rises, banks with
less market power increase their time deposit spreads by less and experience a larger inflow
of time deposits compared to banks with more market power.
Finally, I use the heterogeneity in bank market power in deposits market to investigate the
effect on C&I lending. To this end, I estimate the differential effect of monetary policy on
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C&I lending depending on bank Time Deposit Spread Beta. In particular, I use Specification
1.9 with the log change in C&I loans as a dependent variable.
Table 1.5 Panel (a) presents the results. Column (1) confirms the evidence established
through local projections that C&I loans increase in response to monetary policy tightening.
Column (2) reports the heterogeneous effect using the cross-sectional variation in Time
Deposit Spread Beta. It shows that banks with lower market power in local deposit markets
increase their business lending more strongly. The magnitude of the effect does not attenuate
even after introducing time fixed effects in Column (3). Overall, these results show that
deposit market power impacts the sensitivity of C&I loans to monetary policy which is the
first piece of evidence in support of the role of credit supply.
1.5.2. Time-varying demand factors in small business and syndicated lending
To further disentangle the role of credit supply from credit demand, this section uses loan-level
data that allow me to better control for time-varying demand for credit with fixed effects.
Small business lending. I start with the small business lending data and estimate the
following regression:

log(New Small Business Creditb,c,t ) = αb,c + αc,t + ζ(∆Rt × Market Powerb ) + ϵb,c,t , (1.10)

where the dependent variable denotes a log of new small business credit by bank b in county c
in year t. Similarly to the analysis presented in Section 1.2.3, I saturate the specification with
bank-county and county-time fixed effects. Notably, the county-time fixed effects allow me to
compare lending behavior by different banks facing similar lending opportunities within the
same county. I exploit the heterogeneity in the market power at the cross-section of banks
measured by the Time Deposit Spread Beta to analyze the difference in responses of bank
lending to monetary policy.
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Table 1.5 Panel (b) summarizes the results. In order to estimate the average effect of
monetary policy on small business loans, specifications in Columns (1) and (2) are estimated
without county-time fixed effects. Instead, I control for aggregate economy business cycle
(through lags of GDP growth and inflation) and local, county-level business cycle variation
(through lagged changes in county-level wages and employment as well as lagged county-level
deposit growth). Column (1) shows that the average effect of monetary policy on credit is
positive: higher Fed funds rate is associated with an increase in new small business lending,
consistent with the findings obtained in Panel (a) for the total bank-level C&I lending.
Column (2) finds that the effects is stronger for bank with less market power. Column (3)
introduces county-time fixed effects to absorb any county-time variation. The estimates with
county-time fixed effect are quantitatively very close to the results in Column (2). This
suggests that even after controlling for county-level demand for business credit, banks with
less market power in deposit markets, that are able to attract more time deposits when
interest rates increase, extend more new small business loans.
Syndicated lending. As a next step, I examine the effect of time deposits and monetary
policy on syndicated lending using Dealscan data. The focus on syndicated lending allows
me to introduce sector-time or even firm-time fixed effects that absorb any sector or firm
time-variation that can drive demand for credit. Equation 1.11 summarizes the set up:

log(New Syndicated Creditb,l,f,t ) = αb +αf,t +ζ(∆Rt ×MktPowerb )+γXb,l,f,t +ϵb,l,f,t , (1.11)

where the outcome variable denotes the log of newly issued syndicated loans l to a firm f by
bank b at time t. Following the approach in Chodorow-Reich (2014), I use the information on
the syndicate structure to assign loan shares to lead arrangers and participants. The regression
is saturated with time-varying macroeconomic controls (four lags of GDP and inflation),
time-varying bank controls (total assets), time-varying firm controls (size, current assets,
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sales growth) as well as bank, loan-type, loan-purpose and rating fixed effects. In addition,
in Columns (3) and (4) I introduce sector-time and firm-time fixed effects, respectively. This
allows me to absorb time-varying sectoral demand in Column (3) and time-varying firm
demand for credit in Column (4). To this end, I compare the behavior of two banks with
different time deposits market power (proxied by Time Deposit Spread Beta) lending to the
same sector (or firm) when monetary policy tightens.
Table 1.6 reports the results. Column (1) shows that when the Fed funds rate rises, banks
on average increase syndicated lending. Columns (2), (3) and (4) exploit the Time Deposit
Spread Beta heterogeneity at the cross-section of banks. Negative and statistically significant
interaction coefficients demonstrate that when the Fed funds rate rises, the lending response
is stronger for banks with less market power in deposits market even after controlling for
credit demand through sector-time or firm-time fixed effects. These findings are consistent
with the previously documented aggregate evidence as well as the evidence from the small
business lending.
1.5.3. Prices and quantities
Aggregate evidence. In this section, I examine the effect of monetary policy not only on
quantity of business credit but also on its price measured with C&I loan spreads. C&I loan
spread is computed as a C&I effective rate minus the effective Fed funds rate.20 As before,
I start by focusing on the aggregate evidence. Figure 1.12 plots the evolution of C&I loan
spread against the year-over-year C&I loan growth.
Figure 1.12 reveals striking negative relationships between the C&I loan spread and the C&I
loan growth. Strong negative relationship between C&I quantities and prices suggests that
the bank loan supply effects play an important role.
Figure 1.13 further illustrates the relationship between loan spreads and the Fed funds rate.
Panel (a) shows a remarkably strong negative relationship between C&I loans spread and the
Fed funds rate. In addition, we can observe an upward trend in the C&I loan spread, which
20

For details about the C&I effective rate, its definition and time evolution, see Section 1.3.1.
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increased from around 2.5 pp at the beginning of 1990s to 4 pp in 2015. In Panel (a), I use
effective C&I rate from Call reports to construct the spread. In order to address a potential
worry that the increase in spread can be associated with an increase in riskiness of banks’
loan portfolio (banks change the composition of borrowers towards riskier firms), in Panel
(b) I control for the riskiness of firms by using the data from Dealscan. Specifically, I plot
the spread only for new loans issued to speculative grade or unrated firms (the highest risk
category). Similarly to the C&I loan spread from Call Reports, the Dealscan based spread
for new loans exhibits an upward trend (increases from around 1.5 pp at the beginning of
1990s to around 2.5 pp in 2015) and a strong negative relationship with the Fed funds rate.21 .
Further, Appendix Figure 1.23 plots the evolution of spreads on C&I loans and 1-year
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). It shows that C&I loan spreads co-move strongly with
spreads on other floating-rate loans products such as ARMs. This finding is consistent
with bank interest-rate sensitivity matching of assets and deposit. Furthermore, the similar
sensitivity of different loan products lends support to the supply effects rather than demand
effects as it is unlikely that different types of borrowers (of different loan products) would
respond in such a remarkably consistent manner.
To summarize, I find that when monetary policy rates fall, C&I loan spreads increase and that
high loan spreads are associated with low C&I loan growth. These findings are inconsistent
with predictions from models with credit demand shocks. According to the demand story,
a sudden fall in the Fed funds rate should shift the demand outwards which would lead to
both higher spreads and higher loan volumes. Instead, the presented evidence illustrates that
high interest spreads are associated with lower C&I volumes which lends support to credit
supply shock-based models (similarly to Mian et al., 2017). The aggregate evidence suggests
that a fall in the Fed funds rate leads to an inward shift of the C&I credit supply which is
accompanied with a decrease in loan quantities and increase in spreads. In what follows, I
examine the relationships further using the local projections and cross-section of banks.
21

This evidence is consistent with the results in Roberts and Schwert (2020) who show that interest rates
are inversely related to the cash flow rights and positively related to the control rights granted to creditors
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Local projections. Next, I investigate the response of C&I loan spreads to monetary policy
using the local projection exercise following Equation 1.6. Figure 1.14 Panel (a) shows the
impulse response to 1 percentage point increase in the Fed funds rate for C&I loan spreads
based on Call reports data. In line with the aggregate evidence, monetary tightening is
associated with a decrease in loans spread. This result together with a positive response of
loan quantities (as shown in Figure 1.9 Panel(c)) provides an additional evidence in support
of the role of bank loan supply.
As a next step, I use Dealscan data on new business loans to further investigate the effect
of contractionary monetary policy on business loan spreads. The benefit of Dealscan data
is that it allows me to observe rating categories and thus either control for or examine the
heterogeneity based on borrower riskiness (rating). I start by controlling for riskiness with
rating category fixed effects and estimate local projections as follows:

Loan Spreadr,t+h − Loan Spreadr,t−1 = αh + αr + βh ∆Rt + γXt−1 + ϵt+h ,

(1.12)

where LoanSpreadr,t denotes an average spread of loans at rating category r.
Figure 1.14 Panel (b) reports the results. It shows that in response to a 100 bps increase in
the Fed funds rate, loan spreads fall. In Appendix Figure 1.24, I further differentiate the
effect by rating categories. For the group of the safest borrowers in Panel (a) measured as
AAA–A rated, I do not find effects that would be statistically different from zero. Panel
(b) reports the effect for riskier BBB-rated firms and Panel (c) shows the effects for the
speculative grade and non-rated firms. While both Panels (b) and (c) find that spreads drop
following a contractionary monetary policy, the results are the strongest for the riskier firms
in Panel (c).
Cross-sectional analysis. Finally, I exploit the cross-sectional variation in bank market
power in deposit markets to estimate the effect of changes in Fed funds rate on loan spreads
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by running the following regression:

Loan Spreadb,l,f,t = αb + αs,t + ζ(∆Rt × MktPowerb ) + γXb,l,f,t + ϵb,l,f,t .

(1.13)

The regression is saturated with time-varying macroeconomic controls (four lags of GDP and
inflation), time-varying bank controls (total assets), time-varying firm controls (size, current
assets, sales growth) as well as bank, loan-type and loan-purpose fixed effects. In addition, I
control for loan riskiness with rating fixed effects and in Column (3) I introduce sector-time
fixed effects that control for time-varying demand for credit at the sector level.22
Table 1.7 summarizes the results. Column (1) reports the average effects showing that when
the Fed funds rate rises, spreads fall, consistent with the aggregate and local projection
evidence. In Column (2), I exploit the heterogeneity in banks’ market power in deposit
markets using Time Deposit Spread Beta as a proxy. The results show that the effects are
stronger for banks with less market power (low Time Deposit Spread Beta). Finally, Column
(3) introduces sector-time fixed effects to control for time-varying demand at the sector
level. The estimate of the interaction coefficient remains positive, statistically significant and
quantitatively similar to Column (2).
In summary, the loan quantity and loan spread results in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 further corroborate
that even at the cross-section of banks, Fed funds rate hikes are associated with higher
volume of C&I loans and lower spreads, with the effects stronger for banks with less market
power (that are able to attract more time deposits). This cross-sectional evidence provides
additional support in favor of the supply effects.

1.6. Evidence from other asset classes
Local projections. In this section, I investigate whether my findings are special to the
case of C&I loans or whether they could be generalized to other floating-rate asset classes. I
22

The loan-spread regressions do not allow to control for firm-time fixed effects because spread on the loan
at the facility level is the same for all banks in the syndicate and in most cases firms only receive one loan
per period.
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revisit the local projections exercise as presented in Equation 1.6 to examine the effect of
monetary policy on a range of other adjustable and fixed rate assets. Specifically, I consider
the following six asset classes: securities (short-term and fixed-term long-term), real estate
loans (adjustable-rate and floating-rate), and other loans (adjustable-rate and fixed-rate).
Figure 1.15 presents the results. Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the results for short-term (less
than three-year maturity) and fixed-rate long-term security holdings, respectively.23 The
impulse response functions show that following a 100 bps increase in the Fed funds rate,
banks increase their short-term securities holding and decrease the size of the long-term
security portfolio. Similarly, to Panel (a) and previous evidence on C&I loans (as examined
in Panel (c) of Figure 1.9), Panels (c) and (e) show the positive response of adjustable-rate
loans (mortgages and other loans) with respect to the contractionary monetary policy. In
contrast, Panels (b), (d) and (f) illustrate a negative effect for all fixed-rate asset classes.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that not only (floating-rate) C&I loans but also
other asset classes with interest-rate sensitive cash flows respond positively to Fed funds rate
increases. Interest-rate insensitive assets, on the other hand, fall when the Federal Reserve
raises rates. These findings demonstrate that C&I loans are not special when it comes to
the sensitivity to monetary policy rates. Other assets, that share the same interest-rate
sensitivity characteristics, behave similarly.
Cross-sectional analysis. Appendix Figure 1.25 highlights that the evidence from crosssectional analysis of C&I loans and security holdings (Figure 1.10) also holds for other assets.
Panels (a), (c), (e) of Appendix Figure 1.25 show that for interest-rate sensitive assets, there
is a strong positive relationship between the Time Deposits Quantity Beta and the Quantity
Betas of the asset class with interest-rate sensitive cash flows. This means that banks with
larger inflow of time deposits increase their holdings of short-term (floating-rate) securities,
adjustable-rate mortgages and other floating-rate loans. This pattern strongly resembles
23
Call Reports data on the repricing maturity of bank assets starts only in 1997. Thus, I estimate the
impulse responses of different asset classes for up to 8 quarters only. The amount of data is insufficient to
estimate the responses for longer horizons (beyond 8 quarters).
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the striking positive relationship in Figure 1.10 Panel (a) for C&I loans. In contrast, Panels
(b), (d) and (f) illustrate a strong positive correlation between the Savings Deposits Beta
and the Quantity Betas of the respective interest-rate insensitive assets. To summarize, the
presented cross-sectional evidence reveals that banks match interest rate (in)sensitive assets
with interest rate (in)sensitive deposits.

1.7. Falling interest rates and investment
So far, I have documented that falling interest rates lead to a lower supply of business
lending by banks. As a next step, I examine the effects of lower interest rates on business
investment. Figure 1.16 plots the time series evolution of business investment normalized
by firms’ gross operating surplus (profits) and business loans normalized by non-financial
sector debt. It shows that the two series very closely co-move with one another. They were
increasing from 1960s until the beginning of 1980s and declining over the last four decades. I
document a similar pattern if I rescale investment to non-financial sector debt (Panel (a) of
Appendix Figure 1.26) or business sector value added (Panel (c) of Appendix Figure 1.26).
The observed decline in investment over the past decades and the potential reasons for it have
been at the forefront of a recent academic debate (e.g., Crouzet and Eberly, forthcoming;
Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2016). In this paper, I argue that a lower supply of lending to
firms induced by falling rates contributed to the decline in business investment.
Figure 1.17 focuses on the dynamics. Panel (a) plots the year-over-year growth of business
investment and C&I loans. It finds a strong positive relationship (with a correlation of 0.6).
Panel (b) plots the dynamics of investment and corporate bonds and finds negative weak
correlation between the two variables. The weak correlation of business investment and bond
financing is consistent with the fact that only a small fraction of firms has access to the bond
market, primarily large and high rated firms.24
In light of this aggregate evidence, I test two hypotheses regarding the effect of changes in
interest rates on investment at the firm level.25 First, when the Fed funds rate falls, firms
24
25

Among publicly traded firms in Compustat, only 20% of firms have bond market access.
For the rest of this analysis, the credit data are from the syndicated lending in Dealscan and bond
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solely relying on banks experience a cut in loan supply and decrease investment. Second,
when the Fed lowers rates, firms with bond market access substitute a decrease in bank
loan supply with bond market financing. To this end, I proxy for the access to bond market
financing with the availability of firm rating.26
I start by running the following regression:



yf,t = αf + β1 ∆Rt × (Rating Existsf,t−1 = 0) + β2 ∆Rt × (Rating Exists

f,t−1


= 1) +

+ γFf,t−1 + ϵf,t . (1.14)
where the dependent variable is the log of new external financing a firm f receives in time
t. I, specifically, examine two types on news financing: new bank loans and new bonds,
respectively. In the regressions, I either examine the effect of monetary policy measured by
changes in the Fed funds rate (∆Rt ) or monetary policy surprises (∆ft ). Dummy variable
Rating Existsf,t−1 takes the value of one if the firm has had a rating in period t − 1, and
zero otherwise. My main coefficients of interest (β1 and β2 ) examine the heterogeneous
response of firms with and without rating to the Fed funds rate changes. Finally, I control for
firm time invariant characteristics with firm fixed effects and introduce additional firm-time
controls such as sales growth, size and current assets as a share of total assets.
Table 1.8 presents the results. Columns (1)–(4) focus on new bank loans. Columns (1) and
(2) revisit the average lending effects: softer monetary policy (measured with a cut in the Fed
funds rate in Column (1) or an expansionary monetary surprise in Column (2)) is associated
with a decrease in new bank loans at the firm level. Column (3) splits firms into two groups:
with and without rating. It finds that for both types of firms, the coefficient is positive and
statistically significant and I can rule out that two magnitudes are statistically different.
Column (4) repeats the heterogeneous analysis using monetary surprises and finds similar
financing is from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).
26
As a robustness, I also proxy for access to bond market financing with firm’s previous borrowing through
the bond market and the results are consistent.
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results. To summarize, the presented evidence shows that when the Fed funds rate falls, all
firms relying on banks (both with and without bond market access) experience a cut in loan
supply.
Columns (5) and (6) examine the effect on monetary policy on new bond financing. Since
the new bond borrowing occurs vastly for firms with existing rating, I only estimate the
effects for rated firms. The negative and statistically significant estimates demonstrate that
when the Fed funds rate falls, firms increase their bond market financing. Taken together,
the results illustrate that when the Federal Reserve cuts rates, firms without the access to
bond market suffer from a decrease in bank credit. To better understand the effect for firms
with bond financing, I next present the following within-firm analysis:

log(1+New Debti,f,t ) = αf,t + β(∆Rt × Bondi ) + γBondi + δFf,t−1 + ϵi,f,t ,

(1.15)

where the outcome variable denotes the log of new external debt of type i (where i is either
a bank loan or a bond) taken by firm f at time t. Most importantly, the specification uses
firm-time fixed effects that allow me to control for time-varying firm-level demand for external
financing. The main coefficient of interest (β) thus estimates the differential response of
bond financing with respect to bank financing within the same firm f at the same time t.27
Table 1.9 summarizes the results. Similarly to Table 1.8, I find that in response to lower Fed
funds rate, bank credit falls (estimate of ∆Rt in Column (1) is positive) and the difference
in the reliance of bank vs. bonds increases (beta estimate of the interaction coefficient from
Equation 1.15 is negative). This holds even after controlling for firm-time fixed effects in
Column (2). The results are economically and statistically relevant both when the monetary
policy is measured with the Fed funds rate in Columns (1)–(2) and high-frequency monetary
policy shocks in Columns (3)–(4). Taken together, the results suggests that conditioning on
27

In the regressions without firm-time fixed effects, I include time-varying firm controls, i.e. sales growth,
size, current assets as a share of total assets, as well as macro controls, i.e. four lags of quarterly GDP growth
and CPI inflation.
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firm demand for external financing (through firm-time fixed effects), lower interest rates are
associated with more financing received by firms through the bond market. This indicates
that firms with bond market access substitute towards bond financing when experiencing
lower supply of bank credit due to lower interest rates.
Finally, I study the aggregate credit and investment effects at the firm-level. This allows me
to understand what happens to overall (bank and bond financing) as the Fed funds rate falls.
Equation 1.16 summarizes the set-up:



yf,t = αf + β1 ∆Rt × (Rating Existsf,t−1 = 0) + β2 ∆Rt × (Rating Exists

f,t−1


= 1) +

+ γFf,t−1 + ϵf,t . (1.16)

First, I examine the effect on total firm credit. The dependent variable denotes a log change
in total debt (bank and bond debt) of firm f in time t. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.10
present the results. The estimates show that when the Fed funds rate falls, firms without
bond access (measured as firms without rating) suffer from a decrease in total debt. For
firms with access to the bond market, I find that the change in debt is zero. In other words,
firms with bond market access substitute a decrease in bank loan supply with bond market
financing.
In the remainder of Table 1.10, I present the results on the effect of monetary policy on
firm investment. Columns (3)–(4) report the effect on a log change in capital of firm f in
time t.28 Columns (5)–(6) show the effect on firm investment (CAPX) as a share of lagged
capital. In both cases, I find that when Fed cuts interest rates, firms solely relying on banks
(without bond market access) experience a cut in loan supply and consequently they decrease
investment. Instead, firms with bond market access substitute a decrease in bank loan supply
with market financing and their investment remains unaffected.
These findings document the importance of interest rate changes (through bank time deposits)
28

Capital is computed using perpetual inventory method as in Ottonello and Winberry (2020).
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on supply of business lending and investment. When firms do not have access to the bond
market, this channel bears real consequences. A 1 pp decrease in the Fed funds rate is
associated with a 1.9% cut in firm credit and a 1% drop in firm investment (on impact) for
firms without access to bond market.
Finally, I examine whether the negative investment effects of softer monetary policy are
indeed related to a lower amount of credit. For this purpose, I estimate firm-specific sensitivity
of credit and investment to interest rate changes, by running the following regression:

i
yf,t
= αf +

4
X

i
βf,τ
∆Rt−τ + γFf,t−1 + ϵf,t ,

(1.17)

τ =0

where I first use the change in log of firm debt ∆log(Debtf,t ) as my outcome variable to
estimate firm level sensitivity to monetary policy and I denote it as Firm Debt Beta. Second,
I repeat the estimation using ∆log(Capitalf,t ) as a dependent variable to estimate Firm
Investment Beta. Finally, I sort firm into 100 bins based on their Firm Debt Beta and plot
the relationship between the Firm Debt Beta and Firm Investment Beta in a scatter plot.
Appendix Figure 1.27 illustrates the results. It shows that the response of firm debt and
firm investment to Fed funds rate changes are strongly, positively correlated. Taken together,
my results suggest that the investment effects of monetary policy are strongly related to
the credit effects. This result is consistent with the strong co-movement between bank loan
financing and investment observed in aggregate data.

1.8. The effects of lower interest rates on new firm creation
Time deposits and business loans have been on a decline since 1980s. Panel (a) of Figure
1.1 documents this secular trend.29 The U.S. banking sector has been running out of time
deposits and business loans both in terms of a share to non-financial sector debt (Panel (a))
and total banking sector assets (Panel (b)). At the same time, a new firm creation has also
29

Similar pattern holds if business loans and time deposits are normalized by total non-financial sector
debt as presented in Appendix Figure 1.28.

41

been falling over the last four decades (see e.g., Decker et al., 2016). Figure 1.18 Panel (a)
illustrates a strong positive correlation between time deposits and jobs created in new firms.
Panel (b) shows consistent co-movement for the slowdown in time deposits and firm creation.
Understanding the role of a decline in time deposits and business lending in the decline of
firm creation is particularly important given that banks are the main source of financing for
small and young firms.
In this section, I test the hypothesis that lower interest rates contributed to a decline in firm
creation. Specifically, I examine the role of time deposits in the transmission mechanism
through bank balance sheets. Lower Fed funds rate led to a decrease in time deposits which
serve as a key source of funding for business loans. As supply of bank credit to businesses
contracted, new firms creation deteriorated.
To study the effect of monetary policy on firm creation, I exploit county-time panel data
on new firm creation and additional heterogeneity across industries with respect to their
external finance dependence. I construct a Bartik-style instrument that allows me to measure
an ex-ante exposure to time deposit growth on a county level:
∆log(Time Depositsc,t ) =

X


∆log(Time Depositsb,t ) × Lending Shareb,c,t−1 ,

(1.18)

b

that computes an average of the log change in (national) time deposits of bank b from quarter
t − 1 to t weighted by the lending share of the bank b in county c in the previous year.
My analysis focuses on both short-run and long-run effects. In the short-run, I examine
whether counties exposed to banks with stronger time deposit growth have more new firms
created within the same quarter. In the long run, I test the hypothesis that a downward
trend in firm creation is stronger for counties more exposed to banks with (i) a larger decline
in time deposits and (ii) a higher ratio of time deposits to total assets.
Short-run analysis. I start by examining the pooled data on new firm creation across
counties and time, and time deposit growth of banks operating in the county. Appendix
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Figure 1.29 presents a strong positive relationship between the new firm creation and time
deposit growth.30 Motivated by this evidence, I examine the relationship between time
deposits and new firm creation by estimating the following OLS regression:
log(New Firmsc,t ) = αc + αt + β∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 ) + δXc,t−1 + ϵc,t ,

(1.19)

where the outcome variable denotes the log number of new firms established in county c
in period t. I exploit the variation in county-level exposure to time deposit growth, as
defined in Equation 1.18. In addition, the regression absorbs any time-invariant county and
time-varying aggregate characteristics by introducing county and time fixed effects. Finally,
across all specifications, I control for a change in per capita income of the county and change
in population and I progressively introduce additional county-time control variables discussed
below.
Table 1.11 summarizes the results. Regardless of the specification, all three columns show
that the effect of county-level time deposit growth is positive, statistically significant and
the magnitude does not attenuate.31 This finding shows that counties exposed to banks
with stronger time deposit growth have more new firms created. Using baseline estimates in
Column (2), a one standard deviation increase in time deposits growth is associated with a
2% increase in firm creation.
To further corroborate the findings, in Appendix Table 1.17, I replace the Bartik-type
measure of county-level deposit growth with the county-time level Time Deposit Spread Beta
interacted with the change in the Fed funds rate. Consistently to the baseline, I find that
when the Fed funds rate rises, counties exposed to banks with low market power in time
deposit markets have more new firms created (after controlling for local deposits growth).
30

While Appendix Figure 1.29 shows the results on pooled county-time data, Appendix Figure 1.30 confirms
the same pattern at different points in time (exploiting only the county cross-section).
31
Column (1) controls for a change in savings deposits of banks operating in county c, and this control
variable has no effect. In Column (2), I instead control for a change in total local deposits and the control is
positive suggesting that counties with stronger local deposit growth also have more firm creation. In Column
(3), I split the deposits into local time deposits and local savings deposits.
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Finally, I exploit additional industry-level heterogeneity to examine whether the effect are
stronger for industries that are more reliant on external financing. To this end, I estimate
the following regression:

log(New Firmsi,c,t ) = αi,c + αt + β1 ∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 )


+ β2 ∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 ) × Hi + δXc,t−1 + ϵc,t , (1.20)
where log(New Firmsi,c,t ) denotes the log number of new firms created in industry i in county
c in time t. In addition to the measure of the change in county’s time deposits (based on
Equation 1.18), I examine the heterogeneity based on the industry i’s dependence on external
finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Gilje, 2019) and I denote it as Hi .
Table 1.12 presents the results. Column (1) confirms the average effect, i.e. counties with
the largest increase in time deposits are also witnessing the strongest new firm creation.
Columns (2) and (3) split the firms by industry. In Column (2), I use the External Finance
index that ranges between -1 and 1. The estimates show that the effect of time deposits
on firm creation is stronger for industries with larger dependence on external finance. In
Column (3), I introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the industry is
associated with high dependence on external finance (the index has positive values), and zero
otherwise. Here, only the interaction coefficient remains positive and statistically significant.
This emphasizes that the effect of time deposits on firm creation is fully driven by industries
with high external finance dependence.
Long-run analysis. Figure 1.19 looks at the long-run changes (1995–2015) in deposits vs.
C&I loans as a share of banking sector total assets at the cross-section of banks. It highlights
two facts. First, effectively all growth rates are negative which shows that the importance of
time deposits (on liability side) and C&I loans (on asset side) has been shrinking. Second,
there is a strikingly strong positive correlation between the decline of the two variables. This
further confirms that banks are matching business loans with time deposits and a decline in
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time deposits had triggered a decline in C&I loans.
Next, I examine the link between ex-ante reliance on time deposits in 1995 and the long run
trends in time deposit and C&I loans at the bank-level by running the following regression:

Time Deposits
∆log(yb,2015−1995 ) = α + β
Total Assets


where:



Time Deposits
Total Assets




+ ϵb .

(1.21)

b,1995

is the share of bank financing obtained from time deposits

b,1995

in 1995, and ∆log(yb,2015−1995 ) denotes either the long-run change in time deposits or C&I
loans for bank b between 1995 and 2015. First, in Table 1.13 Column (1), I analyze the
relationship between ex-ante share of time deposits and the dynamics in time deposits. The
negative and statistically significant estimate shows that banks with higher ex-ante time
deposit share experienced a larger decline in time deposits. Second, Table 1.13 Column
(2) focuses on the effect for a long-run change in the C&I loans issued by bank b in 2015
vs. 1995. Similarly to the case of the deposit dynamics, the negative estimates point out
to the fact that banks with higher ex-ante dependence on time deposits suffered from the
sharpest decline in C&I loans. Third, Column (3) puts the two pieces together and shows
the estimates when I regress the C&I loan growth on time deposits growth. The positive
estimates reveal that bank which lose the most time deposits also cut C&I lending by the
most.
The final missing piece is to examine the long run effect on firm creation. Table 1.14 presents
the long run effect by reporting coefficients from the regression:
∆log(New Firmsc,2015−1995 ) = α + βTime Deposit Exposurec + γXc,2015−1995 + ϵc , (1.22)
where I measure county-level exposure to the decline in time deposits, Time Deposit Exposurec ,
in two ways. In Column (1), I rely on average of bank ex-ante shares of time deposits weighted
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by their county lending shares:


Time Deposits
Total Assets


c,1995

!
X  Time Deposits 
=
× Lending Shareb,c,1995 . (1.23)
Total Assets b,1995
b

The negative and statistically significant estimate shows that counties with higher ex-ante
dependence on time deposits suffered from the largest drop in new firm creation. In Column
(2), I define county-level exposure to the decline in time deposits using a weighted average of
long-run changes in time deposits of banks operating in county c:
∆log(Time Depositsc,2015−1995 ) =

X


∆log(Time Depositsb,2015−1995 ) × Lending Shareb,c,1995 .

b

(1.24)

The findings demonstrate that over the 1995–2015 period, counties with banks experiencing
the largest outflow of time deposits also experienced the strongest fall in new firm creation.
Taken together, these results suggest that a decline in interest rates and a resulting outflow
of time deposits played an important role in the decline in new firm creation observed over
the past decades.

1.9. Model
To rationalize and quantify the empirical results, I develop a quantitative macro-finance
general equilibrium model with banks exposed to liquidity and interest rate risk. In the
model, there are five main types of agents: households, banks, financially constrained firms,
unconstrained firms and monetary authority.
1.9.1. Households
The representative household maximizes utility over consumption, Ct , liquidity services, Lt ,
and labor, Nt (as in Galí (2015); Walsh (2017)):

U0 = E0

∞
X
t=0

βt

Zt1−γ − 1 Nt1+ψN
−
1−γ
1 + ψN
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!
(1.25)

where Zt is a CES aggregator of consumption and liquidity:

Zt =

ρ−1
ρ

λ C Ct


+ (1 − λC )

Lt
Pt

ρ
 ρ−1 ! ρ−1
ρ

(1.26)

Household can save using four types of assets: money, Mt , savings deposits, Ds,t , time
deposits, DT,t , and short-term risk-free nominal bond, Xt . These assets differ in the return
and amount of liquidity they provide, as described below. Household’s budget constraint is
given by:
Pt Ct +Mt +DS,t +DT,1 +Xt = Mt +DS,t−1 (1 + rS,t−1 )+DT,t−1 (1 + rT,t−1 )+Xt (1 + ft−1 )+Wt Nt
(1.27)

where: rS,t−1 and rT,t−1 are nominal deposit rates on savings deposits and time deposits,
respectively. Nominal bonds pay a short-term rate, ft−1 , set by the central bank. It is useful
to define prices of deposits and money. We can define the price of deposit products as a
deposit spread, si,t = ft − ri,t for i = {S, T }. The price of money is the foregone nominal
interest rate ft .
Liquidity services are derived from money, savings deposits, and time deposits.32 Time
deposit is the least liquid asset while money is the most liquid asset.33 Savings deposit is
assumed to be a closer substitute for money than time deposit. The three assets provide
imperfectly substitutable services according to a CES aggregator:

 ϵ
ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ−1
ϵ
ϵ
Lt = (1 − λT ) LH,t + λT DT,t
where:
LH,t


 ξ
ξ−1
ξ−1
ξ−1
ξ
ξ
= λS DS,t + (1 − λS ) Mt

(1.28)

(1.29)

denotes the liquidity services provided by assets of highest liquidity, money and savings
deposits. ξ denotes the elasticity of substitution between money and savings deposits, while
32
33

For simplicity but without the loss of generality, I assume that nominal bonds provide no liquidity.
Money can be associated with not only currency but also demandable deposits and checking accounts.

47

ϵ is the elasticity of substitution between time deposits and highly liquid assets. This
formulation of liquidity services allows for different level of substitution within highly liquid
assets (money and savings deposits) and between highly liquid assets and time deposits. As a
result, it can allow for savings deposits to be a closer substitute for money than time deposit.
While money does not earn any interest, savings and time deposits pay the interest rate of
rS,t and rT,t , respectively. The deposit rates will be set by the profit maximizing bank that
will take the household’s demand curve for deposit products as given. We can define the
price of deposit products as a deposit spread, si,t = ft − ri,t for i = {S, T }. The price of
money is the foregone nominal interest rate ft .
1.9.2. Banks
Banks use net worth, savings deposits and time deposits to invest in two types assets. First,
banks can lend to firms through long-term, illiquid floating rate loans. Second, banks can
invest in long-term fixed-rate government bonds. There are two frictions affecting banks.
First, banks are subject to dividend adjustment costs (e.g. Begenau, 2020; Elenev et al.,
2021). As a result, banks have an incentive to smoothen their dividends and are averse to
variations in Net Interest Margin. This assumption is consistent with Floyd et al. (2015),
who show that banks have a higher and more stable propensity to pay dividends. Second,
liquid savings deposits are subject to bank-idiosyncratic withdrawal shock, ωb,t , in which
case ωb,t DS,t savings deposits are withdrawn.34 Upon the withdrawal shock, bank needs
to rapidly liquidate their assets to satisfy the outflow of savings deposits. While liquid
government bonds can be sold at a market value, selling illiquid business loans results in
a fire-sale discount. Specifically, only a fraction 1 − χ of the value of a business loan can
be recovered quickly enough to absorb a funding shock. Because of the fire sale, it takes
1/(1 − χ) dollars of the business loan to meet one dollar of redemption, and each dollar sold
incurs χ dollars of fire sale losses. The modeling of withdrawal shocks and fire sales has its
roots in the banking literature that has extensively studied the liquidity transformation of
34

The withdrawal shock is following a distribution with the CDF denoted by F (ωb,t ).
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banks (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Drechsler et al., 2018).
Banks solve the following problem:

Jb (Gt , Bc,t , DS,t , DT,t , ωb,t ) = −

χ
max [ωb,t DS,t − qG,t Gt , 0] + Vb (Gt , Bc,t , DS,t , DT,t )
1−χ
(1.30)

where:
Vb (Gt , Bc,t , DS,t , DT,t ) =

max

{db,t + Et Mt,t+1 Jb (Gt+1 , Bc,t+1 , DS,t+1 , DT,t+1 , ωb,t+1 )}

db,t , Bc,t+1 , Gt+1
rS,t+1 , rT,t+1

subject to the balance sheet constraint:
db,t + ϕb,d (db,t ) + qB,t (Bc,t+1 − (1 − ηB ) Bc,t ) + qG,t (Gt+1 − (1 − ηG ) Gt ) + DS,t + DT,t =
(ft + ηB ) Bc,t + (c + ηG ) Gt +

DS,t+1
1+rS,t+1

+

DS,t+1
1+rT ,t+1

and the demand curves for savings and time deposits obtained from the household’s problem:

DS,t+1 = g (rS,t+1 , ft , Lt , LH,t )

DT,t+1 = h (rT,t+1 , ft , Lt , LH,t )
with ω̄b,t =

qG,t Gt
DS,t

being a threshold level of ωb,t above which bank incurs fire sale losses and

Mt,t+1 denoting a stochastic discount factor of households.
1.9.3. Firms
There are two types of intermediate good producing firms: financially constrained ones and
unconstrained ones.
Financially constrained firms
The setup of financially constrained firm is similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2012). A
financially constrained firm uses equity and debt. Debt is preferred to equity because of its
tax advantage. Firm is subject to leverage constraint and dividend adjustment cost that
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limit their debt borrowing and equity issuance policies. Firm borrows from a bank to finance
investment. Bank borrowing takes the form of long-term floating-rate debt. In every period
a fraction ηB of the principal is paid back, while the remaining (1 − ηB ) remains outstanding.
This means that the debt has an expected life of 1/ηB . It solves the following problem:

Vc (Kc,t , Bc,t ; St ) =

max

dc,t ,Bc,t+1 ,Kc,t+1 ,Nc,t

{dc,t + Et (Mt,t+1 Vc (Kc,t+1 , Bc,t+1 ; St ))}

(1.31)

subject to the balance sheet constraint:

dc,t + ϕc (dc,t ) + qK,t Kc,t+1 + (ft (1 − τ ) + ηB ) Bc,t =
F (Kc,t , Nc,t ) − wt Nc,t + qK,t (1 − δ) Kc,t + qB,t (Bc,t+1 − (1 − ηB ) Bc,t )
and leverage constraint:
θc qK,t Kc,t ≥ Bc,t
The leverage constraint, familiar from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), limits the total new
borrowing of the firm to a fraction θ of its new capital valued at market prices. The price of
bank debt, qB,t , will be determined in equilibrium as the price that clears demand for debt
by firms and its supply by banks.
Unconstrained firm
An unconstrained firm operates in Modigliani-Miller world and solves a standard firm problem:

Vu (Ku,t , Bu,t ; St ) =

max

du,t ,Ku,t+1 ,Nu,t

{du,t + Et (Mt,t+1 Vu (Ku,t+1 , Bu,t+1 ; St ))}

subject to the balance sheet constraint:

du,t + qK,t Ku,t+1 = F (Ku,t , Nu,t ) − wt Nu,t + qK,t (1 − δ) Ku,t

50

(1.32)

Final good producers and total labor supply
The intermediate goods from each type of firm are packaged by competitive final goods
producers using the CES aggregator:

Yt =

ζY −1
ζY

ωc Yc,t

ζY −1
ζY

!

ζY
ζY −1

(1.33)

+ (1 − ωc ) Yu,t

where: Yj = F (Kj,t , Nj,t ) for j = {u, c} and ωc denotes the share of financially constrained
firms in the economy.
Total labor supply is a CES aggregate of labor supplied to financially constrained and
unconstrained firms:

Nt =

ζN −1
ζN

ωc Nc,t

ζN −1
ζN

!

ζN
ζN −1

(1.34)

+ (1 − ωc ) Nu,t

Capital producers
Capital producers combine the final good, It , with the last period capital goods, Kt−1 , in
order to produce new capital goods that competitively sell to entrepreneurial firms at price
qK,t . The representative capital-producing firm is owned by the household and maximizes
the expected discounted value of profits:

max Et
It+j

where S



It+j
Kt+j−1



∞
X





Mt,t+j qK,t+j S

j=0

It+j
Kt+j−1




Kt+j−1 − It+j

(1.35)

Kt+j−1 gives the units of new capital produced by investing It+j and using

Kt+j−1 . The increasing and concave function S (·) captures the existence of adjustment



1− 1
ψk
I
ak,1
It
costs, which we specify as in Jermann (1998): S Kk,t
=
+ ak,2 , where
Kt−1
t−1
1− 1
ψk

ak,1 and ak,2 are chosen to guarantee that in the steady state the investment-to-capital ratio
is equal to the depreciation rate and S ′ (It /Kt−1 ) equals one.
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1.9.4. Monetary policy, markets clearning and equlibrium
Nominal interest rate is set by the monetary authority and follows an AR(1) process:
log(1 + ft ) = ρf log(1 + ft−1 ) + (1 − ρf ) log(1 + f¯) + ϵf,t

(1.36)

where exogenous monetary policy shock, ϵf,t , is normally distributed with zero mean and
standard deviation σf .35
I assume that cash, Mt , short-term bonds, Xt , and long-term bonds, Gt , are elastically
supplied by the government and backed by taxes.
An equlibrium is a set of i) household policy functions for money, savings deposits, time
deposits, nominal bonds, consumption and leisure; ii) bank policy functions for dividends,
the supply of loans to constrained firms, demand for long-term government bonds, demand
for savings and time deposits; iii) constrained firm policy functions for dividends, capital,
loan and labor demand; iv) unconstrained firm policy functions for capital and labor demand;
v) capital producing firm policy function for investment; vi) monetary authority decisions
on interest rates; vii) prices of money, short-term bonds, long-term bonds, business loans,
savings deposits, time deposits and wages; such that all agents optimize and all markets
clear.
1.9.5. Calibration
The model is calibrated to quarterly data. The calibration of the model follows a two-step
procedure. First, some parameters are set to commonly used values in the literature or values
directly corresponing to data counterparts. Second, I calibrate the parameters pinning down
the portfolio choices of households and banks to match moments from 1985Q4, when the
Fed funds rate was 8%, and 2016Q4, when the Fed funds rate was 0.5%.
Households. Discount rate of households, β, is set to 0.99, which implies a real rate of 4%.
35
The results are robust to setting nominal interest rates according
 to Taylor-type rule: log(1 + ft ) =
ρf log(1 + ft−1 ) + (1 − ρf ) log(1 + f¯) + ρπ log (πt /π̄) + ρY log Yt /Ȳ + ϵf,t
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I set the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES), γ, to 2 and the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, ψ, to 1. Following Walsh (2003), I set the elasticity of substitution between
liquidity services and consumption, ρ, to 0.39.
Firms. Both constrained and unconstrained firms use Cobb-Douglas technology to produce
the output with capital share in production, α, set to 0.33. I set capital depreciation rate
δ = 0.025 and the capital adjustment cost parameter, ψk , is set to 0.5, which is a typical
value used in the literature. Using firm-level Compustat data, I classify a firm as financially
constrained if the firm uses bank financing. I consider the firm to be bank dependent if
either it does not have a rating or its rating is below investment grade.36 Following this
classification, the share of financially constrained firms, ωc , is set to 0.56 which matches the
average share of output (proxied by sales) produced by bank dependent firms. For the final
goods and labor aggregator, I follow the literature and set an elasticity ζY = 6 and ζN = 6,
respectively.
Financially constrained firms. The tax wedge, τ , is set to 0.35, which corresponds to
the marginal tax rate of 35 percent. The maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, θc , is set
to 0.31, which corresponds to the average loan to asset ratio of bank dependent firms in
Compustat. The average maturity of syndicated business loans is around 12 quarters which
pins down ηB = 1/12. I specify the dividend adjustment cost function for constrained firms
2
as ϕc (dc,t ) = κc dc,t − d¯c , where κc is set to 0.15 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and
d¯c is the long-run payout target which is pinned down by the equilibrium of the model.
Banks. The average maturity of long-term fixed rate securities and real estate loans held by
banks in Call Reports data is about 38 quarters which pins down ηG = 1/38. The functional
form for the dividend adjustment cost is specified in an analogous way as for the constrained
firms. Following Elenev et al. (2021), I set the dividend adjustment cost parameter κb equal
to 7 and the long-run payout target d¯b to 6.8% of bank’s book equity (nb,t ) per year. The
36
Rauh and Sufi (2009) show that investment grade firms use bonds as their primary source of external
financing.
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funding shock, ωb , is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
Monetary Policy. The parameters of the AR(1) process for nominal interest rate are
estimated from the detrended series of Fed funds rate for the period 1985Q4-2016Q4. The
estimation implies ρf = 0.953 and σf = 0.0052.
Parameters calibrated jointly to match data moments. The rest of the parameters is
calibrated jointly to match a number of moments in the banking and macro data. In order
to calibrate the share and elasticity of substitution parameters in the CES aggregator for
liquidity services, I match moments from both high nominal rate period (1985) and low
nominal rate period (2016). Specifically, I solve the model for two levels of f¯, 8% and 0.5%,
while keeping the rest of the parameters the same. The moments implied by the model solved
with f¯ = 8% (f¯ = 0.5%) correspond to moments in the data in 1986 (2016).
Although the second stage parameters are set jointly, some parameters can be linked to
specific targets. Elasticity of substitution between money and savings deposits, ξ, and share
of savings deposits in high liquidity assets, λS , help to match the ratio of money in total
liquidity in 1985 and 2016 from the Flow of Funds data and the savings deposit spread in
1985 computed from Call Reports data.37 Elasticity of substitution between time deposits
and high liquidity assets, ϵ, and share of time deposits in liquidit assets, λT , are pinned down
by the ratio of time deposits in total deposits in 1985 and 2016 and the time deposit spread
in 1985 computed from Call Reports data. The share of consumption in the composite of
consumption and liquidity services, λC , is used to match the ratio of consumption to total
liquidity in 1985. Finally, the fire-sale cost parameter, χ, helps match the share of business
loans in total bank assets in Call Reports data.38
The parameters of the model are summarized in Table 1.15. Table 1.16 compares the moments
implied by the model with the ones observed in the data and shows that the model matches
37
In the data, money is defined as currency and demand deposits. Total liquidity is defined as the sum of
money, savings deposits and time deposits.
38
Banks’ total assets are defined as the sum of busines (C&I) loans, real estate loans and security holdings.
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the data targets reasonably well. Importantly, the model is able to reproduce high share
of time deposits in the high nominal interest rate environment and a substantial fall in the
importance of time deposits in a low nominal rate economy. The model can also account for
the fact that savings deposits are more liquid and as a result banks exercise their market
power by setting higher spreads compared to time deposits which are less liquid.
1.9.6. Results
In equilibrium, differences in liquidity of deposits give rise to differences in their short-rate
sensitivity. Specifically, as savings deposits are more liquid than time deposits, banks set
higher prices (deposit spreads) for savings deposits. As a result, savings deposit rates are
lower and less volatile compared to time deposit rates. On the other hand, time deposits
protect banks against the funding shock. In the model, banks manage interest rate and
liquidity risk by funding loans to firms with time deposits and long-term government bonds
with savings deposits. Both time deposits and business loans are illiquid and have a high
short-rate sensitivity. In contrast, savings deposits and long-term bonds are liquid and exhibit
low interest rate sensitivity.
I use the calibrated model to examine the effects of a decline in nominal rates on equlibrium
outcomes. For that purpose, I solve and simulate the model for different levels of f¯, while
keeping other parameters unchanged. When changing f¯, the steady-state inflation, π̄, adjusts
such that the steady-state real rate remains constant and equal to 1/β. Figure 1.20 plots
the mean values of deposit spreads, time deposits share, business loans share and capital of
financially constrained firms from simulated data for nominal interest rates vaying between
0.5% (the level of Fed funds rate in 1985) and 8% (level in 1985).
Consistent with the deposits channel (Drechsler et al., 2017), in response to lower nominal
rates, the opportunity cost of holding money falls which decreases banks’ effective market
power. As a result, banks decrease the spreads on the savings and time deposits. As savings
deposit is the closest substitute for money, the savings deposit spread falls by relatively
more (from 2.5 pp to 0.25 pp) consistent with the data. The difference between time and
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savings deposit rates falls by 2.1 pp. In response to the falling relative price of savings
deposits, households substitute away from illiquid time deposits towards liquid savings
deposits. Consequently, the share of bank financing from time deposits falls significantly
from 42% to 17% in line with the patterns observed in the data. As a reaction to the decline
in time deposits, banks decrease their supply of business loans which falls from around
40% to around 22% of banks’ total assets. The model implied decline in business loans
is quantitatively significant and accounts for the entire decrease in C&I loans observed in
the data. Consistent with the supply effects, the business loan spread increases by 2 pp.
in line with the empirical values. Finally, the fall in nominal rates induces a 16% drop in
investment/gross operating surplus. Taken together, the model suggests that decline in
nominal rates played a quantitatively important role in the decline of time deposits, business
lending and investment.

1.10. Conclusion
This paper documents a monetary transmission through time deposits to business outcomes.
I show that banks use time deposits to finance business lending in order to hedge their
interest-rate and liquidity exposures. Falling interest rates decrease the price of liquidity and
trigger an outflow of time deposits. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in business lending.
Consistent with the supply effects, while the quantity of business loans falls, its price (loan
spread) increases. The decline in business lending supply has important macroeconomic
consequences. In response to lower rates, bank-dependent firms reduce investment and entry.
I present a battery of evidence using a range of granular data (such as bank-level balance sheet,
small business lending, syndicated lending, firm-level investment and county-industry-level
firm creation) to corroborate my findings. For identification, I exploit cross-sectional variation
in bank market power in attracting time deposits. My findings reveal the importance of the
shift in supply of bank business lending.
To quantify the importance of the mechanisms observed in the data, I develop a general
equilibrium model with banks and monetary policy. In the model, banks conduct dynamic
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portfolio optimization on both liabilities and assets side. Banks optimally manage interest
rate and liquidity risk by funding business loans with time deposits. The simulation of the
model in different interest rate environments suggest that the effect of lower interest rates
on business lending and investment is quantitatively significant. Taken together, this paper
introduces a new perspective on the effects of falling interest rates for the banking sector
and macroeconomy.
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1.11. Tables
Table 1.1: Time deposits and small business lending
log(New small business lendingb,c,t )
∆log(Time Depositsb,t−1 )

(1)

(2)

0.113∗∗∗

0.128∗∗∗
(0.0476)

(0.0361)

∆log(Saving Depositsb,t−1 )

-0.0465
(0.0692)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Bank-County FE

Yes

Yes

County-Time FE

Yes

Yes

359,174
0.850

346,286
0.851

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effect of time deposits on small business lending, as described in Equation 1.1. The
outcome variable denotes the log of new lending by bank b in county c in year t. ∆log(TimeDepositsb,t−1 ) denotes the
log change in time deposits of bank b in year t − 1. Controls include local deposit growth of bank b in county c.
Standard errors two-way clustered at the county and bank-time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Table 1.2: Interest-rate sensitivity of bank asset and deposit effective rates
Time Deposits

Saving Deposits

C&I Loans

Securities

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

P4

0.58

0.32

0.53

0.29

F-test p-val
P
( 4τ =0 βyτ = 0)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

520,785
0.1885

520,785
0.3481

520,785
0.022

520,785
0.032

τ
τ =0 βy

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the interest-rate sensitivity of the effective rates of different assets and deposits as described
by Equation 1.3. The effective rate for deposits is computed as the interest expenses divided by the quantity of deposit
(time or savings) and for assets as the interest income divided by the quantity of the asset (C&I loans or securities).
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Table 1.3: Net interest margin analysis
∆NIM
C&I loans less

Securities less

Time deposits

Savings deposits

Time deposits

Savings deposits

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

P4

-0.01

0.21

-0.30

-0.03

F-test p-val
P
( 4τ =0 βyτ = 0)

0.78

0.00

0.00

0.42

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

520,785
0.0613

520,785
0.0642

520,785
0.131

520,785
0.118

τ
τ =0 βy

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the interest-rate sensitivity of changes in net interest margin components, as described by
Equation 1.5. I compute the net interest margins for a combination of an asset class a matched with a deposit type d
for bank b at time t, as described by Equation 1.4.

Table 1.4: Monetary policy and time deposits: Heterogeneity in market power
∆Time Deposit
Spreadb,t
(1)
∆Rt

∆ log(Time Depositsb,t )
(2)

(3)

3.736∗∗∗
(0.797)

5.682∗∗∗
(0.849)

∆Rt × βbTimeDepSpread
∆Rt × HHIb
Controls
Bank FE
Time FE
N
R2

-9.143∗∗∗
(1.484)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3.972∗∗∗
(0.591)
-8.664∗∗∗
(1.479)

0.111∗∗∗
(0.0300)

-4.125∗∗∗
(0.800)

-4.198∗∗∗
(0.853)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

314,795
0.734

646,634
0.153

557,883
0.142

557,883
0.176

429,306
0.174

429,306
0.189

Notes: This table shows the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on time deposit spreads and volumes, as
described in Equation 1.9. Column (1) uses the change in time deposits spreads by bank b in time t as a dependent
variable. Column (2)–(6) focus on the log change in the volume of time deposits by bank b in time t. ∆Rt denotes the
change in the Fed funds rate. HHIb denotes the bank’s Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) which is computed using
branch-level bank data provided by the FDIC. I calculate the HHI for deposit market by squaring deposit-market
shares of all banks operating in a given county in a given year, and averaging over the time. βbTimeDepSpread denotes
the Time Deposit Spread Beta which is estimated as the bank-level sensitivity of time deposit spread to monetary
policy, as described by Equations 1.8. Controls included time-varying macroeconomic controls (four lags of GDP and
inflation) and time-varying bank controls (total assets). Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the bank and
time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Monetary policy and C&I lending: Heterogeneity in market power
Panel (a): C&I lending
∆log(C&I Loansb,t )
∆Rt

(1)

(2)

1.365∗∗
(0.583)

1.792∗∗∗
(0.570)

∆Rt × βbTimeDepSpread

(3)

-2.755∗∗∗
(0.901)

-2.354∗∗∗
(0.780)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time FE

No

No

Yes

641,115
0.0711

552,597
0.0552

552,597
0.0614

N
R2

Panel (b): Small business lending
log(New small business lendingb,c,t )
∆Rt

(1)

(2)

15.86∗∗∗

20.34∗∗∗

(2.271)

(3)

(3.242)

∆Rt × βbTimeDepSpread

-20.78∗∗∗
(7.906)

-21.54∗∗∗
(7.405)

Controls

Yes

Yes

-

Bank-County FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

County-Time FE

No

No

Yes

384,293
0.823

377,683
0.823

373,389
0.850

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effect of monetary policy on lending. Panel (a) presents the analysis on C&I lending from
Call reports, as described in Equation 1.9. The outcome variable in Panel (a) is a log change in C&I lending by bank b
in time t. Panel (b) shows the results for small business lending, as described in Equation 1.10. The dependent variable
is the log of new small business lending by bank b in county c in time t. ∆Rt denotes the change in the Fed funds rate.
βbTimeDepSpread denotes the Time Deposit Spread Beta which is estimated as the bank-level sensitivity of time deposit
spread to monetary policy, as described by Equation 1.8. In Panel (a), controls included time-varying macroeconomic
controls (four lags of GDP and inflation) and time-varying bank controls (total assets). In Panel (b), controls further
include county-time controls namely:lagged per capita income growth of the county, growth of population, change in
employment and growth of local county-level deposits. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the bank and
time level in Panel (a), and at the county and bank-time level in Panel (b). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Monetary policy, time deposits and syndicated lending volumes
log(New Syndicated Creditb,l,f,t )
∆Rt

(1)

(2)

6.979∗∗∗

21.20∗∗∗

(2.162)

∆Rt ×

βbTimeDepSpread

(3)

(4)

-23.21∗∗∗
(5.883)

-18.04∗∗∗
(4.574)

-8.387∗∗∗
(2.598)

(4.416)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rating Group FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loan Purpose FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loan Type FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sector-Time FE

No

No

Yes

-

Firm-Time FE

No

No

No

Yes

133,223
0.254

133,208
0.255

133,096
0.386

129,121
0.773

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effect of monetary policy on syndicated lending volumes, as described in Equations 1.11.
The outcome variable denotes the log of newly issued syndicated loans l to a firm f by bank b at time t. ∆Rt denotes
the change in the Fed funds rate. βbTimeDepSpread denotes the Time Deposit Spread Beta which is estimated as the
bank-level sensitivity of time deposit spread to monetary policy, as described by Equation 1.8. Controls included
time-varying macroeconomic controls (four lags of GDP and inflation), time-varying bank controls (total assets) and
time-varying firm controls (size, current assets, sales growth). Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the firm
and bank-time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Monetary policy, time deposits and syndicated lending spreads
Loan Spreadb,l,f,t
∆Rt

(1)

(2)

-0.115∗∗∗

-0.198∗∗∗

(0.0225)

∆Rt ×

(3)

(0.0405)

βbTimeDepSpread

0.134∗∗∗
(5.883)

0.106∗∗∗
(4.574)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rating Group FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loan Purpose FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Loan Type FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sector-Time FE

No

No

Yes

150,143
0.422

150,072
0.422

149,904
0.551

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effect of monetary policy on syndicated lending spreads, as described in Equations 1.13.
The dependent variable in Panel (b) is the spread on newly issued syndicated loans l to a firm f by bank b at time t.
∆Rt denotes the change in the Fed funds rate. βbTimeDepSpread denotes the Time Deposit Spread Beta which is
estimated as the bank-level sensitivity of time deposit spread to monetary policy, as described by Equation 1.8.
Controls included time-varying macroeconomic controls (four lags of GDP and inflation), time-varying bank controls
(total assets), time-varying bank controls (total assets) and time-varying firm controls (size, current as-sets, sales
growth).. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the firm and bank-time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8: Firm financing and monetary policy
log(new loansf,t )
(1)
∆Rt

(2)

(3)

log(new bondsf,t )
(4)

15.20∗∗∗
(3.345)

(5)
-13.89∗∗∗
(6.659)

41.36∗∗∗
(12.04)

∆ft

(6)

-26.81∗∗∗
(9.124)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 0) × ∆Rt

14.24∗∗∗
(3.777)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 1) × ∆Rt

16.16∗∗∗
(3.429)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 0) × ∆ft

50.68∗∗∗
(13.50)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 1) × ∆ft

30.24∗∗∗
(9.691)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

21,270
0.792

21,270
0.791

21,270
0.792

21,270
0.791

95,884
0.0951

95,884
0.0949

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effects of lower interest rates on firm financing, as described in Equation 1.14. Columns
(1)–(4) focus on new bank loans where the log(new loansf,t ) denotes the log of new loans received by a firm f in time
t. Columns (5) and (6) examine the effect on monetary policy on new bond financing where log(new bondsf,t ) denotes
the log of new bond market financing received by a firm f in time t. ∆Rt denotes a change in the Fed funds rate, or
∆ft denotes monetary policy surprises based on Gertler and Karadi (2015). Dummy variable Rating Existsf,t−1 takes
the value of one if the firm has had a rating in period t − 1, and zero otherwise. Controls include firm-time variables,
i.e. sales growth, size, current assets as a share of total assets and macro variables, i.e. four lags of quarterly GDP
growth and CPI inflation. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the firm and time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Firm financing and monetary policy: Within-firm analysis
log(1+ new debti,f,t )
(1)
∆Rt

0.0998∗∗∗
(0.0371)

∆Rt × Bondi

-0.170∗∗∗
(0.0334)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.170∗∗∗
(0.0153)

∆ft

0.275∗∗∗
(0.0922)

∆ft × Bondi

-0.425∗∗
(0.182)

-0.425∗∗∗
(0.0655)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm FE

Yes

–

Yes

–

Firm–Time FE

No

Yes

No

Yes

175,646
0.0708

175,646
0.566

175,646
0.0704

175,646
0.566

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the withing-firm effect of monetary policy on firm financing, as described in Equation 1.15.
The outcome variable denotes the log of new external debt of type i (where i is either a bank loan or a bond) taken by
firm f at time t. ∆Rt denotes a change in the Fed funds rate, or ∆ft denotes monetary policy surprises based on
Gertler and Karadi (2015). Bondi takes the value of one if the external financing i is a bond, and 0 if it is a bank loan.
Controls include firm-time variables, i.e. sales growth, size, current assets as a share of total assets and macro
variables, i.e. four lags of quarterly GDP growth and CPI inflation. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the
firm and time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.10: Borrowing and investment effects of monetary policy
∆log(Debtf,t )
(1)

∆log(Capitalf,t )

(2)

(3)

(4)

Investmentf,t /Capitalf,t−1
(5)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 0) × ∆Rt

1.853∗∗∗

1.008∗∗

0.809∗∗∗

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 1) × ∆Rt

-0.174
(0.509)

-0.194
(0.345)

0.141
(0.151)

(0.484)

(0.479)

(6)

(0.190)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 0) × ∆ft

5.283∗∗∗
(1.835)

2.908∗∗
(1.418)

2.178∗∗∗
(0.799)

(RatingExistsf,t−1 = 1) × ∆ft

-0.844
(1.694)

-0.122
(1.503)

0.153
(0.703)

Controls
Firm FE
N
R2

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

372,774
0.0849

277,820
0.0928

514,436
0.132

387,712
0.145

487,110
0.237

367,639
0.250

Notes: This table shows the firm-level borrowing and investment response to monetary policy, as described in Equation
1.16. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) denotes a log change in total debt (bank and bond debt).
Columns (3)–(4) report the effect on a log change in capital of firm denoted as ∆log(Capitalf,t ). Capital is computed
using perpetual inventory method using Compustat data as in Ottonello and Winberry (2020). Columns (5)–(6) show
the effect on firm investment as a share of capital denoted as Investmentf,t /Capitalf,t−1 where Investment is a CAPX
measure form Compustat data. ∆Rt denotes a change in the Fed funds rate, and ∆ft denotes monetary policy
surprises based on Gertler and Karadi (2015). Dummy variable Rating Existsf,t−1 takes the value of one if the firm
has had a rating in period t − 1, and zero otherwise. Controls include firm-time variables, i.e. sales growth, size,
current assets as a share of total assets and macro variables, i.e. four lags of quarterly GDP growth and CPI inflation.
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the firm and time level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Time deposits and firm entry rate: Short-run analysis
log(NewFirmsc,t )
(1)

(2)

(3)

∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 )

0.0828∗∗∗

0.0870∗∗∗

(0.0246)

(0.0241)

0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0260)

∆ log(Income Per Capitac,t−1 )

0.357∗∗∗
(0.0524)

0.355∗∗∗
(0.0523)

0.355∗∗∗
(0.0523)

∆ log(Populationc,t−1 )

1.649∗∗∗
(0.455)

1.641∗∗∗
(0.454)

1.647∗∗∗
(0.456)

∆ log(Savings Depositsc,t−1 )

0.00449
(0.0210)

∆ log(Local Depositsc,t−1 )

0.0377∗∗∗
(0.0127)

∆ log(Local Time Depositsc,t−1 )

0.0383∗∗
(0.0161)

∆ log(Local Savings Depositsc,t−1 )

-0.00232
(0.0158)

Time FE
County FE
N
R2

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

189,740
0.940

189,618
0.940

189,598
0.940

Notes: This table shows the effect of the change in time deposits on new firm creation, as described by Equation 1.19.
The outcome variable is the log number of new firms established in county c in time t (quarterly data).
∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 ) denotes the county-level growth in time deposits computed as a weighted average of deposit
growth of banks operating in the county weighted by their lending share, as discussed in Equation 1.18. All
specifications control for lagged growth of county’s income per capita and population. Column (1) further controls for
a change in savings deposits of bank operating in county c. Column (2) controls for a change in total local deposits.
Column (3) splits the local deposits into two control variables: local time deposits and local savings deposit growth.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parenthesis ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Time deposits and firm entry rate: Industry heterogeneity
log(NewFirmsi,c,t )
∆ Time Depositsc,t−1

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.106∗∗∗
(0.0130)

0.0897∗∗∗
(0.0149)

-0.0179
(0.0218)

∆ Time Depositsc,t−1 × External Finance (Index)i

0.262∗∗∗
(0.0345)

∆ Time Depositsc,t−1 × External Finance (Dummy)i

0.209∗∗∗
(0.0330)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

County-Industry FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,590,741
0.821

1,259,501
0.818

1,259,501
0.818

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the effect of the change in time deposits on new firm creation and exploits additional
industry-level heterogeneity to examine the effect for industries with different reliance on external financing, as
described by Equation 1.20. The outcome variable is the log number of new firms established in industry i in county c
in time t (quarterly data). ∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 ) denotes the ex ante county-level growth in time deposits
computed as a weighted average of deposit growth of banks in the same county weighted by their lending share, as
discussed in Equation 1.18. Controls include lagged growth of county’s income per capita, population and total local
deposits. Column (1) report the average effects. Columns (2) and (3) introduce an additional interaction term
between the ∆log(Time Depositsc,t−1 ) and a measure for industry’s dependence on external finance. Column (2) uses
the External Finance Index based on Rajan and Zingales (1998) that ranges between -1 and 1. Column (3) uses a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the External Finance Index is positive, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors at
clustered at the county level in parenthesis ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Table 1.13: Long-run analysis across banks: 1995–2015



TimeDeposits
Total Assets


b,1995

∆ log(TimeDepositsb )

∆ log(C&I Loansb )

∆ log(C&I Loansb )

(1)

(2)

(3)

-3.105∗∗∗

-0.855∗∗∗

(0.116)

(0.149)

∆ log(TimeDepositsb )
N
R2

0.748∗∗∗
(0.0137)
5,503
0.115

5,474
0.00601

5,454
0.353

Notes: This table shows the relationship between the long-run trend in time deposits and C&I loans at the bank-level,
as described by Equation 1.21. Column (1) examines the effect of ex-ante bank reliance on time deposits on the
dynamics in time deposits between 1995 and 2015. The outcome variable denotes the log change in time deposits for
bank b between 1995 and 2015 and the independent variable denotes the ex-ante (1995) bank dependence on time
deposits as a share of total assets. Column (2) focuses on the effect for a log change in the C&I loans extended by bank
b in 2015 vs. 1995 as the outcome variable. Column (3) puts the two pieces together and shows the estimates for the
regression using the C&I loan growth between 2015 and 1995 as dependent variable and time deposits growth between
2015 and 1995 as an independent variable. Standard errors in parenthesis ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.14: Time deposits and firm entry rate: Long-run analysis
∆ log(NewFirms)c,2015−1995
(1)


TimeDeposits
Total Assets

(2)

-0.347∗∗
(0.158)


c,1995

∆log(Time Deposits)c,2015−1995
Controls
N
R2

0.132∗∗∗
(0.0300)
Yes

Yes

1,186
0.133

1,055
0.154

Notes: This table shows the long-run effect of time deposits on firm creation, as as described by Equation 1.22. The
outcome variable is the change in log number of new firms established in county c between 2015 and 1995. County-level
time deposit exposure is measured in two ways, in two ways. In Column (1) uses an average of bank ex ante exposures
weighted by ex-ante lending shares, as described in Equation 1.23. Column (2) uses the weighted average of changes in
time deposit dynamics of banks in county c, as described in Equation 1.24. Controls include growth of county’s income
per capita and population. Standard errors in parenthesis ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.15: Parameter values used in the model
Parameter

Symbol

Value

Discount rate

β

0.99

IES

γ

2

ψN

1

ρ

0.39

Depreciation rate

δ

0.025

Capital share in production

α

0.33

Capital adjustment cost

ψk

0.5

Share of constrained firms

ωc

0.56

Elasticity of substitution b/t firm outputs

ζY

6

Elasticity of substitution b/t firm labor demand

ζN

6

Tax wedge

τ

0.35

LTV ratio parameter

θc

0.31

1/ηB

12

κc

0.15

1/ηG

38

κb
4 × d¯b /nb,t

7
0.068

Persistence of interest rates

ρf

0.953

Standard deviation of monetary policy shock

σf

0.0052

Households

Frish elasticity
Elasticity of substitution b/t Ct and Lt
Firms

Financially constrained firms

Business loan maturity
Firm dividend adjustment cost
Banks
Long-term bond maturity
Bank dividend adjustment cost
Bank dividend target
Monetary Policy

Parameters calibrated to match data moments
Elasticity of substitution b/t Mt and DS,t

ξ

2.33

Elasticity of substitution b/t LH,t and DT,t

ϵ

1.15

DS,t share in LH,t

λS

0.44

DT,t share in Lt

λT

0.07

Ct share in Zt

λC

0.91

χ

0.22

Fire-sale parameter
Notes: This table presents the parameter values used in the model.
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Table 1.16: Moments targeted in the model calibration
Moment

Data

Model

Time Deposits/Total Deposits in 1985

0.45

0.42

Time Deposits/Total Deposits in 2016

0.18

0.17

Money/Liquidity in 1985

0.15

0.12

Money/Liquidity in 2016

0.20

0.17

Consumption/Liquidity in 1985

1.02

1.10

Time Deposit Spread in 1985 (pp)

0.20

0.25

Savings Deposit Spread in 1985 (pp)

2.50

2.48

Business Loans/Total Assets in 1985

0.38

0.40

Notes: This table presents the moments targeted by the calibration. Model implied moments are based on simulating
the model for 1,000,000 periods. The model is solved for two levels of f¯, 8% and 0.5%, while keeping the rest of the
parameters the same. The moments implied by the model solved with f¯ = 8% (f¯ = 0.5%) correspond to moments in
the data in 1986 (2016).

Table 1.17: Time deposits and firm entry rate: Short-run analysis (Robustness)
log(NewFirmsc,t )
Baseline
(1)
∆log(Time Depositsc,t )

(2)

0.0870∗∗∗
(0.0241)

TimeDepSpread
∆Rt−1 × βc,t−1

-0.0682∗∗
(0.0300)

Controls

Yes

Yes

Time FE

Yes

Yes

County FE

Yes

Yes

189,618
0.940

189,618
0.940

N
R2

Notes: This table shows the robustness results for the effect of the change in time deposits on new firm creation, as
described by Equation 1.19. The outcome variable is the log number of new firms established in county c in time t
(quarterly data). ∆log(Time Depositsc,t ) denotes the lagged county-level growth in time deposits computed as a
weighted average of deposit growth of banks in the same county weighted by their lending share, as discussed in
Equation 1.18. Controls include lagged growth of county’s income per capita, population and total local deposits.
Column (1) reports the baseline effect (as in Column (2) of Table 1.11). Column (2) presets the robustness measure
using a lagged Time Deposit Spread Beta (computed as in Equation 1.8 and aggregated at the county-level based on
the same approach as time deposits growth, see Equation 1.18) interacted with the lagged change in the Fed funds
rate. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parenthesis ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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1.12. Figures
Figure 1.1: Nominal short rate and shifts in bank assets and liabilities
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(a) C&I loans vs. time deposits
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(b) Real estate loans and securities vs. savings and checking deposits

2010m1

(RE Loans + Securities) / Total Assets
(Savings + Checking Deposits) / Total Assets
Fed Funds Rate

Notes: This figure presents the time-series evolution of C&I loans vs. time deposits in Panel (a), and real estate loans
and securities vs. savings deposits in Panel (b) against the Fed funds rate. Bank balance sheet items are expressed as
a share of total banking sector assets.
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Figure 1.2: Growth rates of bank balance sheet items
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(a) C&I loans vs. time deposits
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(b) Real estate loans and securities vs. savings and checking deposits
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Savings and Checking Deposits growth (yoy)

Notes: This figure presents the year-over-year growth rates of C&I loans vs. time deposits in Panel (a), and real estate
loans and securities vs. savings deposits Panel (b). During the deregulation period for savings deposits between 1982
and 1983, savings deposits experienced an abnormal growth rate of above 30% on annual basis. Including these data
points in the graph would obscure the evolution of the series in periods outside of the deposit deregulation. Therefore,
the scale for savings and checking deposits in Panel (b) was adjusted to values between -20% and 30% on annual basis
to allow for clear presentation of the entire time series over the period 1970–2010.
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Figure 1.3: Deposit and asset classes in the cross-section of banks
(a) Time Deposits vs. C&I Loans

(b) Savings Deposits vs. C&I Loans

(c) Time Deposits vs. Securities

(d) Savings Deposits vs. Securities

Notes: This figure presents the relationship between different deposit (time and savings deposits) and asset classes
(C&I loans and security holdings) in the cross-section of banks. I compute year-over-year log changes in shares of a
balance sheet item to individual bank total assets (TA). I sort banks by their time deposit dynamics (in Panels (a) and
(c)) and savings deposits dynamics (in Panels (b) and (d)) into 100 bins. For the respective bins, I compute the
average change in C&I loans (in Panels (a) and (b)) and security holdings (in Panels (c) and (d)) and graph the bin
scatter plots.
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Figure 1.4: Deregulation of small time deposits
(a) C&I loans and time deposits
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(b) Securities and time deposits
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Notes: This figure presents the relationship between the evolution of time deposits and a range of asset classes during
the deregulation of small time deposits 1978–79 (as a part of Regulation Q). Panel (a) documents a close co-movement
of the business lending and time deposits around the regulatory change. Panel (b) plots the diverging evolution of
securities and time deposits. Panel (c) shows the evolution of real estate (RE) loans – a loan category that does not
appear to be impacted by the deregulation of small time deposits (the series had been trending up already in the
pre-period and the trend continued throughout the 1976–1980 sample period). Panel (d) shows the relationship
between the change in small time deposits and C&I loans between 1977 and 1979 at the cross-section of banks. I sort
banks by their small time deposit dynamics into 100 bins and plot the change in small time deposits and C&I loans
(normalized by total deposits in 1977) for each bin in a scatter bin plot.
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Figure 1.5: Effective rates on assets and deposits

1990q1

2000q1

2010q1

C&I Loan Effective Rate
Securities Effective Rate
Fed funds rate

2020q1

Time Dep. Effective Rate
Sav. Dep. Effective Rate

Notes: This figure shows the aggregate interest-rate sensitivity of a range of balance sheet items. C&I loan effective
rate (in blue) is computed as a share of C&I loan interest income to lagged C&I loan volume. Time deposit effective
rate (in red) is the interest expense on time deposits divided by lagged volume of time deposits. Securities effective
rates (in green) denotes interest income on security holdings divided by quantity of securities in t − 1. Savings deposit
effective rate (in orange) is a share of interest expense on savings deposit to savings deposit volume in t − 1. Finally,
EFFR (dashed black) denotes effective Fed funds rate.

75

Figure 1.6: Interest-rate sensitivity matching: Cross-sectional evidence
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for interest-rate sensitivity matching. Panel (a) illustrates the high
short-rate sensitivity matching between time deposits and C&I business loans. Panel (b) shows the low short-rate
sensitivity matching between savings deposits and security holdings. The figure is constructed in following steps. The
first step is to estimate the sensitivity of bank b time deposit effective rate to changes in the Fed funds rate, following
Equation 1.3. The sum of the beta coefficients for each bank is denoted as Time Deposits Interest Expense Beta.
Second step is to repeat the estimation for C&I loans, savings deposits and securities and denote the respective bank
betas as C&I Loan Interest Income Beta, Savings Deposits Interest Expense Beta and Securities Interest Income Beta.
Third step is to sort the banks into 100 bins based on their Time Deposits Interest Expense Beta in Panel (a) and
their Savings Deposits Interest Expense Beta in Panel (b). Fourth step is to compute the average interest
expense/income betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.7: Liquidity matching: Cross-sectional evidence
(a) All loans (Call reports)
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for liquidity matching. It plots the relationship between time deposit
maturity (in months) and loan maturity (in months). Panel (a) shows loan maturity for all bank lending except for the
real-estate credit based on Call reports data. Panel (b) uses Dealscan syndicated lending data and shows loan maturity
only for syndicated business loans. The figure presents banks sorted into 100 bins based on their time deposit maturity.
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Figure 1.8: Monetary policy and deposit products: Aggregate growth rate series
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Notes: This figure presents the evolution of the year-over-year changes in Fed funds rate and aggregate year-over-year
growth rates of deposit products. Panel (a) shows the growth rate on the volume of time deposits against the change
effective Fed funds rate (EFFR). Panel (b) plots the growth rate of savings deposits against the change in EFFR.
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Figure 1.9: Monetary policy, bank deposit and asset classes: Local projections
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response to a 100 basis point increase in the Fed funds rate based on the local
projections approach, as described by Equation 1.6. The response of the cumulative growth (log-difference) of time
deposits is plotted in Panel (a), savings deposits in Panel (b), C&I loans in Panel (c) and security holdings in Panel
(d). 90 percent confidence bands are shown using standard errors that are clustered at the bank and time level.
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Figure 1.10: Monetary policy and deposit products: Cross-sectional evidence
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for the relationship between the sensitivity of deposit and asset
quantities to the Fed funds rate. Panel (a) illustrates the relationship between time deposit and C&I loan volumes to
the Fed funds rate. Panel (b) shows the relationship between savings deposit and security holdings quantities. The
figure is constructed in following steps. The first step is to estimate the sensitivity of bank’s log change in time deposit
volume to changes in the Fed funds rate, following Equation 1.7. The sum of the beta estimates is denoted as Time
Deposits Beta. Second step is to repeat the estimation for C&I loans, savings deposits and securities volumes and
denote the respective betas as C&I Loan Beta, Savings Deposits Beta and Securities Beta. Third step is to sort the
banks into 100 bins based on their Time Deposits Beta in Panel (a) and their Savings Deposits Beta in Panel (b).
Fourth step is to compute the average betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.11: Monetary policy, time deposits and market power
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for the relationship between bank market power and the sensitivity
time deposit quantities to the Fed funds rate. The figure is constructed in following steps. First, I proxy for bank
market power with Time Deposit Spread Beta which is estimated following the Equation 1.8. Second, vertical axis
denotes Time Deposits Beta which is constructed by estimating the sensitivity of the bank’s log change in time deposit
volume to the changes in the Fed funds rate, following Equation 1.7. The sum of the beta estimates is denoted as
Time Deposits Beta. Third, the figure sorts the banks into 100 bins based on their market power proxy: Time
Deposits Spread Beta. Fourth, it computes the average betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.12: Business loan quantities and spreads
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Notes: This figure presents the evolution C&I loans spreads vs. growth rate of the volume of C&I loans. C&I loan
spread is computed as a difference between the effective C&I loan rate and the Fed funds rate. C&I loan growth rates
is year-over-year real change (reported on the right y-axis).

82

Figure 1.13: Monetary policy and business loan spreads
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Notes: This figure presents the time-series relationship between the Fed funds rate and business loan spreads. Panel
(a) uses Call reports data to construct the C&I loan spread as a difference between the effective C&I rates and the Fed
funds rate. Panel (b) controls for riskiness by using Dealscan data for spreads on newly issued loans only to
speculative-grade and unrated firms which are the highest risk category. EFFR denotes the effective Fed funds rate.
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Figure 1.14: Local projections: Loan spreads
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response to a 100 basis point increase in the Fed funds rate for C&I loan spreads
based on the local projections approach. Panel (a) uses C&I loan spread data computed from Call reports and
estimates local projections, as described by Equation 1.6. Panel (b) uses spreads on new business loans from Dealscan
which allows to further control for riskiness with rating fixed effects, as described by Equation 1.12. 90 percent
confidence bands are shown using standard errors that are clustered at the bank and time level.
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Figure 1.15: Monetary policy and other asset classes: local projections
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Notes: This figure presents the impulse response to a 100 basis increase in the Fed funds rate as described by
Equation 1.6. The outcome variable is the growth (log-difference) of a range of asset classes: Panels (a), (c) and (e)
report results for a range of adjustable-rate assets (other than C&I loans) while Panels (b), (d) and (f) present the
results for fixed-rate asset classes. Specifically, Panel (a) shows the impulse response for short-term securities (with
maturity less than one year). Panel (b) plots the results to long-term securities (with maturity of one year and more).
Panel (c) focuses on adjustable-rate real estate loans and Panel (d) reports the results for fixed-rate real estate loans.
Finally, Panels (e) and (f) show the impulse responses of other adjustable-rate and fixed-rate assets, respectively. 90
percent confidence bands are shown using standard errors that are clustered at the bank and time level.
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Figure 1.16: Business investment & loans
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Notes: This figure presents the time-series evolution of business lending and business investment. Business loans are
expressed as a share of non-financial sector debt. Business investment is reported as a share of business sector gross
operating surplus.
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Figure 1.17: Business investment and funding sources: Growth rates
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Notes: This figure presents the relationship between the business investment and firm financing. Panel (a) plots the
year-over-year real growth rate of business investment and C&I loans. Panel (b) plots the dynamics of year-over-year
real business investment growth and corporate bond growth.
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Figure 1.18: Trends in firm entry rate
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Notes: This figure presents the relationship between time deposits and new firm creation. Panel (a) shows a number of
job created in new firms while Panel (b) focuses on the number of new firms born each year. Time deposits are
expressed as a share to total assets of the banking sector.
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Figure 1.19: Long-run analysis across banks: 1995–2015
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plot of a relationship between time deposits and C&I loans over the long
run. The horizontal axis expresses the log change (between 2015 and 1995) in the share of time deposit of a bank b to
total banking sector assets. The vertical axis denotes the log change (between 2015 and 1995) in the share of C&I
loans of bank b to total banking sector assets. The data is sorted into 100 bins based on the bank’s time deposit
change. For each bin, the figure plots the average value of the two variables.
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Figure 1.20: The effects of changes in nominal interest rates on equilibrium outcomes
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Notes: This figure presents the mean values of savings deposit spread, difference in deposit rates, time deposits share,
business loans share, loan spread and investment normalized by the gross operating surplus (GOS) from model
simulated data for nominal interest rates vaying between 0.5% (the level of Fed funds rate in 1985) and 8% (level in
1985).
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1.13. Additional figures
Figure 1.21: Local projections with monetary policy shocks
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response to a 100 basis point contractionary monetary policy shock based on the
local projections approach, as described by Equation 1.6. Panel (a) shows the response to the growth (log-difference)
of time deposits. Panel (b) plots the response to the growth of savings deposits. Panel (c) plots the response to the
growth of C&I loans. Panel (d) plots the response to the growth of security holdings. The monetary policy shocks are
based on high frequency surprises around policy announcement by Gertler and Karadi (2015). 90 percent confidence
bands are shown using standard errors that are clustered at the bank and time level.
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Figure 1.22: Monetary policy, time deposits and market power: robustness

Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for the relationship between bank market power and the sensitivity
time deposit quantities to the Fed funds rate. I proxy for bank market power with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI). Vertical axis denotes Time Deposits Beta which is constructed by estimating the sensitivity of the bank’s log
change in time deposit volume to the changes in the Fed funds rate, following Equation 1.7. The sum of the beta
estimates is denoted as Time Deposits Beta. The figure sorts the banks into 100 bins based on HHI, computes the
average betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.23: Loan Spreads on C&I Loans and ARMs
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Notes: This figure presents the evolution of spreads for C&I loans and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). C&I loans
spreads are computed from Dealscan data as a difference between the newly issued loans to speculative-grade and
unrated firms which are the highest risk category and the Fed funds rate. ARM Loan Spread is computed as a
difference between a 1-Year Adjustable Rate Mortgage Average (from Freddie Mac) and 1-Year Treasury Rate.
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Figure 1.24: Monetary policy and loan spreads: Heterogeneity by riskiness
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Notes: This figure presents impulse response to a 100 basis point increase in the Fed funds rate based on the local
projections approach, as described by Equation 1.12. The outcome variable is the change in the average spread of
loans at a respective rating category. Panel (a) uses the safest borrowers, measured as AAA to A rated firms. Panel
(b) focuses on BBB rated firms. Panel (c) presents the results for riskiest borrowers: firms rated either below a BBB
notch or non-rated firms. 90 percent confidence bands are shown using standard errors that are clustered at the bank
and time level.
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Figure 1.25: Monetary policy and other asset classes: Cross-section
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Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for the relationship between the responses of time (savings) deposits
quantity and quantity of various adjustable-rate (fixed-rate) asset classes to Fed funds rate changes. Panels (a), (c)
and (e) report results for a range of adjustable-rate assets while Panels (b), (d) and (f) present the results for
fixed-rate asset classes. Specifically, Panel (a) focuses on short-term securities (with maturity less than one year).
Panel (b) plots the results for long-term securities (with maturity one year and more). Panel (c) focuses on
adjustable-rate real estate loans and Panel (d) reports the results for fixed-rate real estate loans. Finally, Panels (e)
and (f) show the responses for other adjustable-rate and fixed-rate assets, respectively. The figure is constructed in
following steps. The first step is to estimate the sensitivity of bank’s log change in time (savings) deposit volume to
changes in the Fed funds rate, following Equation 1.7. The sum of the beta estimates is denoted as Time (Savings)
Deposits Beta. Second step is to repeat the estimation for all six asset classes and construct their respective quantity
beta denoted on the y-axis in each panel. Third step is to sort the banks into 100 bins based on their Time (Savings)
Deposits Beta. Fourth step is to compute the average betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.26: Business investment & loans
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Notes: This figure presents the time-series evolution of business lending and business investment. Business loans are
expressed as a share of non-financial sector debt. Business investment is reported as a share of non-financial sector
debt in Panel (a) and as a share of business sector gross value added in Panel (b).

Figure 1.27: Firm borrowing and investment effects of monetary policy

Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plots for the relationship between the firm-level credit and investment
sensitivity to monetary policy. The figure is constructed in following steps. The first step is to estimate the sensitivity
of the change in log of firm debt to the Fed funds rate following Equation 1.17. The sum of the beta estimates is
denoted as Firm Debt Beta. Second step is to repeat the estimation using log change in capital as a dependent
variable to estimate Firm Investment Beta. Capital is computed using perpetual inventory method using Compustat
data as in Ottonello and Winberry (2020). Third step is to sort the firms into 100 bins based on their Firm Debt
Beta. Fourth step is to compute the average betas for each bin and graph the bin scatter plots.
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Figure 1.28: Trends in time deposits and business loans
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Notes: This figure presents an evolution of time deposits and business loans. Plan (a) shows the series in terms of a
share to non-financial sector debt. Panel (b) scales the series to total assets of the banking sector.

Figure 1.29: Short-term analysis: Time deposits and firm entry

Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plot of a relationship between the new firm creation and time deposits
growth using pooled data across all years. Time deposit growth is a quarter-over-quarter change in time deposits of
banks operating in county c computed as described in Equation 1.18. The vertical axis denotes number of new firms
created in county c in quarter t over county-level population in quarter t. The data is sorted into 100 bins based on
the time deposit growth. For each bin, the figure plots the average value of the two variables.
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Figure 1.30: Time deposits and firm entry: Sub-samples

.012

New Firms Created/Population
.013
.014
.015

New Firms Created/Population
.014
.016
.018
.012

-.1

0

.1
Time Deposits Growth

.2

.3

-.05

0

.05
.1
Time Deposits Growth

.15

.2

Time Deposits Growth and Firm Creation in 2008

.01

.01

New Firms Created/Population
.011
.012

.013

Time Deposits Growth and Firm Creation in 2004

New Firms Created/Population
.012
.014

.016

Time Deposits Growth and Firm Creation in 2000

.016

Time Deposits Growth and Firm Creation in 1997

-.05

0

.05
Time Deposits Growth

.1

.15

-.1

0

.1

.2

Time Deposits Growth

New Firms Created/Population
.009
.01

.011

Time Deposits Growth and Firm Creation in 2013

-.1

-.05

0
Time Deposits Growth

.05

.1

Notes: This figure presents the bin scatter plot of a relationship between the new firm creation and time deposits
growth using pooled data for a respective year: 1997, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2013. Time deposit growth is a
year-over-year change in time deposits in county c computed as described in Equation 1.18. The vertical axis denotes
number of new firms created in county c in year t over county-level population in year t. The data is sorted into 100
bins based on the time deposit growth. For each bin, the figure plots the average value of the two variables.
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CHAPTER 2
Twin Defaults and Bank Capital Requirements
(with Caterina Mendicino, Kalin Nikolov,
Juan Rubio-Ramirez and Javier Suarez)
More than a decade after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the optimal level of bank capital
requirements still remains an open question. Bank capital is considered the best way to
protect individual banks and the aggregate economy against the risk of bank insolvencies.
When bank capital ratios are low, abnormally high default rates among bank borrowers
lead to sharp declines in bank net worth and increases in bank failures. The resulting
fall in bank lending further amplifies the real and financial implications of credit losses.
Thus, many academics and policy-makers have made the case for significantly higher capital
requirements (see e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 2013; The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
2017). However, when banks’ capacity to raise equity is limited, lowering the frequency of
severe bank insolvencies may come at the cost of restricting bank credit provision in normal
times (see e.g. Calomiris, 2013). Quantifying this trade-off is crucial for the assessment of
optimal capital requirements and requires a framework that captures well the behavior of
the economy in normal times as well as the frequency and severity of twin defaults – i.e.
episodes of simultaneously high levels of borrower and bank defaults.
This paper studies this important trade-off in a quantitative macro-banking model whose
main distinguishing feature is to account for the special structure of bank asset risk (see
Nagel and Purnanandam, 2020). Specifically, in our model banks hold portfolios of risky
loans whose risk of default is not fully diversifiable at the bank level. As a result, bank
solvency problems arise endogenously from high default rates among bank borrowers. Such
features allow the model to replicate the high and positive correlation between borrower and
bank defaults observed in the data and capture the behavior of the economy not only in
normal times but also during periods of twin defaults. While rare, such episodes involve
very large deadweight losses due to the simultaneous occurrence of high default rates among
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both banks and their borrowers. This exacerbates the contraction in economic activity and
the welfare losses associated with bank insolvencies.39 Hence, for the same level of bank
insolvencies, our model implies optimal capital requirements that are five percentage points
higher than under alternative specifications of bank asset returns which overlook the impact
of borrowers’ default on banks’ default.
As noted by Gornall and Strebulaev (2018) and Nagel and Purnanandam (2020) in a partial
equilibrium setup, capturing bank default risk dynamics requires a structural model of bank
asset returns. We model banks’ portfolios of loans subject to non-diversifiable default risk.
The distribution of the returns of these portfolios differs from the log-normal distribution of
asset returns assumed in standard models of default since Merton (1974) (which we call the
Merton-type model). In our framework, loans yield bounded repayments when they perform
but may entail significant losses when banks’ borrowers default, so the portfolio returns
exhibit limited upside potential but significant downside risk. Importantly, the asymmetry in
bank asset returns arises endogenously in our model as loan performance is the main driver
of bank insolvencies. We show that in our general equilibrium set up this is essential to
reproduce the high and positive correlation between borrower and bank defaults and generate
the frequency and severity of twin default crises observed in the data.
Existing macro-banking papers on the optimal level of capital requirements typically instead
assume that banks earn equity-like returns with unlimited upside, like in the Merton-type
model. Some of the models abstract from the default of bank borrowers and assume that banks
invest directly in productive capital (e.g. Van Den Heuvel, 2008; Begenau and Landvoigt,
2017; Begenau, 2020).40 Others adopt a “double-decker” framework where banks explicitly
provide defaultable loans to firms (e.g., Clerc et al., 2015; Mendicino et al., 2018, 2020;
Elenev et al., 2021). However, for tractability, these models assume that bank solvency risk
39

As in the costly state verification model (Townsend, 1979) adopted by the financial accelerator literature
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), defaults in our model entail deadweight bankruptcy costs.
40
This approach is similar to the one adopted in seminal macro-banking models (e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki,
2010; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) whose focus is neither
on bank default risk nor the optimal level of capital requirements.
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arises from idiosyncratic shocks to bank revenues which are unrelated to the performance of
the underlying loans.41 We show that, for this reason, standard Merton-type models of bank
default underestimate the correlation between firm and bank defaults and the frequency
of twin defaults observed in the data. Hence, in these frameworks bank insolvencies are
associated to remarkably lower deadweight losses and contractions in economic activity than
in our model. This biases downward the net benefits of higher capital requirements, and,
thus, underestimates their optimal level.42
In our quantitative framework banks extend loans to firms using insured deposits and equity
(own net worth) and are subject to regulatory capital requirements. Firms produce the final
good using capital and labor and pay for their inputs of production partly using external
financing in the form of bank loans. Both firms and banks operate under limited liability
and can default on their debt obligations. As in Baron et al. (2021), bank equity declines
are the key driver of bank solvency crises in our model.43 Banks are exposed to default
risk because firms’ performance is affected by shocks which are not fully diversifiable at the
bank level. Specifically, we assume that credit markets are segmented into islands: a bank
can only grant loans to a continuum of firms on a given island.44 Each firm in the island is
exposed to both firm- and island-idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Banks can diversify away
firm-idiosyncratic shocks by lending to all firms in the island. But island-idiosyncratic shocks
affect all firms operating in the island in the same way and, hence, are not-diversifiable at
the bank level.45 Thus island risk generates heterogeneity in banks’ asset returns and default
41

A single risk factor specification (Vasicek, 2002) or aggregate shocks could also generate bank default
risk. In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks to bank revenues, these approaches, however, would not produce
heterogeneity in default outcomes across banks.
42
The comparison is based on a calibrated Merton-type variant of our model. Specifically, we assume
that the default risk of banks comes from exogenous disturbances that directly hit banks’ loan returns.
Importantly, the average probability of bank default and its standard deviation is the same in both models.
43
Using historical data, Baron et al. (2021) find bank equity losses to predict subsequent contractions
in bank credit and aggregate economic activity. Their evidence clearly shows that while panics are an
amplification mechanism, they are not necessary for banking crisis to have severe economic consequences.
Our analysis therefore abstracts from the complications associated with the modelling of panics.
44
In our model, the segmentation does not apply to any other market, including the funding of banks.
45
Our assumption on the exposure of banks to non-diversifiable risk is consistent with the evidence in
Galaasen et al. (2020), which using matched bank-firm data for Norway show that idiosyncratic borrower
risk is an economically significant source of non-diversifiable risk affecting banks’ loan portfolio returns.
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outcomes.
The asset returns of individual banks depend on the island-idiosyncratic shock in a highly
non-linear manner. In islands with high realizations of this shock, a large fraction of borrowers
repay the contractual amount. In islands with low realizations, more borrowers default and
banks make significant losses. Thus, asset returns of individual banks are characterized by
limited upside risk but significant downside risk. While idiosyncratic shocks are assumed
to be log-normally distributed, individual bank banks’ asset returns endogenously feature
highly left-skewed and asymmetric returns.
After building a macro-banking model of default risk, we ensure that it reproduces relevant
features of the data, including the positive correlation between bank and firm defaults and
the frequency and severity of twin default episodes. To generate aggregate fluctuations in
macroeconomic and financial variables, the model includes aggregate shocks: total factor
productivity (TFP) shocks, as well as firm- and island-risk shocks. Firm- and island-risk
shocks affect the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks to firms and islands, respectively, and
resemble the risk and uncertainty shocks commonly used in the literature (see Bloom, 2009;
Christiano et al., 2014). In our model, they are crucial to generate fluctuations in firm and
bank defaults.
We estimate the model parameters using the generalized method of moments, targeting a
large set of unconditional moments in macro, banking and financial euro area (EA) data
over the period 1992-2016. To capture the non-linearity intrinsic in the returns on bank
loans in a tractable way, we use a higher order perturbation solution method. Our model
matches well the targeted mean and standard deviation of firm and bank defaults, as well
as the positive correlation that these rates exhibit in the data. In contrast, as mentioned
above, the standard Merton-type model of bank default risk commonly used in the literature
underestimates the correlation between the default rates of banks and their borrowers.
We also validate the performance of the model in terms of empirical moments describing the
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relationship between firm and bank defaults and GDP growth not targeted in the estimation.
In the data, the overall positive correlation between the two default rates hides substantial
non-linearity in their co-movement. Quantile regressions clearly show that the sensitivity
of bank default to firm default is higher in the upper quantiles of bank default. Once bank
default risk is already very high, its sensitivity to an increase in borrowers’ default is higher
than in good times. In addition, there is a strong negative link between GDP growth and
bank default at lower quantiles of GDP growth, consistent with the importance of financing
conditions as a determinant of the economy’s downside risk (Adrian et al., 2019). Contrary
to the Merton-type approach, our model can mimic these non-linearities well thanks to the
non-linear structure of bank asset returns, which enables it to reproduce the frequency and
severity of the twin default episodes and the associated macroeconomic outcomes.
In addition to helping match the data, the structural link between the solvency of firms and
banks constitutes a powerful amplification mechanism which allows the model to generate twin
default episodes without the need for large exogenous aggregate shocks. In fact, these episodes
are the result of sequences of small negative island-risk shocks that become increasingly
amplified as the probability of bank failure grows. Intuitively, the non-linearity in bank asset
returns implies that, once banks have a high risk of failure, the marginal impact of additional
credit losses on banks’ solvency and the macroeconomy is much larger than in normal times.
After validating the quantitative implications of the model, we turn to the assessment of
the optimal level of capital requirements. The rationale for bank capital requirements in
our setup stems from the presence of safety net guarantees for banks.46 Banks’ outside
funding comes from insured deposits which pay an interest rate that is independent of banks’
leverage choices. This gives banks with limited-liability an incentive to under-price borrower
risk, as they do not internalize the effects of their individual choices on the social costs of
their failures. In addition, they also neglect their impact on the aggregate dynamics of bank
equity, which is key to determine the lending capacity of the whole banking sector and,
46

See Kareken and Wallace (1978) for an early reference.
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hence, the dynamics of the real economy. Thus, the model combines conventional micro- and
macro-prudential rationales for regulatory capital requirements.
Higher bank capital requirements limit bank risk taking incentives and make the banking
sector more resilient to credit losses. This reduces the probability of twin defaults and,
hence, the negative impact of high firm and bank defaults on welfare. However, higher
capital requirements also imply a higher average cost of funding for banks, which translates
into higher average borrowing costs for firms and lower average equilibrium levels of credit.
Assessing the optimal level of the capital requirements that maximizes social welfare requires
quantifying this trade-off.
In our estimated model, a fifteen percent bank capital requirement brings the probability of
twin defaults close to zero and maximizes social welfare. This is about five percentage points
higher than the optimal level of capital requirements implied by the Merton-type model
of bank default risk, which underestimates the probability of twin defaults. While in the
Merton-type model firm default is not the main driver of bank default, in our framework
bank insolvencies are always accompanied by high levels of defaults among banks’ borrowers.
Hence, bank default events are significantly more severe in our model compared to the
Merton-type framework. For the same level of bank insolvencies, our model predicts larger
costs for the society, as the economy experiences deadweight default losses and equity declines
not only for banks but also for firms. This result underscores the importance of modelling
bank default risk in a structural way. Failing to generate the right frequency and severity of
twin defaults understates the costs associated with bank default and, hence, biases downwards
the net benefits of higher capital requirements.
Related literature This paper contributes to several strands of the macro-finance literature. First, from a modeling perspective, we contribute to the macro-banking literature by
capturing the link between borrowers’ and banks’ default in a structural and yet tractable
way. In an important departure from the standard financial accelerator literature (e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012), we
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assume that banks are not a veil and are subject to default risk. We share with earlier papers
the assumption that the returns on the firms’ productive projects are log-normally distributed,
as in the classical Merton model of corporate default (Merton, 1974). But, in line with
Gornall and Strebulaev (2018) and Nagel and Purnanandam (2020), the returns on the portfolio of defaultable loans feature limited upside but unlimited downside risk. This appears endogenously in our model due to the incidence of borrower default risk which is non-diversifable
at bank level (island setup). This natural but non-trivial extension of the standard framework
is what crucially distinguishes our model also from other models in which banks directly hold
productive assets (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Piazzesi et al., 2019) as well as from standard
double-decker models of bank default risk.

47

The tractability of the Merton-type approach to bank default risk is useful when solving large models which include, for instance, different types of intermediaries (e.g.,
Begenau and Landvoigt, 2017) or loans (e.g., Mendicino et al., 2018), long-term debt (e.g.,
Jermann, 2019; Elenev et al., 2021), liquidity interventions (e.g., Gete and Melkadze, 2020)
and monetary policy (e.g., Mendicino et al., 2020).48 However, our structural approach is
better suited to understand the normative and positive implications of credit losses as the
main driver of bank insolvencies.
Second, capturing the special structure of bank asset risk, and hence the frequency and
severity of twin defaults, allows us to properly account for the social costs of bank insolvencies. This implies substantially higher optimal capital requirements than in the
literature that provides a quantitative macroeconomic assessment of bank capital requirements (e.g. Van Den Heuvel, 2008; Clerc et al., 2015; Begenau, 2020; Corbae and D’Erasmo,
2019; Davydiuk, 2019; Mendicino et al., 2018, 2020; Elenev et al., 2021). Regardless of the
47

Gete (2018), Rampini and Viswanathan (2019), Ferrante (2019) and Villacorta (2020), among others,
develop double-decker models of banks’ and borrowers’ net-worth which, however, abstract from bank default.
48
In these models, banks are only exposed to aggregate risk and the ex-post heterogeneity in bank asset
returns arises from shocks that affect directly the aggregate returns on the loan portfolio of the bank and not
the performance of the individual loan/borrower. We share with this earlier literature the focus on banking
crises without panics (Baron et al. (2021)).
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differences in the underlying frictions, a common result in this strand of the literature is that
the optimal level of capital requirements is only a couple of percentage points different from
baseline pre-crisis levels.49
Third, our structural approach to bank asset risk also contributes to the understanding of how
financial vulnerabilities lead to downside risks to GDP. Consistent with recent evidence on the
link between financial vulnerabilities and downside risks to GDP (e.g. Adrian et al., 2019),
we show that bank default risk is a strong determinant of the economy’s downside risk. In
our model, when the risk of bank insolvencies is high, small shocks to banks’ non-diversifiable
risk have a magnified negative impact on aggregate macroeconomic outcomes.
Finally, our focus on the non-linearities due to the special structure of bank asset risk
and its impact on bank default risk adds a complementary perspective to the literature that emphasizes other non-linear aspects of financial crises.

Aspects analyzed

by prior work include asset price feedback loops (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), occasionally binding constraints (Mendoza, 2010;
Benigno et al., 2013; Bianchi, 2016), bank panics (Gertler et al., 2019), liquidity problems
(Bigio, 2015; De Fiore et al., 2018), systemic risk (Martinez-Miera and Suarez, 2014), time
varying risk-premia (Coimbra and Rey, 2019) and sovereign defaults (Arellano, 2008; Bocola,
2016).

2.1. Model
Household. The model economy is populated by a representative household that provides
consumption insurance to three types of members: workers, entrepreneurs and bankers.
Workers supply labor to the production sector and transfer their wage income back to
the family. Entrepreneurs and bankers provide equity to entrepreneurial firms and banks,
respectively.50
49
The majority of such papers suggests gains from higher capital requirements. An exception is Elenev et al.
(2021) whose results point to an optimal level of capital requirements one percentage point below the baseline
pre-crisis level.
50
The focus of our paper on bank lending to firms is consistent with the important role of EA banks in
lending to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and the importance of NFC defaults as drivers of credit losses
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Entrepreneurial firms and banks. Entrepreneurial firms produce the final good and pay
for the inputs of production in advance. Banks grant loans to firms. Both entrepreneurial
firms and banks live for one period, issue equities among, respectively, entrepreneurs and
bankers (both with limited net worth) and obtain external financing by issuing non-recourse
non-contingent debt in the form of bank loans and deposits, respectively. They operate
under limited liability and default when their terminal asset value is lower than their debt
obligations. In the case of default, their lenders take possession of their assets at a cost equal
to a proportion µκ of assets (with κ=e,b). Non-defaulted entrepreneurial firms and banks
pay their terminal net worth to entrepreneurs and bankers, respectively. Explicit safety net
guarantees for banks are modelled in the form of insured deposits.
Island setup. There exist a continuum of measure one of islands. In each island there is a
continuum of measure one of entrepreneurial firms and a representative bank. Entrepreneurial
firms are subject to both firm- and island-idiosyncratic shocks, whose realizations affect
their terminal net worth. Banks cannot lend across islands. So, each representative bank
diversifies its lending across entrepreneurial firms in its island but not across islands.51 The
bank’s terminal net worth therefore depends on the realization of the island-idiosyncratic
shock.
The island-based market segmentation only applies to the credit market. All factors of
production as well as the final output are freely mobile across islands. Deposit and equity
funding are also not island specific. Without loss of generality, each firm (bank) receives an
identical amount of equity from entrepreneurs (bankers).52 Given that all firms (banks) are
identical ex-ante they all receive the same loan (deposit) amount.
in Europe (EBA, 2018). Our model could be adapted to consider the case in which bank borrowers are
households to finance house purchases with mortgages. However, such a setup would be less relevant in the
EA since the recourse nature of most European mortgages makes the default rates of these loans very low
even in bad times.
51
Imperfect diversification can be interpreted as the result of credit market segmentation and/or specialization. In Europe, banks operate largely within national borders and many specialize in lending to particular
industries and sectors (Guiso et al., 2004; De Bonis et al., 2011; Behr and Schmidt, 2016; De Jonghe et al.,
2020). Geographic and sectoral specialization is also a feature of US small and medium-sized banks
(Deyoung et al., 2015; Regehr and Sengupta, 2016) and banks in Peru (Paravisini et al., 2015).
52
This is also equal to the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs (bankers).
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2.1.1. The Household
In each period some workers become either entrepreneurs (e) or bankers (b) and the same
measure of entrepreneurs and bankers retire and become workers again.53 At the beginning
of each period entrepreneurs (bankers) receive payments from last period entrepreneurial
firms (banks) and stay active with probability θκ (with κ=e,b) or retire otherwise. Upon
retirement entrepreneurs (bankers) transfer any accumulated net worth to the household.
At the same time, a mass (1 − θκ ) of workers become entrepreneurs (bankers). The new
entrepreneurs (bankers) receive aggregate endowments ικ,t from the household. Bankers pay
lump-sum taxes to the deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) so as to cover the losses on the
insured deposits in banks that defaulted in the previous period.
The household chooses consumption, Ct , hours worked, Ht , and insured bank deposits, Dt ,
to maximize the present discounted value of utility
∞ 
X
Et
β s log (Cs ) −
s=t

φ
H 1+η
1+η s



subject to the budget constraint

Ct + Dt = wt Ht + Rd,t−1 Dt−1 + Υt + Ξt

(2.1)

where η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, φ is the weight of labor supply
in the utility of households, wt is the real hourly wage and Rd,t−1 is the gross rate of deposits.
In addition Υt are aggregate net transfers from entrepreneurs and bankers to households
(including both the aggregate initial transfers (ικ,t , κ=e,b) and the accumulated net worth
upon retirement), and Ξt is profits from the capital producing firms that households own.
We are interested in a symmetric equilibrium, hence we assume that the household invests
its deposits symmetrically in all the (symmetric) banks in the economy. All the variables in
53

This assumption guarantees that entrepreneurs and bankers do not accumulate enough net worth such
that entrepreneurial firms and banks can be entirely financed with internal funds (see Gertler and Kiyotaki,
2010).
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the problem of the household represent aggregate variables.
2.1.2. Entrepreneurs and Bankers
As the problems of entrepreneurs (κ=e) and bankers (κ=b) are identical, we outline them together in general terms in this section. Let Vκ,t (nκ,t (i)) be the value of being an entrepreneur
(banker) i ∈ (0, 1) with net worth nκ,t (i) at period t from the perspective of the household
to which she belongs. Every period, entrepreneur (banker) i decides how much of her net
worth, nκ,t (i), to invest in a portfolio of equity of the continuum of entrepreneurial firms
(banks) living in period t, eqκ,t (i), and how much to pay back to the household in the form
of dividends, dvκ,t (i), to maximize

Vκ,t (nκ,t (i)) =

max
eqκ,t (i),dvκ,t (i)

{dv κ,t (i) + Et Λt+1 [(1 − θκ ) nκ,t+1 (i) + θκ Vκ,t+1 (nκ,t+1 (i))]}
(2.2)

subject to

eqκ,t (i) + dv κ,t (i) = nκ,t (i),

(2.3)

nκ,t+1 (i)) = θκ ρκ,t+1 eqκ,t (i), and
dv κ,t (i) ≥ 0.
From the point of view of the entrepreneur (banker) maximizing the value function described
above, ρκ,t+1 is an exogenous random variable. In equilibrium, ρκ,t+1 equals the gross
rate of return of the portfolio of entrepreneurial (banker) equity. A detailed expression
for the equilibrium value of ρκ,t+1 is provided below. We are interested in a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence, we assume that each entrepreneur (banker) invests symmetrically in all
the (symmetric) entrepreneurial firms (banks) of the economy. The constraint dv κ,t (i) ≥ 0
reflects the fact that entrepreneurs (bankers) can freely pay positive dividends back to the
household but the household cannot provide further net worth to the entrepreneurs (bankers).
All the variables in the problem of the entrepreneur (banker) represent per capita variables.54
54
The rate of return ρκ,t+1 is a function of time t endogenous aggregate state variables and time t + 1
exogenous aggregate state variables (i.e., aggregate shocks). Hence, the value function Vκ,t is not only a
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As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), we guess that the value function of being an entrepreneur
(banker) is linear in her net worth, Vκ,t (nκ,t (i)) = νκ,t nκ,t (i), where νκ,t is the shadow value
of one unit of entrepreneurial (banker) net worth.55 Then we can write the Bellman Equation
(2.2) as

νκ,t nκ,t (i) =

max
eqκ,t (i),dvκ,t (i)

[dv κ,t (i) + Et Λt+1 (1 − θκ + θκ ν κ,t+1 ) nκ,t+1 (i)] .

(2.4)

We guess and later verify that, in the proximity of the steady state, νκ,t ≥ 1. From the
envelope theorem dv κ,t (i) = 0 whenever νκ,t > 1. Under our parameter values νκ,t = 1
with a probability close to zero. As a result, we impose dv κ,t (i) = 0 such that the Bellman
equation (2.4) reduces to

νκ,t = Et Λt+1 (1 − θκ + θκ νκ,t+1 ) ρκ,t+1

(2.5)

and the evolution of an entrepreneur’s (banker’s) net worth is nκ,t+1 (i) = ρκ,t+1 nκ,t (i).
We assume that continuing entrepreneurs (bankers) cannot raise additional outside equity
from the household. This creates an aggregate shortage of entrepreneurial (banker) equity,
which keeps the risk-adjusted expected return to entrepreneurial (banker) equity greater
than the risk-free rate in equilibrium. As a result, the shadow value of funds in the hands of
entrepreneurs (bankers), νκ,t , is greater than unity (that is, if the household were able to
transfer more funds to entrepreneurs (bankers), it would do so). The entrepreneur (banker)
therefore retains all her net worth and pays no dividends until she retires. Equation (2.5)
defines the entrepreneurs’ (bankers’) stochastic discount factor for later use as Λκ,t+1 =
Λt+1 (1 − θκ + θκ νκ,t+1 ), where Λt+1 ≡ β λλt+1
is the household’s stochastic discount factor
t
function of the individual state variable, nκ,t (i) but also of the aggregate state variables. For this reason the
individual entrepreneur (banker) needs to guess rules to forecast the aggregate state variables. In equilibrium,
those rules need to be coherent with behavior. To simplify notation, we only describe the dependence of the
value function with respect to the individual state variable.
55
We need an index i for individual entrepreneurs (bankers) because each of them has been an entrepreneur
(banker) for a different length of time and has therefore accumulated a different level of net worth. However,
since individual entrepreneur (banker) value functions and policy functions are linear in own net worth, the
distribution of entrepreneurial (banker) wealth is irrelevant for aggregate outcomes. As we will see below,
aggregate investment and credit demand depend only on the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs (bankers).

110

and λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint of the household problem.
2.1.3. Entrepreneurial firms
Entrepreneurial firms active in period t produce the final good, yt+1 , using labor, ht , and
capital, kt
yt+1 = At+1 ktα h1−α
,
t

(2.6)

where At is an aggregate TFP shock. At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurial firms
buy capital from capital producers at price qt . In period t, they pay wt ht + qt kt using equity
from entrepreneurs, EQe,t , and loans from the bank in their island, Bf,t , with gross loan
interest rate Rf,t . At the beginning of period t + 1, the final good is produced and sold to
the households and the depreciated capital, (1 − δ) kt , is sold back to the capital producers
at price qt+1 . Although entrepreneurial firms can only borrow from island-specific banks,
final goods, labor, and capital can move freely across islands.56
The idiosyncratic shocks. Entrepreneurial firms active in period t face a firm-idiosyncratic
shock, ωi , and an island-idiosyncratic shock, ωj to the terminal value of their assets (output
plus the market value of undepreciated capital).57 We assume that ωi and ωj are log-normally
 2

σω ,t+1
2
ϑ
distributed, log(ωϑ ) ∼ N − 2 , σωϑ ,t+1 for ϑ= i, j. The standard deviation of both
idiosyncratic shocks is time-varying and subject to persistent aggregate shocks whose law of
motion will be introduced below. We denote the CDFs of ωi and ωj by Fi,t+1 and Fj,t+1 ,
respectively. The subscript t + 1 captures the dependence of the CDFs on the aggregate risk
shocks.
Terminal net worth of an entrepreneurial firm. An entrepreneurial firm i living on
an island j borrows from bank j and default if its terminal assets values is insufficient to pay
back its loan, Rf,t Bf,t , in full

Πi,j,t+1 (ωi , ωj ) = ωi ωj [qt+1 (1 − δ) kt + yt+1 ] − Rf,t Bf,t < 0.
56

(2.7)

Since entrepreneurial firms have constant returns, the scale of an individual firm is indeterminate.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a continuum of measure one of firms in each island.
57
These shocks are independent across firms and across time and they are realized at the same time.
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and the entrepreneurial firm defaults on its loan when Πi,j,t+1 (ωi , ωj ) < 0.
Thus, entrepreneurial firms can default both for aggregate (e.g. large movements in TFP, At+1
or in the price of capital, qt+1 ) and idiosyncratic reasons. While the two idiosyncratic shocks
are indistinguishable from the point of view of the individual firm, they have very different
implications for the bank lending to the firms on a given island. The ωi is idiosyncratic
across the continuum of firms operating in an island and, thus, can be diversified by the
banks lending in each island. Instead, the ωj is idiosyncratic across islands and hits all the
firms within an island in the same way. As banks cannot lend across islands, this shock is
non-diversifiable by the bank lending within an island.
From Equation (2.7), it is useful to define the threshold value for the firm-idiosyncratic shock
ωi below which entrepreneurial firms experiencing an island-idiosyncratic shock ωj default is

ω̄t+1 (ωj ) =

Rf,t Bf,t
.
ωj (qt+1 (1 − δ) kt + yt+1 )

(2.8)

A low realization of the island-idiosyncratic shock increases the threshold at which firms
default on their bank. This implies that a larger fraction of firms default.Thus, the default rate
on the portfolio of the bank on island j depends on the realization of the island-idiosyncratic
shock ωj in the island. This is a key source of default risk for banks in our framework.
Entrepreneurial firms choose capital, hours worked, the loan amount, and the gross loan
rate to maximize the net present value of the entrepreneurs’ equity stake conditional on not
defaulting
Z
max

kt ,ht ,Bf,t ,Rf,t

∞Z ∞

Et Λe,t+1


max [Πi,j,t+1 (ωi , ωj ) , 0] dFi,t+1 (ωi ) dFj,t+1 (ωj )

0

0

subject to
Bf,t + EQe,t = wt ht + qt kt , and
Et Λb,t+1 Πb,t+1 ≥ νb,t ϕBf,t ,
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(2.9)
(2.10)

where Equation (2.9) is the entrepreneurial firm’s budget constraint. Equation (2.10) is the
bankers’ participation constraint, which determines the interest rate Rf,t at which a bank is
willing to lend such that the expected discounted bank profits are sufficient to compensate
for the cost of equity required to provide the loan. As explained and fully specified in detail
below, Λb,t+1 is bankers’ stochastic discount factor, Πb,t+1 is the payoff that bankers would
receive from equity invested across banks that provide the corresponding bank loans to all
the firms operating in their island (that will be defined below), νb,t is the shadow value of
bankers’ net worth, and ϕ is the regulatory capital requirement that determines the fraction
of the loan amount Bf,t that must be funded with equity at period t. Thus, the participation
constraint of the bank reflects the competitive pricing of the loans that banks are willing to
offer for different leverage and productive choices by entrepreneurial firms.
Finally, the gross rate of return on the portfolio of equity of an entrepreneur that symmetrically
invests in all entrepreneurial firms is ρe,t+1 =

Πf,t+1
EQe,t .

2.1.4. Banks
As entrepreneurial firms, banks are active for a single period. In period t banks use equity
EQb,t from bankers and deposits dt from households in order to provide loans bf,t to
entrepreneurial firms operating in their island. Hence, they face the following balance-sheet
constraint
bf,t = EQb,t + dt .

(2.11)

We assume that banks invest symmetrically in all the (symmetric) entrepreneurial firms in
their island. Banks also face the following regulatory capital constraint

EQb,t ≥ ϕbf,t

(2.12)

where ϕ is the capital requirement on loans. As explained below, in equilibrium, the capital
constraint is always binding because funding the bank with deposits is always cheaper than
funding it with equity.
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Gross rate of return on assets of the bank in island j. Banks operate under constant
returns to scale; hence, their individual loan supply is perfectly elastic as long as the loan
rate and the decisions of the borrowing firm satisfy bankers’ participation constraint. This
constraint plays the role of the zero profit condition in standard production theory and it
stipulates that the loan must guarantee the bankers the equilibrium expected rate of return
on banker equity. Because the bank is a levered institution with the possibility to default
at time t + 1, the expected equity return also includes the value of limited liability, which
allows shareholders to avoid negative returns. In the remainder of this section, we cover the
steps needed to derive a detailed expression for bankers’ payoffs.
We start by computing the terminal asset value of the representative bank living in island
j. At the beginning of period t + 1, firm- and island-idiosyncratic shocks, ωi and ωj , hit
the entrepreneurial firms living at period t. As derived in Equation (2.8), conditional on
the island-idiosyncratic shock ωj , an entrepreneurial firm pays back its loan in full when it
experiences a firm-idiosyncratic shock no lower than ω̄t+1 (ωj ). Entrepreneurial firms with
firm-idiosyncratic shocks smaller than ω̄t+1 (ωj ) default on their loans and the bank only
recovers a fraction 1 − µf of the terminal value of the entrepreneurial firm’s assets. Hence,
the gross rate of return on assets of the bank in island j is
R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) =

(1 − µf ) ωj [qt+1 (1 − δ) kt + yt+1 ]
bf,t

ω̄t+1 (ωj )

Z

∞

Z
ωi dFi,t+1 (ωi ) + Rf,t

0

dFi,t+1 (ωi ) .
ω̄t+1 (ωj )

(2.13)

where the first (second) part of Equation 2.13 represents the repayment per unit of loan
from non-defaulting (defaulting) entrepreneurial firms in an island experiencing an islandidiosyncratic shock ωj .
Following Bernanke et al. (1999) it is useful to define
Z
Γi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) =

ω̄t+1 (ωj )

Z

∞

ωi dFi,t+1 (ωi ) + ω̄t+1 (ωj )
0

dFi,t+1 (ωi )
ω̄t+1 (ωj )

and
Z

ω̄t+1 (ωj )

Gi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) =

ωi dFi,t+1 (ωi ) .
0

114

Then Equation (2.13) can be rewritten more compactly as

R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) = [Γi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) − µf Gi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj ))]

ωj [qt+1 (1 − δ) kt + yt+1 ]
.
bf,t

(2.14)

Yet again, it is worth noting that the return of the bank in island j is a function of the
island-idiosyncratic shock ωj . The mechanism works through the impact of ωj on the default
rate of entrepreneurial firms on island j as well as on the recovery value of the assets of
defaulted entrepreneurial firms.
Equation (2.14) shows that the bank’s loan portfolio return is a non-linear function of ωj and
hence is not log-normal even if ωj itself is. Thus our model departs from the standard Merton
approach (Merton, 1974) where it is assumed that bank asset returns follow a log-normal
process.58 Our choice complicates the model solution with respect to the Merton’s approach.
More details will be provided in Section 2.2.1.
We will analyze extensively the implications of this feature of our model in Section 2.3.
Most importantly, our approach captures the limited upside of loan payoffs together with
the significant downside risks posed by borrower defaults. As we will see this enables our
model to capture important features of the data, including the frequency and severity of
twin default crises.59
Terminal net worth of a bank. Banks default on their deposits if their loan returns at
the beginning of period t + 1, R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) bf,t , are insufficient to pay the promised repayment,
Rd,t dt , in full
Πb,t+1 (ωj ) = R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) bf,t − Rd,t dt < 0.

(2.15)

58
Island-idiosynscratic shocks play at bank level the same role as the so-called “single risk factor" in the
partial equilibrium model of Vasicek (2002). See also (Gordy, 2003). In contrast to direct implementations
of such framework (e.g., Repullo and Suarez, 2013) our continuum of islands (and, hence, risk factors) allows
us to capture ex post heterogeneity in bank performance.
59
We will also show that, in contrast, a reduced-form version of bank default risk (Merton-type model)fails
to reproduce them and consequently also generates lower prescriptions for the optimal level of capital
requirements than our model.
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It is possible to show that the returns on the bank loan portfolio, R̃f,t+1 (ωj ), is a highly
non linear function of ωj . See Section 2.2.1.
Gross rate of return on the portfolio of bank equity. From Equation (2.15), it is
useful to define a threshold value for the island-specific shock ωj below which the bank in
island j defaults. This is implicitly done in the next equation
(2.16)

R̃f,t+1 (ω̄j,t+1 ) bf,t − Rd,t dt = 0.

Equation (2.16) implies that banks’ failure rate at the beginning of period t+1 is Fj,t+1 (ω̄j,t+1 ).
Thus, the aggregate payoffs of a portfolio containing the equity of all banks are then
Z

∞

R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) bf,t dFj,t+1 (ωj ) − Rd,t dt (1 − Fj,t+1 (ω̄j,t+1 ))

Πb,t+1 =

(2.17)

ω̄j,t+1

and the gross rate of return on the portfolio of equity of a banker that symmetrically invests
in all banks is
ρb,t+1 =

Πb,t+1
Πb,t+1
=
.
EQb,t
ϕbf,t

(2.18)

2.1.5. Capital Production
Capital producers combine the final good, It , with the last period capital goods, Kt−1 , in
order to produce new capital goods that competitively sell to entrepreneurial firms at price


I
qt . Capital producers face adjustment costs, S Kk,t
, as in Jermann (1998).60 The law of
t−1
motion of the capital stock can be written as

Kt = (1 − δ) Kt−1 + S

It
Kt−1



(2.19)

Kt−1 .

where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
60

The adjustment costs take the functional form: S



Ik,t
Kt−1



=

ak,1
1− ψ1

k



It
Kt−1

1−

1
ψk

+ ak,2 , where ak,1

and ak,2 are chosen to guarantee that in the steady state the investment-to-capital ratio is equal to the
depreciation rate and S ′ (It /Kt−1 ) equals one.
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2.1.6. Deposit Guarantee Scheme
The deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) charges lump-sum taxes to bankers to ex-post balance
its budget. The DGS has to balance its budget period-by-period. Hence, the total lump sum
tax Tt imposed on bankers to balance the agency’s budget is
1 − µj
Tt = Fj,t (ω̄j,t ) Rd,t−1 dt−1 −
dt−1
1−ϕ

ω̄j,t

Z

R̃f,t (ωj ) dFj,t (ωj ) ,

(2.20)

0

which uses the fact that in equilibrium dt = (1 − ϕ) bf,t .
2.1.7. Aggregate Shocks
We assume the following AR(1) law of motion for the TFP shock

log(At+1 ) = ρA log(At ) + σA ϵA,t+1 ,

(2.21)

where ϵA,t+1 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance one.
The standard deviation of the distribution of each idiosyncratic shock is time-varying and
evolves as an AR(1) process

log

σωϑ ,t+1
σ̄ωϑ




= ρσi log

σωϑ ,t
σ̄ωϑ


+ σϑ ϵωϑ ,t+1

(2.22)

for ϑ= i, j, where ϵωϑ ,t+1 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance one.61 These
shocks resemble the risk and uncertainty shocks commonly used in the literature (Bloom,
2009; Christiano et al., 2014). We will refer to them as firm- and island-risk shocks. In the
next sections we will show that these shocks are important source of aggregate risk in the
model and will be vital to generate fluctuations in firm and bank defaults.
2.1.8. Aggregation, Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Aggregation and market clearing conditions as well as the exhaustive list of equilibrium
conditions of the model are reported in Appendix 2.9.2.
61

This specification is similar to the one adopted in Christiano et al. (2014).
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2.2. Solution, Estimation and Model Validation
In this section we present the solution of the model, the estimation of the parameters and
the model validation results.
2.2.1. Solving the Model
We solve the system of stochastic difference equations implied by the equilibrium conditions
using a pruned state-space system for the third-order approximation around the steady state
as defined in Andreasen et al. (2017). This approach eliminates explosive sample paths and
greatly facilitates inference. In particular, it ensures the existence of unconditional moments.
This enables us to estimate the parameters of the model by applying the generalized method
of moments (GMM).
In order to use perturbation methods to approximate the solution to the model, we need
to compute the aggregate loan returns that banks generate conditional on not defaulting,
defined here as Rp,t+1 . These returns are the first term in Equation (2.17), namely,
Z

∞

Rp,t+1 ≡

R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) dFj,t+1 (ωj ) .

(2.23)

ω̄j,t+1

As already mentioned in the previous section, the bank’s loan return R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) is not
log-normally distributed because ωj enters non-linearly in its definition. This introduces a
complication: the integral in Equation (2.23) as well as its derivatives cannot be written as
an explicit function of the state variables. We overcome this challenge by (i) splitting this
integral into the sum of integrals taken over smaller intervals, and (ii) computing a series of
quadratic Taylor approximations of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) around a mid-point of each interval. Because
the powers of log-normally distributed variables are themselves log-normally distributed, the
quadratic approximation to the bank profit function is itself approximately log-normally
distributed and the expected profits as well as its derivatives can be computed as explicit
functions of the state variables.62 This approach is tractable and highly accurate. More
62


The state variables of the model are wt = Dt , Kt , Ht , Ne,t , Nb,t , qt , wt , Rf,t , Rd,t , At−1 , σωj ,t−1 , σωi ,t−1 .
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details are provided in Appendix 2.9.4.
2.2.2. Model Estimation
The estimation of the model follows a two-step procedure. First, prior to the estimation
procedure, some parameters are set to commonly used values in the literature. Second, we
estimate the rest of the parameters using quarterly euro area (EA) data between 1992:Q1
and 2016:Q4.
First Step. Since we use quarterly data, the discount factor of the households, β, is set
to 0.995, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, to one, the value of capital depreciation,
δ, to 0.025, and the capital-share parameter of the production function, α, to 0.30. The
cost parameters µf and µj are all set equal to 0.30.63 The capital requirement level, ϕ, is
set to be 0.08 which was the regulatory minimum in the Basel II regime. We set both θe
and θb to 0.975, implying that bankers and entrepreneurs remain active for ten years on
average. Finally, the labor utility parameter, φ, which only affects the scale of the economy,
is normalized to one.
Second Step. We estimate the parameters summarized in Table 2.1 by targeting a number
of macroeconomic, financial and banking moments.64 We target the standard deviations
of GDP, investment and consumption growth, the mean ratio of corporate loans to GDP
(Bt /GDPt in the model) along with the standard deviation of loan growth, the mean
and standard deviation of the loan spread (Rf,t − Rt in the model), and the mean and
standard deviation of ROE of banks (ρb,t in the model).65 Additionally, we also target
the mean and standard deviation of the conditional expectation of entrepreneurial firm
63

Similar values of firm default costs are used, among others, in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), who refer to
the evidence in Alderson and Betker (1995), where estimated liquidation costs are as high as 36 percent of
asset value. Among non-listed bank-dependent firms, these costs can be expected to be larger than those
among the highly levered, publicly traded US corporations studied in Andrade and Kaplan (1998), where
estimated financial distress costs fall in the range of 10 percent to 23 percent. Our choice of 30 percent is
consistent with the large foreclosure, reorganization and liquidation costs found in some of the countries
analyzed by Djankov et al. (2008). The value of the bank default cost parameter we pick is also in line with
Granja et al. (2017) who find that the average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets.
64
Appendix 2.9.1 describes the data counterpart of these model variables.
65
To avoid the impact of the resource costs of default on the measurement of output, we define GDPt as
GDPt = Ct + It .
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and bank default rates along with the unconditional correlation between the two default
probabilities. The conditional expectation of entrepreneurial firm defaults is defined as
R R

∞ ω̄
(ω )
DFt = Et 0 0 t+1 j dFi,t+1 (ωi ) dFj,t+1 (ωj ) , while the conditional expectation of bank
R

ω̄
defaults is DBt = Et 0 j,t+1 dFj,t+1 (ωj ) .
Table 2.2 shows that our model matches the data targets reasonably well. Importantly, the
model is able to reproduce the positive unconditional correlation between firm and bank
default (0.64 in the data versus 0.76 in the model).66 Matching this correlation turns out be
of first-order importance when drawing conclusions about optimal bank capital requirements.
2.2.3. Model Validation
As shown in Table 2.2, the model is able to match the unconditional moments related to
defaults and macroeconomic variables targeted in the calibration. In this section we perform
model validation by comparing the model’s implications for important untargeted conditional
moments of firm and bank defaults and GDP growth. This is a relevant step, since the
assessment of the benefits and costs of higher capital requirements hinges upon the ability of
the model to match key features of the data, including the frequency and severity of bank
insolvency crises.
Defaults and economic performance in the data
Firm and bank defaults are positively correlated, as successfully matched in the estimation.
However, as Figure 2.1 reveals, the overall positive correlation between the two default rates
hides substantial non-linearity in their co-movement. The figure displays a scatter plot of
the average expected default frequencies (EDFs) of firms and banks in the euro area (EA)
over the period 1992-2016.67
Broadly speaking, one can identify three different regimes in the relationship between firm
and bank default. In the most frequent regime, the default rates of both firms and banks are
low. In another regime, the firm default rate is high but the bank default rate is modest.
66

A similar degree of correlation can be observed in US data.
Each dot represents a monthly average of the corresponding probabilities of default over one year. The
underlying EDFs are estimates provided by Moody’s. See Appendix 2.9.1 for more details on the data.
67
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The last regime is one in which the default rates of both firms and banks are elevated.68 We
deem the EDFs of firms and banks to be "high" when they are above their respective 90th
percentile in the data.
Another way of representing the state-contingent relationship between firm and bank default
risk is through quantile regressions of the following form:

BankDeft (τ ) = ζτ FirmDeft ,

(2.24)

where FirmDeft is firm EDF and BankDeft is bank EDF.
The left panel of Figure 2.2 (red line) plots the quantile regression coefficients ζτ in Equation (2.24). The non-linearity in the relationship between the two defaults is clearly visible
and highly statistically significant. At higher levels of bank default risk, the coefficient
obtained by regressing bank on firm defaults is higher. The quantile regression coefficients
indicate that the correlation between firm and bank default is state dependent and increasing
with the bank default rate.69
Next, we explore the relationship between aggregate economic activity and firm and bank
defaults, respectively. A simple way to analyze this relationship is to look at GDP growth
during the different firm and bank default regimes discussed above. As documented in Table
2.3, the growth rates of GDP in the EA, the US and a number of European countries are
below normal when firm default is high but much lower when firm and bank defaults are both
high. This is consistent with standard definitions of a systemic financial crisis and the large
bank default rates and output losses associated with them (see, e.g., Laeven and Valencia,
2013).70
We investigate the relationship between firm and bank defaults and GDP growth using
quantile regressions of the following form
68

The same pattern can be observed in other countries, including the US.
The variance of firm and bank defaults is roughly constant across bank default quantiles.
70
Average growth rates have been demeaned using the unconditional mean of GDP growth for each country.
69
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∆yt (τ ) = βτ Deft−1 + γτ ∆yt−1 ,

(2.25)

where Deft−1 can either be FirmDeft−1 or BankDeft−1 and ∆yt represents GDP growth.
This exercise is similar in spirit to the one performed in Adrian et al. (2019) who run a
quantile regression of GDP growth on lagged GDP growth and an index of financial conditions
using US data. Firm and bank defaults are the main proxies for financial conditions in
our framework. Hence, we regress GDP growth on the lagged GDP growth and the lagged
level of default (Deft−1 ) of either firms or banks. The right panel of Figure 2.2 plots the
coefficients for either firm (the dashed red lines) or bank (the solid red lines) default in the
corresponding quantile regressions estimated on EA data. The results highlight three key
features of the non-linear relationship between defaults and real activity. First, the link
between both defaults and economic growth is weak for GDP growth quantiles close to the
median. This suggests that defaults (whether bank or firm) have only a weak correlation
with GDP growth in normal times.
Second, the negative relationship between bank default and GDP growth becomes quantitatively more negative for the bottom quantiles. Increases in bank defaults have a larger
(negative) impact on GDP growth when the economy is already in a recession (i.e. at the
bottom quantile for GDP growth).
Third, the above relationship does not hold for firm default. In sharp contrast to the nonlinear pattern between bank default and economic activity, the impact of corporate defaults
on GDP growth is small and flat across all GDP growth quantiles. Thus, Figure 2.2 (right
panel) clearly shows that it is the risk of bank failures that is driving the deterioration in
macroeconomic performance during periods of twin defaults identified in Table 2.3. This link
between bank default and economic performance during twin default crises will explain the
importance of capital regulation in mitigating the downside risk to the real economy.
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Defaults and economic performance in the model
Section 2.2.3 established a number of important data facts regarding the state-dependent
co-movement between default rates and GDP growth. We learned that the marginal impact
of corporate failures on bank solvency is stronger when banks are weaker. We saw that
twin defaults are associated with deeper recessions. Finally, our results established that the
correlation of bank (but not firm) defaults with real activity is higher in recessions. We now
test the performance of the model in reproducing these important empirical regularities not
targeted in the estimation.
In the previous section, we used a 90th percentile-based criterion to identify the low default,
high firm default and twin defaults regimes in the EA data. Here, we use DFt and DBt
as the model counterparts for firm and bank EDFs, respectively, and we employ the same
criterion to split the model-simulated time series into the three regimes.
Table 2.4 compares the model-simulated (Baseline Model) and EA data (Data) averages
for firm default, bank default and GDP growth within each regime. The baseline model
does a good job in reproducing these untargeted conditional moments. First, it reproduces
remarkably well the frequency of the three default regimes. Second, it reproduces the same
ranking observed in the data in terms of the drop in GDP growth in the three regimes. The
twin default regime features by far the worst GDP growth realizations, whereas the high
firm default regime features a relatively mild recession despite the fact that firms’ default
rates are very similar across these two regimes.71
In the previous section we also used quantile regressions to characterize the non-linear
relationships among the two default series and GDP growth. The black lines in Figure 2.2
show that our model can replicate both quantile regressions remarkably well.72 The model is
71
By definition, in the data there is a fourth regime where the bank default rate is above the 90th percentile
but firm default is below the 90th percentile. The model also performs well in matching this additional regime.
Even though the average firm default in this regime is below 90th percentile, it remains at an elevated level
(on average at the 85th percentile in the model).
72
Regression coefficients for the model are obtained using simulations of the model for 100,000 periods. As
before, we use DFt and DBt as the model counterparts for firm and bank EFDs, respectively.
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qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the key facts identified in our description
of the quantile regressions on EA data. The correlation between firm and bank default is
higher when banks are more fragile and their probability of default is high. During times
of average GDP growth, neither firm nor bank defaults affect economic performance in a
significant manner. Bank (but not firm) defaults have a large and negative impact on GDP
growth when the economy is already in recession.
Both the island-idiosyncratic and island-risk shocks are vital in generating realistic conditional
and unconditional correlation patterns between firm and bank defaults and economic activity.
When the non-diversifiable risk is constant (no island-risk shocks), the relationship between
the two defaults and bank default and GDP growth is significantly weakened. Hence, the
model cannot reproduce well the non-linearities observed in the data.
When non-diversifiable risk is absent (no island-idiosyncratic shocks), banks do not default in
our calibrated model.73 In the absence of island-idiosyncratic shocks, banks are only exposed
to aggregate shocks and their net worth evolves ex post in a fully symmetric manner. Bank
default could only occur as a result of implausibly large aggregate shocks that, would, thus,
happen with a very low probability. Additionally, this would imply that either all banks
default at the same time or none does which would be counterfactual.
Given the non-linearity in bank asset returns with respect to non-diversifiable borrower risk,
a crucial element for the ability of our model to reproduce the non-linearities observed in the
data is the use of a higher-order solution method. Table 2.4 also reports the performance
of the linear approximated version of the model (1st Order App.) in terms of untargeted
conditional moments in the three default regimes. The frequency of the twin defaults regime
reproduced by the linearized modelis somewhat lower than the one observed in the data and
in our baseline model. In addition, it underestimates (overestimates) the severity of the twin
defaults (high firm default) regime in terms of GDP growth.74
73

Appendix 2.9.5 (section 2.9.5 - 2.9.5) explores the importance of each of these shocks in detail.
Both the linear and the second-order model clearly fail to match the non-linearities found in the
data.Appendix 2.9.5 (section 2.9.5) provides further details on the role of the higher-order solution method.
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Overall, our model reproduces well the importance of financial vulnerabilities as determinants
of the economy’s downside risk (Adrian et al., 2019). In particular, it reproduces the fact
that a deterioration in bank default risk corresponds to an increase in the downside risk to
GDP growth, consistently with what observed in EA data. In the next section, we will show
that the reason why our model can replicate these non-linearities observed in the data is
because it features a non-linear structure of bank asset returns. This is essential for the
model to generate the right frequency and severity of the twin default episodes and the
associated macroeconomic outcomes.

2.3. Understanding the Model: Bank Asset Returns
Modelling bank portfolios as consisting of defaultable loans introduces an important nonlinearity into bank asset returns and hence into bank default realizations. In what follows we
first show that this is crucial for our model to be able to replicate well the non-linearities observed in the data as well as the frequency and severity of the twin default episodes and the associated macroeconomic outcomes.75 Next, we confirm the result of Nagel and Purnanandam
(2020) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2018), who show that a reduced-form approach to bank
default risk that uses a Merton-type formulation – in which bank asset returns have a
log normal distribution – cannot capture the downward skewness in bank loan portfolio
returns.76 Finally, we show that in our general equilibrium set up, the reduced-form Merton
approach also fails to reproduce the frequency and severity of twin defaults and associated
macroeconomic outcomes.
Bank asset returns in our model. A distinguishing feature of our model is the structural
approach to loan default risk whereby banks fail only when a significant fraction of the
borrowers in their imperfectly diversified loan portfolios default. This modelling strategy
is appropriate for bank asset returns. Indeed, even if the banks are financing underlying
projects with log-normal returns, their payoff structure is downwardly skewed. This is
75
The results shown in section 2.2.3 show that a third-order solution is sufficient to capture such nonlinearities in an accurate manner. See also Intenet Appendix 2.9.5 (section 2.9.5).
76
Baron et al. (2021) document that at the start of banking crises, the distribution of bank equity returns
is considerably more left-skewed than that of non-financial equity returns.
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because financial intermediaries hold portfolios of loans with asymmetrically distributed
payoffs.77 If borrowers repay, they repay a fixed contractual amount. If they default, the
recovery value on loans is limited to a fraction of firms’ asset values.
In the top left panel of Figure 2.3 we report the gross loan returns of the representative
bank of island j, R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) as a function of the island-idiosyncratic shock, ωj . In the top
right panel, we depict the distribution of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ).78 In the top right panel, we depict the
distribution of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ). The top left panel of Figure 2.3 clearly shows that bank asset
returns are highly non-linear in the island-idiosyncratic shock (ωj ). When ωj is very high,
all borrowers repay and the bank receives the promised repayment, including interest, from
all its borrowers. But the upside is limited for the lender as is naturally the case under a
standard debt contract. However, the presence of default creates downside risk for the bank.
As the island idiosyncratic shock takes lower and lower values, the fraction of defaulting
firms in the island increases and bank asset returns decline in a highly non-linear fashion.
The top right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ), which is clearly not
log-normal, despite the fact that the idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be log-normally
distributed. A large spike occurs when all borrowers repay. Bank asset returns are left-skewed
with a fat left tail of low return realizations caused by firm defaults.
Comparison to the Merton-type model. Characterizing the asymmetric distribution of
returns on bank loans in general equilibrium is a distinctive feature of our macro-banking
framework. We now compare bank asset returns in our model with that embedded in
the standard bank default risk approach, as commonly used in the literature. The latter
considers banks with (ex-ante) perfectly diversified loan portfolios. As a result, the (ex-post)
heterogeneity in bank asset returns comes from shocks that directly affect the performance of
banks’ loan portfolios rather than the underlying borrowers. Hence, this makes loan returns
77

Note that we assume that all shocks are symmetrically distributed, as standard in the literature.
For these figures, we have fixed qt+1 , kt , yt+1 , bf,t , Rd,t , dt to their steady-state values obtained with the
parameter values described in Section 2.2.2. We set σωϑ ,t+1 such that the expected bank default equals its
targeted value from Table 2.2. We use 10,000,000 draws of ωj to plot the histograms.
78
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and their implications for bank equity returns and bank failure similar to the classical Merton
(1974) approach to corporate default.
To create a Merton-type version of our model that is in line with formulations in the the
existing macro-banking literature, we modify Equation (2.14) in two ways. First, we remove
the impact of the island-idiosyncratic shocks by setting them to unity at all times ωj = 1.
This is equivalent to assuming that banks are perfectly diversified across borrowers. Second, in
order to introduce ex-post heterogeneity in bank default outcomes, we include a log-normally
distributed bank-idiosyncratic shock to bank revenues ωb . The loan portfolio returns under
this specification are determined by
M
R̃f,t+1
(ωb ) = [Γi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (1)) − µf Gi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (1))]

ωb [qt+1 (1 − δ) kt + yt+1 ]
.
bf,t

(2.26)

Identically to the island-idiosyncratic shock, the standard deviation of the distribution of the
bank-idiosyncratic shock, ωb , is also time-varying and evolves as in Equation 2.22. We keep
the rest of the model identical.79
In the bottom left panel of Figure 2.3 we report the gross loan portfolio returns under
M
the Merton-type formulation, R̃f,t+1
(ωb ), as a function of the idiosyncratic shock to bank
M
loan revenues and in the bottom right plot we depict the distribution of R̃f,t+1
(ωb ). The

figures show that the Merton-type model produces bank asset returns that are linear in
the exogenous bank-idiosyncratic shock to loan revenues. Thus, banks experience upside
M
and downside shocks in a fully symmetric fashion. Since ωb is log-normal, R̃f,t+1
(ωb ) is

log-normal too. Banks in the Merton-type model are exposed to less risk due to a smaller left
tail. This will turn out to be crucial to understand the differences across models regarding
the level of capital requirement needed to make banks safe.
Characterizing bank asset returns in an accurate manner is essential when studying the
relationship between firm and bank defaults. The Merton-type model fails to reproduce the
79
We estimate the parameters of the Merton-type version of our model to match the set of moments
presented in Table 2.2.
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non-linearity in the relationship between firm and bank defaults along several dimensions.
The top right panel of Figure 2.4 presents a scatter plot of firm and bank defaults implied
M
by the Merton-type model, which uses R̃f,t+1
(ωb ) instead of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ). Contrary to what

implied by our model (top left panel), the standard Merton-type representation of bank
asset returns implies that banks can default also when borrowers repay in full. Thus, the
correlation between firm and bank failures is zero in such a variant of our model. In contrast,
our mechanism treats the two dfaults as intimately linked, endogenously generating an
empirically realistic relationship between them.
Another way to examine the relationship between firm and bank defaults is through quantile
regressions. The bottom panels of Figure 2.4 compare the quantile regression coefficients for
Equations (2.24) and (2.25) in our model (black line) to those obtained from its Merton-type
variant (blue line). For completeness, we also include the estimated coefficient using EA
data (red line). Yet again, in the Merton-type model the relationship between firm and bank
defaults is close to zero at all quantiles of bank default. The standard approach to bank
default risk also fails to match the relationship between GDP growth and bank default at
both the top and the bottom quantiles of GDP growth.
Failing to capture the non-linear relationship between firm and bank default has important
implications for the frequency and severity of the twin defaults regime. In Table 2.4 we
compare the performance of our baseline model with the Merton-type model in terms of the
untargeted conditional moments in the three default regimes. First, the frequency of the
twin defaults regime implied by the Merton-type model is significantly lower than the one
observed in the data and in our baseline model. Second, the Merton approach underestimates
(overestimates) the severity of the twin defaults (high firm default ) regime in terms of GDP
growth.
In Section 2.5 we will show that the Merton-type variant of our model, by underestimating
the frequency and severity of twin defaults, also implies a lower optimal level of capital
requirements compared to our baseline model.
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2.4. The Anatomy of Twin Default Crises
After validating the quantitative implications of our framework, we are well equipped to
understand the factors that engender twin default crises in our model. An appealing feature
of our setup is that episodes of simultaneously high firm and bank defaults appear as a
result of sequences of small negative island-risk shocks that become increasingly amplified
as the probability of bank failure grows. Intuitively, the non-linearity in bank asset returns
implies that, once banks have a high risk of failure, the marginal impact of additional
credit losses on banks’ solvency and the macroeconomy is much larger than in normal times.
When the probability of twin defaults is high, small shocks can have severe consequences.
Indeed, for levels of firm and bank defaults already high, an island-risk shock of limited size
disproportionately increases bank default and leads to a large drop in output.
Figure 2.5 shows the average path leading to high firm default (blue line) and twin defaults
(red line) regimes.80 Two facts are noteworthy. First, the model implies that twin default
episodes generate output falls that are twice as large compared to high firm default events.
Second, the model captures remarkably well the evolution of bank defaults for both regimes.
Bank defaults rise above 4 percent during twin defaults, which is very close to what we
observe in the EA data during the recent financial crisis. In contrast, bank failures remain
below 1 percent in the episodes of high firm defaults. Both cases are very close to the evidence
reported in Table 2.4. The declines in output, investment and lending are more pronounced
in the case of twin defaults when compared with high firm defaults.
The model is also consistent with the empirical finding that financial crises tend to be
preceded by above average economic activity and lending (e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012;
Jorda et al., 2016). In the twin defaults regime, output, bank lending, bank capital and
consumption reach a cyclical peak around 8-10 quarters before the crisis event and fall sharply
as it approaches. In our model, the pre-crisis boom is mainly driven by good (below average)
80

The figure is generated by simulating the model for 1,000,000 periods, identifying periods in which
defaults are above the 90th percentile and then computing the average realizations of shocks and endogenous
variables for twenty periods before and after the crisis periods.
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realizations of the firm-risk shock. As a result, corporate leverage is elevated, making firms
(and hence banks) more vulnerable to subsequent adverse shocks.
The figure also shows that, on average, TFP remains broadly unchanged in both types of
episodes. The two risk shocks instead play an important role. The rise in the firm-risk shocks
plays a role in both high firm defaults and twin defaults, while the rise in the island-risk
shocks plays a key role in generating twin default crises.
Finally, the model does not need very large risk shocks in order to generate a twin default
crisis. These episodes occur following a sequence of small and positive risk shocks that
accumulate into a 1.5 standard deviation increase. The island-risk shocks are crucial to
generate bank defaults and, therefore, twin default crises. Firm-risk shocks by themselves
can only create high firm default events. The fact that our baseline model does not need
very large risk shocks explains why it can match the frequency of the twin defaults regime
in the data. In the next section we will show that increasing bank capital requirements
makes banks more resilient to credit losses induced by island-risk shocks and thus reduces
the frequency of such twin default crises.
In addition to matching the data, the microfounded link between the solvency of banks
and firms also introduces a powerful amplification mechanism in the model which allows
it to generate crises episodes without the need for large exogenous aggregate shocks. The
importance of the non-linearities introduced by the structural modelling of bank asset returns
is underlined by the fact that, if solved to a first-order approximation, the model only
generates twin default crises if hit by implausibly large realizations of the island-risk shock.
The dotted-dashed line in Figure 2.6 shows that, in the first-order approximation, island-risk
shocks need to increase by 3 standard deviations rather than only 1.5 standard deviations in
the baseline.81 Nevertheless, despite the large shocks, the first-order approximation cannot
generate a realistic increase in the probability of bank default. This is consistent with the
81

As was the case in Table 2.4, the thresholds used to define the three regimes are always the ones
determined by the baseline model.
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fact that, as shown in Table 2.4, the linear model can only produce twin defaults with a 4
percent probability, while the frequency implied by the baseline model is very close to the 7
percent observed in the data.
The strong non-linear effects of island-risk shocks can also be demonstrated by means
of generalized impulse response (GIRFs) functions as in Andreasen et al. (2017), which
are presented in Appendix 2.9.5 (Section 2.9.5).82 The model solved with a third-order
approximation is able to amplify island-risk shocks during crisis times more strongly than
during normal times. In our model, once the economy finds itself in a situation of high
firm default, it becomes very vulnerable to additional island-risk shocks. The economy
“accelerates” into a twin default event as the impact of additional island-risk shocks grows.
This internal propagation helps the model generate twin default crises without the need for
implausible huge shocks.83

2.5. Implications for Capital Requirements
After documenting the quantitative performance of our model and analyzing how twin
defaults arise, this section addresses the main question of the paper. What is the level of
capital requirements that optimally trades off a lower frequency of crises with a more limited
provision of credit to the economy?
The rationale for capital requirements in this model is related to the presence of safety net
guarantees and to externalities associated with the cost of bank failures and the disruption
of bank lending during twin default crises. The presence of safety net guarantees modelled
in the form of insured deposits, makes the interest rate on deposit funding independent from
banks’ leverage choices. This provides an incentive for banks to under-price their borrowers’
risk. Further, banks operate under limited liability and do not internalize the social cost of
82

Details on how to compute both conditional and unconditional GIRFs can be found in Appendix 2.9.4
(Section 2.9.4).
83
The results in the Appendix 2.9.5 (Section 2.9.5) clearly show the island-risk shocks has a much larger
impact when conditioning on either a twin defaults or a high firm default episode. In contrast, the GIRFs
conditional only on high firm default shows much less amplification than when we condition on a twin defaults
episode.
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their failures and the effects of their choices on the bank equity returns and, hence, on the
next period aggregate lending capacity of the whole banking sector.84 All this provides a
clear rational for the macroprudential calibration of bank capital requirements.
2.5.1. Optimal Capital Requirements
We first assess the implications of different values of the capital requirement on the mean
of the ergodic distribution of selected variables for our baseline model.85 Figure 2.7 shows
that the imposition of higher capital requirements implies a trade-off between reducing
the probability of twin default crises and maintaining the supply of bank credit. Higher
capital requirements limit banks’ risk taking incentives and make bank equity returns better
protected against non diversifiable risk. When banks are less levered, non-diversifiable risk
has a lower impact on banks’ equity and this reduces banks’ default, as well as, the correlation
between firm and bank default. As a result, twin default crises become less frequent and
deadweight losses associated with the costs of asset repossession decline. However, higher
capital requirements are also costly for the economy. They increase the relative scarcity of
bank net worth and the average cost of bank funding. This implies higher borrowing costs,
reduced bank credit, and lower investment.
The trade-off is reflected in the overall effects of higher capital requirements on social welfare.
The solid black line in Figure 2.8 reports the ergodic mean of household welfare as a function
of the level of bank capital requirements. The optimal bank capital requirement is around
15 percent which is associated with welfare gains of approximately 0.1 percent in certainty
equivalent consumption terms relative to the baseline model, wich feature bank capital
requirement of 8 percent.
Starting from the 8 percent capital requirement, welfare first increases because the gains
from the reduction in the probability of bank default outweigh the losses from imposing
higher funding costs on banks. At the optimum, the probability of bank default is below
84

In our model, the market segmentation does apply to the funding of banks. In every period the aggregate
net worth of the whole banking sector is invest in a portfolio of equity of the continuum of banks.
85
We consider changes in the capital requirement ϕ while keeping all other parameters unchanged.
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0.1 percent and further reductions in bank failures have a limited impact on welfare. For
a capital requirement above 15 percent, the negative effect of elevated borrowing costs for
firms dominates and welfare declines.
Imposing such a capital requirement is welfare-improving because of the high costs associated
with twin default crises. In order to understand the implications of higher capital requirements
on the insurgence of twin default crisis, we can turn back to Figure 2.6 and compare the
baseline path to crisis with a bank capital requirements of 8 percent with the path implied
by the model under the optimal capital requirement level (Higher Cap. Req).86
Figure 2.6 also clearly shows that the model with a bank capital requirement of 15 percent
(dashed line) needs a much larger (3.5 standard deviation) increase in the island-risk shock in
order to generate a twin default crisis than the model with a capital requirement of 8 percent
(solid line). This is confirmed by Table 2.4 which describes the performance of the model in
terms of untargeted conditional moments in the three default regimes also under the optimal
level of capital requirements. The fact that with a 15 percent capital requirement level, the
model requires larger shocks to generate twin default crises is consistent with the fact that at
the optimal level of capital requirements, the economy experiences a much lower frequency
of the twin defaults regime is dramatically lower.
2.5.2. The role of non-diversifiable Bank Risk
To gain some insights regarding the importance of properly quantifying the impact of borrower
default risk on bank insolvencies, we consider two counterfactual experiments. In the first,
firm default risk is assumed to be less diversifiable at the bank level than in the calibrated
model. Hence, the link between the default of firms and banks is much stronger, implying a
much higher probability of twin defaults. This is obtained by increasing the average standard
deviation of the island-idiosyncratic shock and reducing the average standard deviation of
the firm-idiosyncratic shock while keeping the probability of firm default unchanged.87 This
86

As was the case in Table 2.4, the thresholds used to define the three regimes are always the ones
determined by the baseline model.
87
The firm default rate is the same as in the calibrated model. The only difference between the two versions

133

reduces the extent to which banks can diversify away firm default risk. The red dashed
line in Figure 2.8 shows social welfare as a function of the capital requirement level in this
counterfactual scenario. As expected, when firm default risk is less diversifiable at the bank
level, the optimal capital requirement needs to be substantially higher, i.e. close to 20
percent.
In the second experiment, we assume that all firm default risk is ex-ante diversifiable at
the bank level (no island-idiosyncratic risk) and the default risk of banks comes from a an
exogenous disturbance that directly hit the banks’ loan returns. This is in line with the
standard Merton-type model of bank default risk used in the previous literature. Figure 2.8
reports welfare as a function of the capital requirement also under this alternative specification
(blue dashed line). Even though the probability of bank default is the same in both models,
under the Merton-type formulation the optimal capital requirement is five percentage points
lower, i.e. around 10 percent.
Importantly, we calibrate this Merton-type version of the model so as to ensure that the
mean and standard deviation of bank default are the same as in our baseline model. However,
since firm default is not the main driver of bank default in such version of the model, the
probability of twin defaults drops to 1.1 percent, which is considerably lower than what is
observed in the data and produced by our baseline model.
Table 2.5 reports the difference in key variables in the high vs low bank default episodes
in each versions of the model. It clearly shows that in the Merton-type model high bank
defaults are not accompanied by firm defaults and the deadweight losses associated with
them. Therefore, the overall losses associated with bank default are lower, as reflected in the
less sizable drop in economic activity. Hence, the Merton-type model features a much less
of the model is the composition of diversifiable and non-diversifiable (firm- vs island-idiosyncratic) firm
default risk for banks. The average standard deviation of the island-idiosyncratic shock is increased by 10
percent, whereas the average standard deviation of the firm-idiosyncratic shock is reduced by 6.3 percent.
While the average probability of firm default remains equal to 2.25 percent, the probability of bank default
increases from 0.59 percent to 1.03 percent. The probability of twin default crises increases from 5.9 percent
to 8.8 percent.

134

substantial reduction in welfare (consumption equivalent) in the high bank default episodes
relative to the low bank default ones. This explains why the standard model of bank default
risk underestimates the welfare gains from increasing capital requirements compared to our
baseline model.88
Overall, our results show that capturing the special nature of bank asset returns and their
implications for bank default risk is essential to provide accurate prescriptions on the optimal
level of capital requirements. Indeed, microfounding the relationship between firm and bank
defaults is crucial to reproduce the frequency and severity of twin defaults observed in the
data, and, thus, properly account for the costs associated with bank insolvencies, and the
net benefits of higher capital requirements.

2.6. Conclusion
The assessment of the benefits and costs of higher capital requirements requires a framework
that adequately quantifies the trade off between a lower frequency of bank insolvency crises
and a more limited provision of credit to the wider economy. Thus, it crucially hinges upon
the ability of the model to match key features of the data, including the frequency and
severity of twin defaults, i.e. episodes characterized by deep recessions and abnormally high
default rates among both banks and their borrowers.
With this purpose in mind, we build a quantitative structural general equilibrium model
of bank default risk in which bank solvency problems arise endogenously from high default
rates among bank borrowers. Our paper represents the first quantitative exploration of the
way bank borrowers’ default translate into rare but severe episodes of bank insolvencies and
the large output losses associated with them.
Microfounding the link between bank and firm solvency allows our framework to capture
a very important aspect of bank loan portfolios: they deliver asymmetrically distributed
88

Appendix Figure 2.11 compares the path to bank default episodes in our baseline model and in the
Merton-type model. In line with the evidence presented in Table 2.5, this figure shows that bank default
episodes in our baseline model are associated with a large increase in firm default and hence feature more
severe output losses compared to the Merton-type model.
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payoffs which feature limited upside potential but significant downside risk due to borrowers’
defaults. This feature allows our model to reproduce the non-linearities associated with firm
and bank defaults and macroeconomic outcomes observed in the data. Thus, our model
captures well the behavior of the economy not only in normal times but also in twin defaults.
We show that our model implies higher optimal capital requirements than standard Mertontype models of bank default risk, which neglect or underestimate the impact of borrower
default on bank solvency. Thus, our results suggest that a structural approach to bank
default risk is crucial for the assessment of the net benefits of higher capital requirements.
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2.7. Tables
Table 2.1: Estimated parameters
Par.
χb
σ̄ωi
σA
σi
σj
ψk

Description
Bankers’ endowment
Mean firm-risk shock
Std TFP shock
Std firm-risk shock
Std island-risk shock
Capital adjustment cost

Value
0.6520
0.3447
0.0044
0.0729
0.0936
1.9942

Par.
χe
σ̄ωj
ρA
ρσi
ρσj

Description
Entrepreneurs’ endowment
Mean island-risk shock
Persistence TFP shock
Persistence firm-risk shock
Persistence island-risk shock

Value
0.5435
0.2625
0.9804
0.9141
0.7539

Notes: The reader should note that σi is not the standard deviation of firm-risk shock, which is

q σi
1−ρ2
σ

The
i

same applies for the standard deviation of the island-risk shock.

Table 2.2: Targeted moments: Baseline model
Variable
Std GDP growth
Mean Loans/GDP
Mean Loan spread
Mean Firm default
Mean Bank default
Mean ROE banks
Corr (FD & BD)

Data
0.6877
2.442
1.2443
2.6469
0.6646
6.4154
0.6421

Model
0.6217
2.6386
1.0058
2.2497
0.5860
6.4652
0.7648

Variable
Std Cons. growth
Std Loan growth
Std Loan spread
Std Firm default
Std Bank default
Std ROE banks
Std Inv. growth

Data
0.5617
1.1965
0.6828
1.0989
0.8438
4.1273
1.3908

Model
0.4912
0.5936
0.7535
2.4384
1.2320
3.7971
2.0106

Notes: Interest rates, equity returns, default rates, and spreads are reported in annualized percentage points.
The standard deviations (Std) of GDP growth, Investment (Inv), and Loan growth are reported in quarterly
percentage points.

Table 2.3: Average quarterly GDP growth
Euro Area
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
US

High Firm Def.
-0.0466
-0.2550
-0.0718
-0.0242
-0.5043
-0.3645
-0.0781

Twin Defaults
-0.5842
-0.6690
-0.6605
-0.5471
-2.1904
-0.4051
-0.9790

Notes: First column refers to periods of high firm defaults and low bank defaults, whereas the second column
uses periods of twin defaults. GDP growth rates (demeaned) are reported in quarterly rates. Sample: EA
1992Q1-2016Q4, US: 1940:Q1-2016:Q4.

137

Table 2.4: Three default regimes
Frequency
Data
Baseline Model
Merton-type Model
1st Order App.
Higher Cap. Req.
Data
Baseline Model
Merton-type Model
1st Order App.
Higher Cap. Req.
Data
Baseline Model
Merton-type Model
1st Order App.
Higher Cap. Req.

GDP growth

Bank default

Low Default Regime
86.0%
0.0923
85.9%
0.0588
82.1%
0.0522
87.3%
0.0318
91.5%
0.0293
High Firm Default Regime
4.0%
-0.0466
4.0%
-0.1344
7.5%
-0.1887
1.0%
-0.1556
8.3%
-0.3079
Twin Defaults Regime
7.0%
-0.8189
5.9%
-0.5737
1.1%
-0.5399
4.1%
-0.2735
0.1%
-0.8990

Firm default

0.4346
0.2388
0.3351
0.3130
0.0453

2.3480
1.5154
1.7118
1.7113
1.5406

0.4033
0.9270
0.3980
1.4211
0.3387

4.8500
6.8463
7.4093
5.5756
7.693

3.0224
4.0225
3.2624
2.4816
2.2445

4.6076
8.6266
7.7483
6.0247
11.833

Notes: This table compares the model and data averages for firm default, bank default and GDP growth
within three default regimes for the EA data and the simulated data from different models. The baseline model
corresponds to a capital requirement set to 8 percent (ϕ = 0.08) and solved with third-order perturbation.
Merton-type Model corresponds to the model in which the Merton-type specification of bank asset returns is
adopted. 1st Order App. corresponds to the model solved with first-order perturbation methods. Higher
Cap. Req. corresponds to the model with a capital requirement set to 15 percent (ϕ = 0.15). Twin Defaults
episodes are defined as the simultaneous occurrence of firm and bank default above their respective 90th
percentiles. High Firm Default are episodes with firm default above the 90th percentile and bank default
below the 90th percentile. In Low Default episodes, both bank and firm default are below the 90th percentile.
The default thresholds used to define the three regimes in the Merton-type model and the 1st Order App.
model are the ones determined by the baseline model. Model results are based on 1,000,000 simulations.
GDP growth is demeaned.
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Table 2.5: High vs low bank default episodes: Baseline vs Merton-type models
Bank Default increase (pp)
Firm Default increase (pp)
Welfare drop (%)
Welfare drop (consumption equivalent terms)
Output drop (%)
Consumption drop (%)
Investment drop (%)
Bankers’ equity drop
Entrepreneurs’ equity drop (%)

Baseline Model
3.011
4.940
-0.325
-0.061
-1.677
-0.594
-6.006
-2.061
-3.536

Merton-type Model
2.985
0.317
-0.052
-0.009
-0.512
-0.312
-1.347
-0.240
-0.831

Notes: This table presents the differences in endogenous variables between High and Low Bank Default
episodes for the baseline and Merton-type models. High (Low) bank default are episodes with bank default
above (below) the 90th percentile. Merton-type Model corresponds to the model in which the Merton-type
specification of bank asset returns is adopted. The results are based on 1,000,000 simulations.
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2.8. Figures
Figure 2.1: Firm and bank default rates
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Scatter plot of Moody’s cross-sectional average of expected default frequencies (EDFs) within one year for
the 1992:M1 to 2016:M12 (monthly frequency) sample of firms (non-financial corporations) and banks in the
EA; series in percent.

Figure 2.2: Quantile regression: Data vs model
(a) Firm and Bank Default

(b) GDP Growth and Bank Default
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Notes: The left panel of this figure presents coefficients ζτ from the quantile regression in Equation (2.24).
The right panel of this figure presents coefficients βτ from the quantile regression in Equation (2.25). Both
equations are estimated on EA data (1992-2016) and on simulated data from the baseline model.
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Figure 2.3: Bank asset returns: Baseline vs Merton-type models
(a) Bank Asset Returns

(b) Histogram of Bank Asset Returns
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Notes: The top panels of this figure present bank asset returns as a function of the non-diversifiable island
shock ωj (left plot) and the histogram of bank asset returns (right plot) in the baseline model. The bottom
panels of this figure present bank asset returns as a function of the bank-idiosyncratic shock ωb (left plot)
and the histogram of bank asset returns (right plot) in the Merton-type version of our model.
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Figure 2.4: Scatter plots and quantile regressions: Model comparison
(b) Merton-type Model
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Notes: The top panels display the scatter plot of firm and bank default produced with the baseline model (top
left plot) and the Merton-type version of our model (top right). The bottom left panel presents coefficients
ζτ from the quantile regression in Equation (2.24), whereas the bottom right panel presents coefficients βτ
from the quantile regression in Equation (2.25) for the Merton-type model (blue line), the data (red line)
and the baseline model (black line).
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Figure 2.5: Paths to crises
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(red solid line) regimes. The figure is generated by simulating the model for 1,000,000 periods, identifying
periods in which defaults are above the 90th percentile and then computing the average realizations of shocks
and endogenous variables for twenty periods before and after the crisis periods. We define twin defaults
as the simultaneous occurrence of firm and bank default above their respective 90th percentiles. High firm
default periods are those where firm default is above the 90th percentile and bank default is below the 90th
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Figure 2.6: Path to Twin Defaults in different scenarios
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Figure 2.7: Comparative statics with respect to capital requirement level
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Figure 2.8: Welfare effects of the capital requirement in different scenarios
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Notes: This figure reports the ergodic mean of household welfare as a function of the level of bank capital
requirements in different scenarios. Baseline (black solid line) corresponds to our baseline model. Merton-type
model (blue dashed line) corresponds to the model in which the Merton-type specification of bank asset
returns is adopted. Higher Contribution of Island Risk, Borrower Risk Unchanged (red dashed-dotted line)
corresponds to the model in which we increase the average standard deviation of the island-idiosyncratic
shock and reduce the average standard deviation of the firm-idiosyncratic shock while keeping the probability
of firm default unchanged.
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2.9. Appendix
2.9.1. Data
• Investment: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Millions of euros, Chain linked volume,
Calendar and seasonally adjusted data, Reference year 1995, Source: the Area Wide
Model (AWM) dataset.
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP): we define the GDP as the sum of Consumption and
Investment.
• Loans: Outstanding amounts of loans at the end of quarter (stock) extended to nonfinancial corporations by Monetary and Financial Institution (MFIs) in EA, Source:
MFI Balance Sheet Items Statistics (BSI Statistics), Monetary and Financial Statistics
(S/MFS), European Central Bank.
• Loan Spread: Spread between the composite interest rate on loans and the composite
risk free rate. We compute this spread in two steps.
1. Firstly, we compute the composite loan interest rate as the weighted average of
interest rates at each maturity range (up to 1 year, 1-5 years, over 5 years).
2. Secondly, we compute corresponding composite risk free rates that take into
account the maturity breakdown of loans. The maturity-adjusted risk-free rate is
the weighted average (with the same weights as in case of composite loan interest
rate) of the following risk-free rates chosen for maturity ranges:
– 3 month EURIBOR (up to 1 year).
– German Bund 3 year yield (1-5 years).
– German Bund 10 year yield (over 5 years for commercial loans).
– German Bund 7 year yield (5-10 years for housing loans).
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– German Bund 20 year yield (over 10 years for housing loans).
Source: MFI Interest Rate Statistics of the European Central Bank, Bloomberg.
• Return on equity of banks: Bank Equity Return (after tax), EA. Source: Global
Financial Development, World Bank.
• Expected default of Banks: Asset weighted average of EDF within one year for the
sample of banks in EA. The data comes on the monthly basis. We aggregate it to
quarterly series by averaging the monthly series within a quarter.

89

Source: Moody’s

KMV.
• Expected default of non-financial firms: we compute it using Moody’s EDF series
for a sample of non-financial corporations in the EA. Since in the Moody’s dataset
we have an over-representation of large firms and under-representation of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) compared to the loan portfolio of bank in the EA, we
proceed in two steps.90 Firstly, we construct two separate EDF indices: i) for SMEs, ii)
for large firms.91 Secondly, we build an aggregate default series for non-financial firms
as a weighted average of EDF indices for SMEs and large firms. As weights we use the
share of loans extended by banks in EA to SMEs and large firms respectively.92 The
data comes on the monthly basis. We aggregate it to quarterly series by averaging the
monthly series within a quarter.
89

See detailed EDF description on the Moody’s webpage.
We define SMEs as firms with average total assets below EUR 43 m within the sample period in the
database (as in the definition of the European Commission)
91
EDF indices are constructed as asset weighted average of EDF within one year for the sample of
non-financial firms within the size category
92
We obtain the data on the share of SMEs loans in total loans from Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs
database of OECD.
90
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2.9.2. Model Details
First Order Conditions
Household. The household’s problem yields the following FOCs with respect to consumption,

UCt = λt ,

(2.27)

− UHt = wt λt ,

(2.28)

labor supply,

and demand for the portfolio of insured deposits,

1 = Et (Λt+1 ) Rd,t ,

(2.29)

where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and Λt+1 ≡ β λλt+1
is the
t
household’s stochastic discount factor.
Entrepreneurial firm. The entrepreneurial firm’s problem yields the following FOCs with
respect to capital,

Et Λe,t+1

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
+ ζf,t qt − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂kt
∂kt

(2.30)

Et Λe,t+1

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
+ ζf,t wt − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂ht
∂ht

(2.31)

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
− ζf,t − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
+ ξf,t νb,t ϕ = 0,
∂Bf,t
∂Bf,t

(2.32)

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
− ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂Rf,t
∂Rf,t

(2.33)

labor demand,

loans,
Et Λe,t+1
and the gross loan rate,

Et Λe,t+1

149

where ζf,t is the Lagrange multiplier of the entrepreneurial firm’s budget constraint, and ξf,t
is the Lagrange multiplier of the bankers’ participation constraint.
Capital Producer. The FOC of the capital producer problem is

qt = S

′



It
Kt−1

−1
.

(2.34)

2.9.3. Model Aggregation and Market Clearing
In this subsection we describe model aggregation and market clearing conditions.
Final good The clearing of the market for final good requires

Yt = yt ,

(2.35)

where aggregate output Yt equals household consumption, Ct , plus the investment in the
production of new capital, It , plus the resources absorbed by the costs of repossessing assets
from defaulting entrepreneurial firms and banks

Yt = Ct + It + Σb,t + Σe,t ,

(2.36)

where
Z
Σb,t = µj

ω̄j,t

R̃f,t (ωj ) Bf,t−1 dFj,t (ωj ) and

0

Z

∞ Z ω̄t (ωj )

ωi ωj [qt (1 − δ) Kt−1 + Yt ] dFi,t (ωi ) dFj,t (ωj ) .

Σe,t = µf
0

0

Labor The clearing of the labor market requires

Ht = ht .
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(2.37)

Physical capital The clearing of the market for physical capital requires
(2.38)

Kt = kt .

Equity The clearing of the market for equity requires
∞

Z
EQe,t =

eqe,t (i)di and

(2.39)

0

Z

∞

(2.40)

eqb,t (j)dj.

EQb,t =
0

Loans The clearing of the market for loans, requires
(2.41)

Bf,t = bf,t .

Bank deposits The clearing of the market for bank deposits, requires
(2.42)

Dt = df,t .

Law of motion of capital Finally, the law of motion of capital is given by

Kt = (1 − δ) Kt−1 + S

It
Kt−1


Kt−1 .

(2.43)

Law of motion of entrepreneurs’aggregate net worth Let Ne,t be the aggregate net
wealth of entrepreneurs at period t. Then

Ne,t = θe ρe,t Ne,t−1 + ιe,t ,

(2.44)

which reflects the retention of net worth by the fraction θe of non-retiring entrepreneurs, the
aggregate endowment ιe,t added by the entering entrepreneurs, and the fact that aggregate
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net wealth equals individual net wealth
∞

Z

ne,t (i)di.

Ne,t =

(2.45)

0

Law of motion of bankers aggregate net worth Let Nb,t be the aggregate net wealth
of bankers at period t. Then

Nb,t = θb ρb,t Nb,t−1 + ιb,t − Tt ,

(2.46)

which reflects the retention of the aggregate net worth by the fraction θb of non-retiring
bankers, the aggregate endowment ιb,t+1 received by the entering bankers, and the fact that
aggregate net wealth equals individual net wealth
Z

∞

Nb,t = nb,t (j)dj.

(2.47)

0

Endowments of entering entrepreneurs and bankers We model the aggregate endowment of entering entrepreneurs as a proportion χe of the aggregate net worth of the retiring
entrepreneurs
ιe,t = χe (1 − θe )ρe,t Ne,t−1 .

(2.48)

Akin to the case of entrepreneurs, we model the aggregate endowment of entering bankers as
a proportion χb of the aggregate net worth of the retiring bankers

ιb,t = χb (1 − θb )ρb,t Nb,t−1 .

(2.49)

Net transfers from entrepreneurs and bankers to the household Let the net
transfers received by the household from entrepreneurs and bankers at period t be Υe,t and
Υb,t respectively. Then, we have

Υe,t = (1 − θe ) ρe,t Ne,t−1 − ιe,t ,
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(2.50)

which reflects the the aggregate worth of the fraction 1 − θe of retiring entrepreneurs minus
the aggregate endowment ιe,t added by the entering entrepreneurs. Equivalently, we also
have that
Υb,t = (1 − θb ) ρb,t Nb,t−1 − ιb,t ,

(2.51)

which reflects the the aggregate worth of the fraction 1 − θe of retiring bankers minus the
aggregate endowment ιb,t added by the entering bankers. Thus, we have that the sum of net
transfers from entrepreneurs and bankers to the household is

Υt = (1 − θe ) ρe,t Ne,t−1 − ιe,t + (1 − θb ) ρb,t Nb,t−1 − ιb,t .

(2.52)

Profits from capital production Profits received by households from capital producing
firms are

Ξt = qt S

It
Kt−1


Kt−1 − It .

(2.53)

Model Equilibrium Conditions
We provide the equilibrium conditions for our model. We begin with the equilibrium
conditions related to the households, then entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firms, then
bankers and banks, then the capital production sector, and finally the market clearing
conditions.
Household Using Equations (2.27) and (2.28) we obtain

−

UHt
= wt ,
UCt

(2.54)

Equation (2.29) is part of the equilibrium conditions. Hence, we have

1 = Et Λt+1 Rd,t .
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(2.55)

Entrepreneurs Equations (2.5) and stochastic discount factor of entrepreneurs give us

νe,t = Et Λe,t+1 ρe,t+1 .

(2.56)

The elements of the law of motion of entrepreneurs’net worth reflected in Equations (2.44)
and (2.48) are also part of the equilibrium. Hence, we have
Ne,t+1 = θe ρe,t+1 Ne,t + ιe,t+1 and

(2.57)

ιe,t+1 = χe (1 − θe )ρe,t+1 Ne,t .

(2.58)

Entrepreneurial Firm Equations from the entrepreneurial firms’ problem are also part
of the equilibrium conditions. Hence, we have
Yt+1 = At+1 Ktα (Ht )(1−α) ,

(2.59)

Πi,j,t+1 (ωi , ωj ) = ωi ωj (qt+1 (1 − δ) Kt + Yt+1 ) − Rf,t Bf,t ,

(2.60)

ω̄t+1 (ωj ) =
Z

∞Z ∞

Πi,j,t+1 (ωi , ωj ) dFi,t+1 (ωi ) dFj,t+1 (ωj ) , and

Πf,t+1 =
0

Rf,t Bf,t
,
ωj (qt+1 (1 − δ) Kt + Yt+1 )

(2.61)
(2.62)

ω̄t+1 (ωj )

Bf,t + Ne,t = wt Ht + qt Kt ,

(2.63)

Et Λb,t+1 Πb,t+1 = νb,t ϕBf,t ,

(2.64)

Et Λe,t+1

∂Πb,t+1
∂Πf,t+1
+ ζf,t qt − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂Kt
∂Kt

(2.65)

Et Λe,t+1

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
+ ζf,t wt − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂Ht
∂Ht

(2.66)

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
− ζf,t − ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
+ ξf,t νb,t ϕ = 0,
∂Bf,t
∂Bf,t

(2.67)

Et Λe,t+1
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Et Λe,t+1

∂Πf,t+1
∂Πb,t+1
− ξf,t Et Λb,t+1
= 0,
∂Rf,t
∂Rf,t

(2.68)

Πf,t+1
,
Ne,t

(2.69)

ρe,t+1 =

where we have also used the clearing of the market for the final good, labor, physical capital,
and the entrepreneurial firms’ equity and the fact that aggregate net wealth equals individual
net wealth, i.e. Equations (2.35), (2.37), (2.38), (2.39), and (2.45) and the balance sheet of
the entrepreneurs, i.e. Equation (2.3), together with dv e,t = 0.93
Bankers Equation (2.5) with κ = b gives us
(2.70)

νb,t = Et Λb,t+1 ρb,t+1 .

The laws of motion of bankers net worth reflected in Equations (2.46) and (2.49) also part of
the equilibrium. Hence, we have
Nb,t+1 = θb ρb,t+1 Nb,t + ιb,t+1 − Tt and

(2.71)

ιb,t+1 = χb (1 − θb )ρb,t+1 Nb,t .

(2.72)

Banks Equations (2.11), (2.12), (2.14), (2.16), (2.17), and (2.18) from the banks’ problem
are also part of the equilibrium conditions. Hence, we have

Bf,t = Nb,t + Dt ,

(2.73)

Nb,t = ϕBf,t ,

(2.74)

R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) = [Γi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) − µf Gi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj ))]

ωj [qt+1 (1 − δ) Kt + Yt+1 ]
, (2.75)
Bf,t
(2.76)

R̃f,t+1 (ω̄j,t+1 ) Bf,t − Rd,t Dt = 0,
93

To simplify notation, we say that the derivative
at x.

∂f
∂X

is evaluated at X, while the derivative
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∂f
∂x

is evaluated

Z

∞

Πb,t+1 =

R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) Bf,t dFj,t+1 (ωj ) − Rd,t Dt (1 − Fj,t+1 (ω̄j,t+1 )) , and

(2.77)

Πb,t+1
,
ϕBf,t

(2.78)

ω̄j,t+1

ρb,t+1 =

where we have also used the clearing of the market for the final good, physical capital,
and banks’ equity and and the fact that aggregate net wealth equals individual net wealth,
i.e. Equations (2.35), (2.38), (2.40), and (2.47) and the balance sheet of the bankers, i.e.
Equation (2.3), together with dv b,t = 0.
Capital production The evolution of capital is controlled by the FOC of the capital
producer and the law of motion of capital, i.e. Equations (2.34) and (2.43)

qt = S

′



It
Kt−1

−1


Kt = (1 − δ) Kt−1 + S

and

It
Kt−1

(2.79)


Kt−1 .

(2.80)

Deposit insurance costs By using Dt = df,t we can write the above expression as in
Equation (2.20)
Tt = Ωt Dt−1 .

(2.81)

Market clearing The aggregate resource constraint Equation (2.36) can be written as,

Yt = Ct + It + Σb,t + Σe,t ,

(2.82)

where we have also used the clearing of the market for the final good, labor, and physical
capital, i.e. Equations (2.35), (2.37), and (2.38).
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2.9.4. Methodological Details
Approximating Banks’ Expected Profits
In order to use perturbation methods to approximate the solution to the model we need
to compute bank’s expected return on the loan portfolio (conditional on not defaulting),
defined here as Rp,t+1 , which is part of Equation (2.17) and is given by the integral defined
in Equation (2.23).
We take qt+1 , kt , yt+1 , bf,t , Rd,t , dt as given and use the notation of R̃f,t+1 to be the function
of island shock, ωj , only. From the analysis in Section 2.3, it should be clear that the
bank’s loan return R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) is not log-normally distributed. Mathematically, this is due
to the fact that Γi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) and Gi,t+1 (ω̄t+1 (ωj )) which enter into R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) are
both non-linear functions of ωj . As a result of highly non-linear shape of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ), the
integral in Equation (2.23) cannot be computed as explicit function of the state variables
and perturbation methods cannot be applied. We overcome this challenge by (i) splitting
this integral into the sum of integrals taken over smaller intervals, (ii) computing a series of
quadratic Taylor approximations of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) around a mid-point of each interval.
Formally, we split the domain of ωj into N intervals of equal length defined on N + 1 points
xk ranging from x1 = ω̄j,t+1 to xN +1 = ωjmax where the highest point ωjmax is chosen such


that R̃f,t+1 ωjmax = Rf,t almost surely. Given those assumptions, Rp,t+1 is approximately
given by:

Rp,t+1 ≈

N Z
X
k=1

xk+1



k

Θ (ωj ) dFj,t+1 (ωj ) + [1 − Fj,t+1 (xN +1 )] Rf,t

(2.83)

xk

where Θk (ωj ) is a Taylor approximation of R̃f,t+1 (ωj ) around a point ωj = x̄k ≡

xk+1 +xk
2

and is given by
1 ′′
′
Θk (ωj ) = R̃f,t+1 (x̄k ) + R̃f,t+1
(x̄k ) (ωj − x̄k ) + R̃f,t+1
(x̄k ) (ωj − x̄k )2
2
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(2.84)

All the derivatives of R̃f,t+1 are with respect to ωj and can be computed as an explicit
functions of the state variables. Using the simplified expression for Θk (ωj ) we can rewrite
R xk+1 k
Θ (ωj ) dFj,t+1 as follows:
xk
xk+1

Z

Z

k

xk+1

Θ (ωj ) dFj,t+1 = Q0 (x̄k ) + Q1 (x̄k )
xk

Z

xk+1

ωj dFj,t+1 + Q2 (x̄k )
xk

xk

ωj2 dFj,t+1
(2.85)

where: Qi (x̄k ) are just constants given by:



1 2 ′′
+ x̄k R̃f,t+1 (x̄k ) ,
Q0 (x̄k ) = [Fj,t+1 (xk+1 ) − Fj,t+1 (xk )] R̃f,t+1 (x̄k ) −
2


1
′′
′
(x̄k ) ,
Q1 (x̄k ) = [Fj,t+1 (xk+1 ) − Fj,t+1 (xk )] R̃f,t+1
(x̄k ) − x̄k R̃f,t+1
2


1 ′′
Q0 (x̄k ) = [Fj,t+1 (xk+1 ) − Fj,t+1 (xk )] R̃f,t+1
(x̄k ) ,
2
′
(x̄k )
x̄k R̃f,t+1

Given our assumption of log-normally distributed island shock, ωj , we have expressions for
R xk+1
Rx
ωj dFj,t+1 and xkk+1 ωj2 dFj,t+1 as explicit functions of the state variables. Consequently,
xk
we can easily derive very accurate, the approximation of Rp,t+1 in Equation (2.83) as an
explicit function of the state variables.
IRFs
Following Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), the GIRF for any variable in the model var in
period t + l following a disturbance to the nth shock of size νn in period t + 1 is defined as

GIRFvar (l, ϵn,t+1 = ν, wt ) = E [vart+l |wt , ϵn,t+1 = ν] − E [vart+l |wt ] ,

(2.86)

where ≾t are the value of the state variables of the model at time t (The state variables

of the model are wt = Dt , Kt , Ht , Ne,t , Nb,t , qt , wt , Rf,t , Rd,t , At−1 , σωj ,t−1 , σωi ,t−1 ) and
n ∈ {A, δ, i, j}. Hence, the GIRF depend on the value of the state variables when the shocks
hits. For example,

GIRF∆ log Yt (4, ϵA,t+1 = −3, (1.1Dss , 0.9Kss , . . . , 1.01σ̄ωi ))
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is the GIRF of GDP growth, ∆ log Yt , at period t + 4, after a TFP shock of value −3 in
period t + 1, when Dt was 10 percent above the steady state, Kt was 10 percent below the
steady state, . . . , and σωi ,t was one percent above steady state.
But GIRF defined in Equation (2.86) are conditioned on the value of the state variables when
the shocks hits. In what follows, instead we want to compute GIRFs that are conditioned
on the values of observables when the shocks hits. For example, we would condition on the
expected default rate of firms, EDf,t , to be above one percent at the time of the shock. In
this case, we want to compute the following GIRF
Z
GIRFvar (l, ϵn,t+1 = ν, EDf,t > 0.01) =

1{EDf,t >0.01} (wt ) GIRFvar (l, ϵn,t+1 = ν, wt )f (wt ) dwt , (2.87)

where 1{EDf,t >0.01} (wt ) takes a value equal to one if the state variables at time t are such
that he expected default rate of firms is above one percent at time t and zero otherwise and
where f (wt ) is the unconditional density of the state variables. Of course Equation (2.87)
needs to be computed by simulation.
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2.9.5. Additional Results
Our model with its endogenous connection between firm and bank solvency features a number
of idiosyncratic and aggregate risk shocks that are important for the transmission of firm
defaults to bank defaults and to the macroeconomy at large. In this section we investigate the
importance of each of these shocks. We do this by removing them on an individual basis and
then examining the extent to which this deteriorates the model’s performance in replicating
the quantile regressions in Section 2.2.1. We also show the importance of solving the model
non-linearly by reporting the results that one would obtain by solving it using a first-order
(instead of a third-order) approximation. Further, we also documents non-linearities in the
transmission of shocks in the model using generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs).
Importance of the island-idiosyncratic and island-risk shocks
We start with the island-idiosyncratic and island-risk shocks. In our framework banks default
when they experience abnormally low realizations of the island-idiosyncratic shock. Our
model also allows aggregate fluctuations in the non-diversifiable (island) risk by means of
island-risk shocks, i.e., shocks to the dispersion of the island-idiosyncratic risk. These shocks
increase the probability of very low realizations of the island-idiosyncratic shocks, making
banks more vulnerable.
The results of eliminating island-idiosyncratic and island-risk shocks are shown in the top panels of Figure 2.9. The figure presents the quantile regression coefficients for Equations (2.24)
and (2.25) for the model without island-idiosyncratic shocks (green line), i.e., when the
island-idiosyncratic shock is set to one, and without the island-risk shocks (blue line). The
red and black lines correspond to our baseline model and the data, respectively.94
The figure shows that both island-idiosyncratic and island-risk shocks are vital in generating
a realistic sensitivity of bank default to firm default and of GDP growth to bank defaults. In
the model without island-idiosyncratic shocks, the quantile regression coefficients go to zero
because banks are perfectly diversified and their loan portfolio returns are very stable. Firms
94

Note that when we eliminate the island-idiosyncratic shocks, the island-risk shocks became irrelevant.
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continue to default because of the firm-idiosyncratic shocks but banks are diversified against
these shocks. And while aggregate shocks induce some fluctuations in firm default, these are
too small to make banks fail, since our banks’ solvency is protected by their equity buffers.
Thus, if the bank is fully diversified, bank defaults do not happen and cannot possibly affect
GDP growth. The model without island-risk shocks shows that, although eliminating this
shock does not lead to fully diversified banks, keeping the non-diversifiable risk (and hence
the probability of bank default) low and relatively constant reduces the model’s capability of
the model to match the sensitivity of bank default to firm default and of GDP growth to
bank default. Clearly, the model without island-risk shocks, although it does a better job
than the model without island-idiosyncratic shocks, fails to generate the state-dependent
relationship between firm and bank defaults and economic activity that we see in the data.
This experiment clearly indicates the importance of both island-idiosyncratic and island-risk
shocks in generating realistic conditional and unconditional correlation patterns between
firm and bank defaults and economic activity. When the non-diversifiable risk is constant
(no island-risk shocks), bank defaults are rare, they are mostly unaffected by firm defaults,
and they do not affect real economic activity. When non-diversifiable risk is absent (no
island-idiosyncratic shocks), banks do not default.
Importance of the firm-idiosyncratic and firm-risk shocks
The other source of risk to firms in our model comes from firm-idiosyncratic and firm-risk
shocks, i.e. shocks to the dispersion of the firm-idiosyncratic risk. These shocks capture risks
to individual firms that are diversifiable at the individual bank level. The firm-risk shocks
increase firm defaults but they affect different banks evenly rather than concentrating the
bulk of losses on a few unlucky banks, as is the case for the island-risk shocks.
In this section we investigate how the model’s ability to replicate the quantile regression
coefficients for Equations (2.24) and (2.25) changes when we eliminate the firm-idiosyncratic
and -risk shocks. The middle panels of Figure 2.9 show the results. This time the green line
displays the quantile regression coefficients in the model where we set the firm-idiosyncratic
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shock equal to unity for all firms, while the blue line presents the results from the model
where firm-risk shocks are shut down.
Both the green and blue lines display a relationship between firm and bank defaults. Intuitively, the green lines in the middle panels of Figure 2.9 correspond to an economy with fully
non-diversified banks in which the defaults of banks and firms are almost perfectly correlated.
This makes the sensitivity of bank default to firm default very large and rather constant
over states. The impact of shutting down the firm-risk shocks is qualitatively similar to
the elimination of the firm-idiosyncratic shocks but not as quantitatively large with respect
to the quantile regression coefficients for Equation (2.24). The right middle panel shows
that eliminating either firm-idiosyncratic or firm-risk shocks generates a state-dependent
relationship between bank defaults and economic activity that is too weak compared both
with the data and the implications of our baseline model.
This experiment clearly indicates the importance of both firm and island shocks in generating
realistic conditional and unconditional correlation patterns between firm and bank defaults
and economic activity. When we eliminate non-diversifiable risk (no island shocks), the
conditional and unconditional correlation between firm and bank default is too small. Instead,
when we eliminate diversifiable risk (no firm shocks), the conditional and unconditional
correlation between firm and bank default is too large. In both instances the conditional and
unconditional correlation between bank default and economic activity is too low.
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Figure 2.9: Quantile regressions: Key model features
(a) Firm and Bank Default - no island shocks

(b) GDP Growth and Bank Default - no island shocks
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(c) Firm and Bank Default - no firm shocks

(d) GDP Growth and Bank Default - no firm shocks
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(e) Firm and Bank Default - diff. approx.

(f) GDP Growth and Bank Default - diff. approx.
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Notes: The figure explores the importance of non-diversifiable risk (top panels), diversifiable risk (middle
panels) and approximation order (bottom panels). The left column presents coefficients ζτ from the quantile
regression in Equation (2.24), while the right column presents coefficients βτ from the quantile regression in
Equation (2.25).
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Importance of the higher approximation order
Finally, we investigate the role of our solution method by comparing the quantile regressions
implied by our baseline model (which is solved using third-order approximation) with
the quantile regressions implied by first-order (green lines) or second-order (blue lines)
approximate solutions.95 The bottom panels of Figure 2.9 shows the results.
Both the linear and the second-order model clearly fail to match the non-linarities found in
the data. They generate flat quantile regression coefficients in both panels. Intuitively, a
model solved to first or second order works well in normal times but fails to generate the
sharp and non-linear deterioration of economic and financial conditions in crises or recessions.
In contrast, a third-order approximation captures the non-linearity in the co-movements of
firm and bank defaults and economic activity.
We have already discussed in Section 2.3 that modelling bank portfolios as consisting of
defaultable loans introduces an important non-linearity into bank asset returns and hence
into bank default realizations. It is therefore natural that a non-linear solution method
is needed to capture such non-linearities in an accurate manner. Our results show that a
third-order solution is sufficient for this purpose.
Generalized Impulse Response Functions to an Island-risk Shock
We now use the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) to show that the economy
“accelerates” into a twin default event as the impact of additional island-risk shocks grows.
This internal propagation helps the model generate twin default crises without the need for
huge shocks. Figure 2.10 reports three sets of GIRFs to a one standard deviation island-risk
shock. The solid line shows the unconditional GIRF, the blue dashed line shows the GIRF
conditional on the economy being at a high firm default episode, and the red dashed line
shows the GIRF conditional on the economy being in a twin default episode. Details on how
to compute both conditional and unconditional GIRFs can be found in Appendix 2.9.4.
95

We estimate the parameters of the first- and second-order approximation versions of our model to match
the set of moments presented in Table 2.2.
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The shock has a much larger impact when conditioning on either a twin defaults or a high
firm default episode.96 The GDP drop is much larger than the effect in the unconditional
GIRF. The same is true for the drop in investment and the price of capital and for the
impact on firm and bank defaults. This shows how the model solved with a third-order
approximation is able to amplify island-risk shocks during crisis times differently than during
normal times. In our model, once the economy finds itself in a situation of high firm default,
it becomes very vulnerable to island-risk shocks. The GIRFs conditional only on high firm
default shows much less amplification than when we condition on a twin defaults episode.

96

It is important to note that the traditional linear IRFs are independent of the state of the economy.

165

Figure 2.10: Conditional Impulse Response Functions: Island risk shock
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Path to Twin Default and Bank Default episodes
Figure 2.11: Path to bank default events in baseline and Merton-type models
Output

Bank Default
3

6

2.5

-1

5

Level (in %)

-0.5

Level (in %)

% dev. from mean

0

Firm Default

2

1.5

4

3

1
2

-1.5
-10

0

10

-10

quarters

10

-10

quarters

Bank Risk

0

1.5

St. dev. from mean

St. dev. from mean

0.5

1

0.5

0
-10

0

10

Firm Risk

1.5

1

0

quarters

Island Risk

1.5

St. dev. from mean

0

1

0.5

0

10

-10

quarters

0

10

quarters
Baseline Model

-10

0

10

quarters
Merton-type Model

Notes: This figure shows the average path leading to a bank default episodes under different model assumptions.
Red solid line corresponds to our baseline model. Red dashed line corresponds to the Merton-type model.
The figure is generated by simulating the model for 1,000,000 periods, identifying periods of twin defaults
and then computing the average realizations of shocks and endogenous variables for twenty periods before
and after the crisis periods. We define a bank default episode as the occurrence of bank default above its
90th percentiles. The 90th percentile bank default thresholds used to define the bank default regime in the
two models are alwaysσ the ones determined by the baseline model. Bank Risk, Island Risk and Firm Risk
σω
σω
ω
represent the level of σ̄b,t+1
, σ̄j,t+1
and σ̄i,t+1
in their respective standard deviation units.
ω
ω
ω
b

j

i

167

CHAPTER 3
Policy Uncertainty, Lender of Last Resort and the Real
Economy
(with Martina Jasova and Caterina Mendicino)
Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, financial sector bailouts and central bank unconventional policies have been surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. Many central banks revived lender of last resort (LOLR) operations and implemented important temporary changes
to their liquidity operations. This, often, generated uncertainty about the circumstances and
terms under which they would provide liquidity assistance.97 While the existing literature has
provided important insights on the impact of government, trade and monetary policy uncertainty on the firm-level and aggregate economic outcomes (e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al.,
2015; Baker et al., 2016; Husted et al., 2019; Caldara et al., 2020), evidence on the real effects
of uncertainty regarding central bank LOLR policy is still scant.
Banks are at the core of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (e.g. Kashyap and Stein,
2000; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Jimenez et al., 2012). Thus, the assessment of how
uncertainty regarding central bank policies affects economic outcomes requires to understand
its impact on bank lending decisions. Estimating the causal effect of LOLR policy uncertainty
on the real economy through its effect on the supply of credit poses important identification
challenges. Crucially, uncertainty simultaneously affects the demand and supply of credit.
Moreover, it is generally difficult to identify exogenous shocks to policy uncertainty, as well
as, to measure the exposure to uncertainty in the cross-section of banks and firms.
We address these challenges by studying the causal effect of a sudden reduction in LOLR
policy uncertainty on bank lending and its propagation to the real economy by using a
unique policy change and granular micro-level data. We focus on the European Central Bank
97
The differential treatment of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG increased uncertainty regarding
the availability of the U.S. Federal Reserve liquidity support. Similarly, in the U.K., the Northern Rock crisis
increased uncertainty regarding the conduct of LOLR operations by the Bank of England (Hauser, 2014).
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(ECB)’s 2011 very Long-Term Refinancing Operation (vLTRO) as a quasi-natural experiment
of a sudden reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty. The vLTRO extended the maturity of
central bank liquidity from short-term to extraordinarily long three years and, thus, reduced
uncertainty regarding the future availability of LOLR funding for a prolonged period of time.
Importantly, the vLTRO was introduced when the ECB was providing banks with a haircut
subsidy, i.e. a favorable gap between the central bank and private market haircut on the
value of risky securities pledged to obtain repo funding. In the presence of a substantial
haircut subsidy, uncertainty regarding the long-term availability of LOLR funding exposed
banks to the risk of having to rely on more costly market funding.
Our identification strategy relies on exploiting banks’ cross-sectional variation in the ex-ante
exposure to the LOLR policy uncertainty in a difference-in-differences research design. We
use the size of the haircut subsidy at the individual bank level as a measure of exposure to
the LOLR policy uncertainty. We analyze the credit supply impact of policy uncertainty
by comparing the credit outcomes of the same firm borrowing from at least two differently
exposed banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jiménez et al., 2019). We show that during the
European sovereign debt crisis, banks more exposed to the reduction in LOLR policy
uncertainty provided more credit to firms, in particular of longer maturity. Further, we also
document that the loan-level effects are economically sizable and translate in investment and
employment effects.
Our paper has several important implications. First, we provide empirical evidence on the
impact of policy uncertainty on investment and employment through its effects on the supply
of credit. By showing that a reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty makes banks choose to no
longer delay their lending, we document that real option channel (Bernanke, 1983; Rodrik,
1991) is also important for banks. We find that banks more exposed to the reduction in
policy uncertainty not only started to invest more in credit, but they also granted loans
of longer maturities. Second, we uncover new insights into the importance of central bank
commitment and forward guidance (e.g. Campbell et al., 2012). Our results suggest that

169

in the absence of an explicit long-horizon commitment to the provision of LOLR funding,
a lengthening of the maturity of central bank liquidity reduces uncertainty regarding the
availability of central bank funding over an extended period of time and is a valid policy
tool to stimulate lending and the real economy. Thus, central bank commitment or explicit
guidance about its future policy intentions is also crucial in the context of lender of last
resort policy. Third, the focus on LOLR policy (e.g. Bagehot, 1873; Friedman and Schwartz,
1963; Drechsler et al., 2016), allows us to provide new evidence on the bank lending effects
of central bank policies that goes beyond those of conventional and unconventional monetary
policies (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2012; Rodnyansky and Darmouni, 2017). Importantly, the size
of the haircut subsidy is key in the propagation of LOLR policy to bank lending and the real
economy.
This paper exploits a unique micro-level dataset that links detailed information on banks,
firms and loans. First, we use the data on banks’ security pledging with the ECB and match
it with the private repo market haircuts to measure the size of the haircut subsidy. Second,
we merge the haircut subsidy measured at the cross-section of banks with the universal credit
registry that collects loan-level information for all credit relationships of Portuguese firms to
investigate lending outcomes. Finally, we link the data with firm-level balance sheet and
employee-employer datasets to study the real effects of the policy. Our paper is, to the best
of our knowledge, the first work that examines the transmission of LOLR policy changes on
the real economy at this level of coverage, match and granularity.
The 2011 vLTRO represents a suitable setting to investigate the effects of a reduction in
uncertainty surrounding the future availability of central bank liquidity. In October 2008, the
ECB started to fully satisfy the demand for short-term liquidity from Eurozone banks against
eligible collateral under fixed rate full allotment policy. However, the ECB never committed
to provide unlimited liquidity and, thus, to act as a LOLR, for an extended period of time.
The lack of long-horizon guidance about its intentions regarding the provision of liquidity
generated uncertainty for banks regarding the future possibility to fully satisfy their funding
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needs through the central bank for an extended period of time.98 By extending the maturity
of available funds to three years, the vLTRO suddenly reduced uncertainty regarding the
longer-term availability of LOLR liquidity.99
We argue that the size of the haircut subsidy plays a crucial role in determining the impact of
a reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty. In case of a withdrawal from the unlimited liquidity
policy, banks borrowing from the ECB against securities with a high haircut subsidy would
incur a drastic reduction in their borrowing capacity by switching to the private repo market.
Using data on private market haircuts, we calculate that the average subsidy for Portuguese
banks was around 70 pp before the introduction of the 2011 vLTRO. In the extreme case of
a complete reliance on the private market, banks’ borrowing capacity would be reduced by
57% of their equity capital (EUR 20 bn). Due to this substantial haircut subsidy, Portuguese
banks heavily relied on the LOLR funding and were, largely exposed to uncertainty about
its future availability. Thus, banks with ex-ante larger haircut subsidy benefited more from
the vLTRO.
Our results highlight that a lengthening of the maturity of central bank liquidity by itself
is not sufficient to stimulate lending. Specifically, we argue that the necessary condition
for this policy change to work is a sizable exposure of banks to LOLR policy uncertainty,
as measured by a large haircut subsidy. We document this by extending our analysis to a
similar long-term liquidity operation introduced in 2009. Unlike the 2011 vLTRO, the 2009
policy was implemented in a period of negligible haircut subsidy. As a result, banks were
less exposed to LOLR policy uncertainty as they could effectively substitute central bank
funding with private market repo financing without suffering from a dramatic reduction in
their borrowing capacity due to the haircut differences.100 Our empirical analysis of the 2009
98
In addition, in April and July 2011 the ECB increased interest rates, after almost two years of interest
rate cuts. This created uncertainty regarding the stance of the ECB monetary policy over the medium term,
and raised concerns of a possible tightening cycle.
99
Based on banks’ public announcements, banks reported the reduction in uncertainty regarding the
guarantee of long-term funding as the crucial reason for their participation in the vLTRO.
100
The average subsidy for a Portuguese bank was around 4 pp before the introduction of the 2009 policy
compared to 70 pp before 2011 vLTRO.
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policy finds no impact of the lengthening of the maturity of central bank liquidity on bank
lending in a period of low haircut subsidy.
Portugal presents an ideal laboratory to investigate the bank lending and real effects of a
sudden reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty in times of crisis for at least three reasons. First,
the high level of granularity of the data allows us to overcome a number of identification
challenges and properly trace the transmission of the policy uncertainty shock to bank
lending and its propagation to the firm-level outcomes and the real economy. Second, the
Portuguese banking sector was highly exposed to the LOLR policy uncertainty. Due to the
fear of contagion from the Greek sovereign debt crisis, in May 2010 Portuguese banks lost
access to the international wholesale funding market and increased their reliance on the
short-term ECB funding. At the time of the introduction of the vLTRO, Portuguese securities
were considered risky and had extremely high haircuts in the private market. Thus, banks
were highly exposed to uncertainty regarding the availability of future LOLR liquidity.101
Third, the focus on Portugal mitigates concerns about confounding effects related to the
change of collateral rules for certain types of securities during the vLTRO. Together with the
announcement of the vLTRO, the ECB also relaxed collateral rules on risky asset-backed
securities and allowed national central banks to temporarily accept non-marketable securities.
In sharp contrast with other European countries, the use of these types of securities was very
limited in Portugal.102 Overall, Portugal represents a valuable choice for our analysis as it
allows us to overcome important identification challenges.
We formally exploit the variation in banks’ exposure to the reduction in LOLR policy
uncertainty entailed in the vLTRO using a difference-in-differences framework. To isolate
the causal effect of the reduction in policy uncertainty on lending, we compare the credit
outcomes of the same firm borrowing from at least two differently exposed banks. Our
101

Portugal received the second largest uptake of the vLTRO relative to the size of the domestic banking
sector among all euro area countries.
102
In Section 3.1, we use security-level data to carefully document that the change in collateral rules
concomitant with the vLTRO did not affect in a relevant way the composition of pledged securities used
by Portuguese banks. In contrast, this increase in the collateral availability had a significant impact on the
pledging behaviour of banks during the vLTRO in other European countries.
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identifying assumption is that in the absence of the policy, the lending of more and less
exposed banks would have followed parallel trends. We measure the exposure to the policy
using the size of the haircut subsidy for each bank as the difference between the ECB and
the private market haircut-adjusted value of its securities pledged with the ECB to obtain
liquidity.
We find that the introduction of long-term operations improves lending outcomes by reducing
banks’ uncertainty regarding the availability of central bank funding over an extended period
of time. This has a positive and economically sizable impact on banks’ credit supply to
firms both on the intensive and extensive margin. Banks more exposed to the reduction
in LOLR policy uncertainty increased their actual lending to firms, allowed borrowers to
increase credit line drawdowns and offered loans of longer maturity. In terms of elasticity,
one standard deviation increase in bank exposure to the reduction in funding uncertainty
is associated with a 3.2 percent increase in lending to non-financial firms in Portugal. The
effects are positive and significant not only at the loan-level but importantly also at the
firm-level credit. We compare the actual credit development to the counterfactual without
the policy intervention and find that although the policy did not stop the ongoing credit
contraction, it significantly reduced its pace. The observed credit contraction in the vLTRO
period was about 5.75%. We estimate that in the absence of the policy, credit would have
reduced by additional 2.15 percentage points (EUR 892 million).
While the reduction in policy uncertainty had a positive impact on lending volumes, it also
led to a temporary loosening of lending standards. Specifically, more exposed banks were
more likely to establish new relationships with riskier firms and these newly extended loans
defaulted more often within the subsequent three years. This provides evidence on the
risk-taking channel of LOLR policy and it is in line with the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy already documented for both conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks.
Finally, we explore whether the loan-level results translate into economically relevant firmlevel credit outcomes. A valid concern is that as firms received more funding from more
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exposed banks, their borrowing from other less exposed banks could have been reduced by
the same proportion (a zero-sum outcome). This would imply negligible firm-level credit
effects.103 We show that the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty strongly transmitted to
firm-level investment and employment during the sovereign debt crisis. To this end, we match
the credit register data for all non-financial firms in Portugal with granular firm-level census
and employer-employee data. While the observed drop in investment in 2011–2012 was about
18.5%, we estimate that without the vLTRO, firms’ investment would have contracted by
additional 2.2 percentage points. In case of employment, we find that while the year-on-year
labor market contacted by 9.7%, in the absence of the vLTRO the employment drop would
have been 2.0 percentage points more severe. Thus, the real option channel for banks prove
to have important effects not only on bank lending decisions, but also for the real economy.
Literature review. This paper contributes to the growing literature that assesses the
real and financial effects of economic policy uncertainty (e.g. Pastor and Veronesi, 2012;
Baker et al., 2016; Kelly et al., 2016; Jens, 2017; Husted et al., 2019; Caldara et al., 2020).
We add to this literature by examining the effects of uncertainty surrounding LOLR policies.
Our results highlight that the real option channel of uncertainty is important for banks and
translates into firm real effects.
The paper also relates to the growing strand of the monetary economics literature which has
highlighted the importance of commitment and forward guidance for interest rate policies
(e.g. Wright, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012) or asset purchases (e.g. Krishnamurthy et al., 2017;
Swanson, 2017). The relevance of providing guidance on central bank policy intentions has
not been assessed in the realm of lender of last resort policies. Our paper fills this important
gap.
By showing that managing the maturity structure of the central bank liquidity is an important
tool for the lender of last resort, we also contribute to existing work that analyzes banks’
103

See, for instance, Jiménez et al. (2019) for an example of how large loan-level effects of a credit supply
shocks in Spain result in close to zero firm-level aggregate effects.
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borrowing from the central bank during crisis times (e.g. Cassola et al., 2013; Drechsler et al.,
2016; Berger et al., 2017). By reducing uncertainty about the availability of future liquidity,
the central bank can provide support to banks and stimulate lending. The positive and
sizable effects of the LOLR policy uncertainty on bank lending and the real economy are
crucially linked to the size of the haircut subsidy.
This paper complements existing work on the effect of central bank policies related to the
vLTRO. Existing papers focus on the vLTRO liquidity uptake (Andrade et al., 2018) or on
the relaxation of the collateral rules concomitant with the vLTRO (e.g., Cahn et al., 2018;
van Bekkum et al., forthcoming; Carpinelli and Crosignani, 2018) and provide evidence of
its effect on the lending in a number of countries.104 We show that the lengthening of the
maturity of central bank liquidity can affect bank lending independently of the relaxation
of the collateral rules. Importantly, the effects are related to the exposure of banks to
uncertainty regarding the long-term provision of LOLR funding. We exploit two distinctive
features of our setup that allow us to examine this mechanism. First, we focus on Portugal
where, differently from other European countries, the relaxation of collateral rules was very
limited.105 Second, we present a novel measure of the exposure to the policy - the haircut
subsidy - that allows us to capture ex-ante bank’s exposure to the reduction in LOLR policy
uncertainty entailed in the vLTRO.106
Finally, this paper connects to the literature on the bank lending channel of monetary
104

At the time of the vLTRO, the ECB (i) reduced the rating threshold for certain asset-backed securities and (ii) allowed national central banks, as a temporary solution, to accept as collateral additional
performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. van Bekkum et al. (forthcoming) exploit
the lowering of the rating requirement for eligible residential mortgage-backed securities in the Netherlands.
Carpinelli and Crosignani (2018) explore the introduction of a regulatory intervention by the Italian government that allowed banks to “manufacture” collateral by guaranteeing securities, such as retained bank own
bonds, otherwise ineligible at the ECB. Andrade et al. (2018) studies the impact of the endogenous vLTRO
liquidity uptake in France, while Cahn et al. (2018) exploit the concurrent relaxation of the collateral rules
for French banks.
105
In Section 3.1, we provide detailed evidence of the negligible role played by these newly eligible securities
in the pledging of Portuguese banks during the vLTRO.
106
In our analysis we also compare the impact of the 2011 vLTRO with that of the 2009 LTRO to further
document the importance of the LOLR policy uncertainty channel in explaining the bank lending effects of
the lengthening in the maturity of central bank liquidity. To the best of our knowledge, the 2009 LTRO was
so far unexplored by the literature.
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policy (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2012, 2014) and in particular to the latest papers on unconventional monetary policies (e.g. Chakraborty et al., 2018; Rodnyansky and Darmouni, 2017;
Altavilla et al., 2018, 2019; Bottero et al., 2019; Heider et al., 2019). We contribute to this
strand of the literature by documenting the bank lending channel of LOLR policy. In addition,
by showing that policy uncertainty that hits banks propagates to the real economy, we also
link to existing work that quantifies the aggregate effects of shocks propagated through the
credit channel (see, e.g., Jiménez et al., 2019; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018; Chodorow-Reich,
2014; Huber, 2018; Luck and Zimmermann, 2020).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 shows the institutional background.
Section 3.2 discusses the data. Section 3.3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 reports
the loan-level effects, Section 3.5 presents firm-level credit and real outcomes. Section 3.6
concludes.

3.1. LOLR, policy uncertainty and haircut subsidy
3.1.1. The liquidity framework of the ECB
Until 2008, the ECB provision of liquidity was implemented in the form of repurchase
agreements against eligible collateral through auctions at variable rate.107 As a reaction to
the financial crisis, in October 2008, the existing tender procedure was replaced by a fixed-rate
full allotment (FRFA). With FRFA, all bank bids were fully satisfied regardless of bids placed
by other banks in the Eurozone as long as the bank could pledge sufficient collateral. Thus,
banks could borrow unlimited amounts of liquidity against eligible collateral.108
On 8 December 2011, the ECB unexpectedly announced a new very Long-Term Refinancing
Operation (vLTRO) with an extraordinarily long maturity of 36 months.109 The newly
107

See Cassola et al. (2013) for details on the primary auctions of liquidity before 2008 and for the analysis
of banks’ bidding behavior under the multiple rate auction during the 2007 sub-prime market crisis.
108
We focus on regular ECB liquidity operations and abstract from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance
program, which is administered by the national central bank to support banks with insufficient eligible
collateral.
109
Previously, the ECB offered liquidity to banks with a maximum maturity of one year, i.e, weekly main
refinancing operations (MRO), and 1-, 3-, 6-month long-term operations (LTRO), and on two special occasions
(in 2009 and 2011) the ECB introduced 12-month LTRO.
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available long-term funding was offered at exactly the same conditions as for the existing
short-term repo.110 More than 800 banks participated to the vLTRO and the ECB allotted
approximately EUR 1 trillion of funding. To date, this is the largest liquidity provision in
the history of modern central banking.
3.1.2. LOLR policy uncertainty and vLTRO
Why was the vLTRO so popular? We argue that at the time of the vLTRO banks were
facing uncertainty about their ability to fully satisfy their funding needs through the ECB
over an extended period of time. The ECB only provided short-horizon guidance on the
future availability of LOLR funding.111 In fact, in October 2011 (one and a half months
before the vLTRO announcement), the ECB announced to maintain the FRFA policy only
until mid-2012. In the absence of a long-horizon commitment to the future course of actions,
the introduction of a new long-term operation reduced uncertainty regarding the availability
of LOLR funding over an extended period of time.
Banks’ public announcements also point towards the reduction in uncertainty regarding the
availability of funding over the incoming years as the crucial reason for their participation
in the vLTRO. The banks communicated that they took “the opportunity to borrow from
the ECB at three years, which made funding more stable and took pressure off the use of
weekly borrowing operations” (Caixa Economica Monte Pio, Annual Report, 2011), as it
“guaranteed the same [liquidity] position for the coming two years” (Banco Carregosa, Report
and Accounts, 2011), represented a “structural improvement in the profile of maturities”
(Caixa Geral de Depositos, Annual Report 2012), “improved financing structure by replacing
short-term maturities by long term funding” (Santander, Annual Report, 2011) and enabled
them “to stabilize [the] structural liquidity profile” (Banco Popolare, Annual Report, 2012).112
Thus, the guidance horizon used by the ECB had left a great deal of uncertainty regarding
110

The vLTRO interest rate was a floating rate computed as an average of the weekly MRO rates set by the
ECB over the horizon of three years and was paid at the maturity of the operation. Banks were required to
pay a floating rate that fully mirrored any changes in the MRO rates over the horizon of three years. Thus,
vLTRO was not associated with a reduction in interest rate risk compared to other shorter-term operations.
111
See Internet 3.9.1 for ECB announcements concerning FRFA.
112
See Internet 3.9.1 for further details.
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the availability of LOLR funding. The vLTRO clearly contributed to reduce this uncertainty.
In addition, in April and July 2011 (i.e., around six months prior to the vLTRO announcement)
the ECB increased interest rates, after almost two years of interest rate decreases. This
increased uncertainty regarding the stance of the ECB monetary policy over the medium
term, and raised concerns of a possible tightening cycle. This, potentially, also contributed
to enhanced uncertainty regarding the future provision of LOLR liquidity.
3.1.3. vLTRO and the Portuguese banking sector
Liquidity provisions
Figure 3.1 Panel (a) summarizes the development of ECB liquidity received by Portuguese
banks. In May 2010, Portuguese banks lost access to international wholesale markets and
increased their dependence on the ECB liquidity operations.113 Prior to the introduction of
the vLTRO, Portuguese banks borrowed from the ECB in short maturities (on average 4
months). The vLTRO allowed banks to costlessly swap their existing short-term funding
into a stable and predictable source of financing of three-year maturity. Figure 3.1 Panel (b)
shows that the average maturity of bank debt from the ECB increased from 4 months right
before the vLTRO announcement to 32 months in the post- period. In total, the vLTRO
provided EUR 20.2bn of long-term liquidity to Portuguese banks in December 2011 and
an additional EUR 26.8bn in February 2012.114 Portuguese banks were the second largest
recipient of vLTRO relative to the size of banking sector.
Pledged securities
Figure 3.1 Panel (c) illustrates the main categories of collateral pledged with the ECB by
Portuguese banks. While government bonds (red) were always a relevant source of collateral,
bank-issued securities (blue) played an increasingly more important role as a collateral for
liquidity operations over time. The majority of these bonds are (risky) domestic securities
issued by Portuguese banks and government and are associated with high haircut subsidy.
113

Alves et al. (2016) find that the banks did not freeze lending to the real economy as they effectively
substituted their source of funding with the ECB liquidity.
114
The policy was administered in two operations on December 21, 2011 and February 29, 2012.
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Together with the vLTRO the ECB also increased collateral availability by “(i) reducing the
rating threshold for certain asset- backed securities (ABS) and (ii) allowing national central
banks, as a temporary solution, to accept as collateral additional performing credit claims
(i.e. bank loans) that satisfy specific eligibility criteria.” (ECB press release 8 December
2011). However, differently from a number of other European countries, Portugal did not
take advantage of the relaxation of collateral rules.
Regarding the use of asset-backed securities, Figure 3.1 Panel (c) illustrates that the share
of securitized assets (light grey), pledged by Portuguese banks, did not increase during the
period of the vLTRO.115 As for the additional credit claims, the Bank of Portugal introduced
only a very limited set of changes to the existing collateral framework and only for the
pledging of collateral in February 2012, i.e. the second allotment date. As a result, the share
of non-marketable securities (dark grey), did not exceed 5% of the total collateral pledged
and its use did not increase substantially during the vLTRO. Thus, our results are by and
large not driven by the relaxation of collateral rules on securitized assets, or by modifications
of the collateral framework at the national level.
Haircut subsidy
The ECB provides funding against adequate collateral and it applies haircuts, i.e. a reduction
to the value of the collateral pledged by banks. The size of the haircuts varies depending on
the riskiness and maturity of the underlying collateral. Prior to 2008, the haircuts applied by
the ECB were similar to the private market haircuts on repo loans. However, after September
2008, the ECB started offering haircuts on risky securities that were below private market
haircuts. We refer to the gap between the private market and central bank haircut on the
value of risky securities, as haircut subsidy. Drechsler et al. (2016) highlight that the changes
in the haircut policy essentially worked as a subsidy for distressed economies in the euro
area.
115

We also do not observe any large movements in pledging of securitized assets in the cross-section of banks.
Prior to the vLTRO, the average share of securitized assets to total pledged assets with the ECB was about
23.2% with a 24.8% standard deviation. Following the vLTRO, the importance of securitized assets has
slightly decreased (18% average and 21.5% standard deviation). For details see Internet Appendix Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.1 Panel (d) shows the average private market and ECB haircut for securities
pledged by Portuguese banks with the ECB.116 The haircut subsidy for those securities was
stable and on average 5 pp between 2007 and 2010 but it increased dramatically during the
European sovereign debt crisis and reached 70 pp in 2011. This change was triggered by a
rating downgrade of Portuguese sovereign bonds and a subsequent increase in private market
haircuts by about 75 pp. While private market repo clearing houses responded by increasing
the haircut on the securities issued by peripheral economies, the ECB kept those haircuts at
significantly lower levels. In fact, ECB haircuts increased only slightly by about 5 pp.
In the extreme case of a complete reliance of banks on the private repo market, the reduction
in the borrowing capacity of the Portuguese banking sector would have been reduced by
around EUR 20 billions (57% of their equity capital) at the time of 2011 vLTRO. By extending
the maturity of the ECB liquidity operations to three years, the vLTRO significantly reduced
uncertainty regarding the long-term availability of LOLR funding and the potential need to
rely on private repo financing at higher market haircuts. Thus, the reduction in uncertainty
was particularly strong for banks holding securities with large haircut subsidy.

3.2. Data
For the purpose of our analysis, we build a novel dataset that matches data from the European
Central Bank, private repo markets and the Bank of Portugal. Below we describe the data
following a top-down approach:
LOLR data. We use the Eurosystem Collateral Database to extract information on
the securities pledged with the ECB to obtain LOLR funding. We observe the following
characteristics of the pledged assets at bank-security-month level: ISIN-code, nominal value,
ECB haircut adjusted value, haircut category, quantity, issuance date, and maturity date.
We also use data from the private repo market - LCH Clearnet. For each security, we observe
monthly series of private market haircuts. We match the ECB and private market data to
construct the measure of the banks’ haircut subsidy.
116

Private repo market haircuts are obtained from LCH Clearnet. See Section 3.2.
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Finally, we exploit the ECB monetary policy and market operations database. This data
source provides us with detailed information on all ECB liquidity operations split by categories
(weekly main refinancing operations (MRO); longer-term refinancing operations with 1, 3,
6, 12 month maturity; 36-month operations (vLTRO)) for all banks on a daily basis. The
database allows us to directly observe the exact amount of 36-month vLTRO funding used
by each bank.
Bank-level data. We rely on several sources maintained by the Bank of Portugal. The
Securities Statistics Integrated System (SIET) contains information on the pool of all
marketable securities held by banks such as quantity, book value, and market value at the
bank-security-month level. We use SIET to define the two alternative measure of banks’
exposure to the LOLR policy uncertainty - (i) holding of eligible securities and (ii) holding
of eligible securities that match the maturity profile of the vLTRO operation.117
Credit register. Central de Responsabilidades de Credito (CRC) provides monthly loanlevel information on the universe of outstanding loans to Portuguese firms above the reporting
threshold of EUR 50.118 CRC includes data on loan amounts and key loan characteristics
(maturity, currency, type of the loan, and the guarantee/collateral used to secure the loan, if
any). CRC allows us to observe both drawn and potential credit (unused credit lines, credit
cards, etc.). The analysis uses all outstanding loans granted by banks to non-financial firms
residing in Portugal and borrowing in euro currency between June 2011 and June 2012. In
the core part of the analysis, we focus on private non-financial firms with multiple bank
borrowing relationships. This accounts for almost 1.5 million (bank-firm-month observations)
and 116,918 bank-firm relationships (see Internet Appendix Table 3.14).
Firm-level data. Firm-level annual census contains balance sheet and financial reports as
117

We also use variables from the bank balance sheet and prudential monthly databases to construct controls
for observable bank characteristics such as size, equity ratio, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, loan-to-assets ratio,
and equity-to-assets ratio. We restrict the analysis to domestic banks and domestic subsidiaries of foreign
banks. This leaves us with a final sample of 30 banks.
118
We exploit the universal coverage of micro-level credit data of firms. This provides an extremely rich
data for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which tend to be underrepresented in other countries.
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well as regional and sectoral classification of firms. We use this information to control for
firm characteristics (total assets, employment, age, industry, and district) as a substitute
to firm fixed effects. In addition, we use firm-level investment for the analysis of the real
outcomes. Finally, we also use employee-employer (Quadros de Pessoal) data matched with
the credit registry to study the effects on employment at the firm-establishment level.

3.3. Empirical strategy
3.3.1. Measuring exposure to the reduction in LOLR uncertainty
Haircut subsidy. We use the size of the haircut subsidy to measure banks’ exposure to
LOLR policy uncertainty. We construct a measure of ECB haircut subsidy at the bank level
as a difference between the ECB and the private market valuation of all pledged securities
normalized to bank’s total assets:119
P 
HaircutSubsidyi =

s

(ECB valuations − private market valuations ) × Qi,s
total assetsi


.

This measure captures bank’s total haircut subsidy taking into account the difference in
the two valuations of its securities pledged with the ECB. For each security s (reported at
ISIN-level), we retrieve the official ECB haircut-adjusted valuation and the private market
(LCH-Clearnet) valuation. Qi,s represents the total before-haircut value of the security
pledged by bank i with the ECB. To minimize endogeneity, we construct the exposure
measure as of September 2011, three months prior to the policy announcement. This measure
of exposure captures a hypothetical reduction in borrowing capacity in the extreme case of
complete reliance on private repo market. Banks with a larger haircut subsidy are the ones
that benefited more from the reduction in policy uncertainty.
Table 3.1 shows that the average haircut subsidy prior to the vLTRO in 2011 was 2.48% of
total assets. Out of a total of 30 banks, 15 banks do not pledge securities with the ECB
119

Our baseline measure of haircut subsidy is constructed using only securities pledged with the ECB. In
the Internet Appendix Table 3.9, we consider an alternative measure of haircut subsidy based on all eligible
securities held by each bank (both pledged and not pledged with the ECB). Our results remain robust to
this alternative specification.
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and we label these banks as control banks. In addition, we observe a large cross-sectional
variation in the haircut subsidy at the bank level (standard deviation is 3.91%).120
In the baseline analysis we use the exposure measure as a continuous variable as it allows us
to capture the fact that the higher the haircut subsidy the stronger the effects for a given
bank. As a robustness, we compare lending outcomes using a dummy exposure by splitting
banks into exposed (treated) and non-exposed (control). In Internet Appendix Table 3.10,
we also compare averages of bank’s observables between these two groups of banks.
We show that exposed banks are on average larger and hold more securities. The two groups
do not differ across other dimensions such as cash holdings, capitalization, profitability or
leverage.121
Alternative measures of exposure. In addition to the haircut subsidy, we also construct
three other measures of banks’ exposure to the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty. First,
we measure exposure as the sum of all short-term ECB funding taken up by a bank as of
September 2011 and normalized to total assets. This measure captures the fact that banks
primarily swapped their existing short-term ECB funding into the newly offered long-term
funding. Second, we construct a measure of exposure that captures total bank borrowing
capacity with the ECB as the value of total banks’ security holdings eligible as collateral
with the ECB (scaled to total assets). Third, we consider a more refined measure of the
latter exposure by focusing only on bank holdings of eligible securities that mature in an
horizon between one and three years. By lengthening the maturity of repo operations to
three years, the ECB implicitly decreased rollover risk for the funding backed by securities
that matured shortly before the vLTRO expiration. In other words, banks did not need to be
concerned about the price volatility of these securities at the time of the vLTRO repayment
120

In Internet Appendix Figure 3.6 we also illustrate the cross-sectional variation of the haircut subsidy at
the bank level as of September 2011.
121
The difference in security holdings confirms the fact that banks must hold securities to be able to
benefit from the haircut subsidy. Instead, the difference in bank’s size is directly related to the fixed cost of
establishing an infrastructure to borrow from the ECB (for example a trading desk). Smaller banks may not
find it beneficial to bear this fixed cost. For further discussion of differences in observables see Internet 3.9.3.
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and as a result, they would not need to face fire-sale risk due to rollover issues.122 Table 3.1
contains summary statistics also for these alternative measures of exposure.
3.3.2. Empirical specification
We use the difference-in-differences (DID) framework to compare lending before and after
the policy intervention by exploiting the variation in the cross-section of banks’ exposure
to the LOLR policy uncertainty. We examine the time series evolution of credit at the
bank-firm-month level following the baseline specification:

log(crediti,j,t ) = αjt + αij + β(HaircutSubsidyi × P ostt ) + ϵi,j,t ,

(3.1)

where log(crediti,j,t ) is log amount of all credit that firm j obtains from bank i at month
t. In the main analysis we focus on drawn credit. HaircutSubsidy i denotes our baseline
exposure to LOLR policy uncertainty - i.e. the size of haircut subsidy for a bank i. We
analyze a 13-month period: June 2011–June 2012. P ostt is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one in the post-period (February–June 2012), and zero otherwise. We end our
baseline sample period in June 2012 to avoid the overlap with the announcement of the
Outright Monetary Operations (i.e., the “whatever it takes” speech of the president of the
ECB Mario Draghi) in July 2012.
We saturate our model with fixed effects to address some of the main empirical challenges.
First, a potential bias in estimating the causal effects of the reduction in central bank
policy uncertainty can stem from the interaction between credit demand and supply. In line
with Khwaja and Mian (2008), we incorporate firm-time fixed effects to absorb time-varying
firm-specific changes in credit demand and isolate the causal effect of the policy by comparing
lending outcomes of the same firm (j) borrowing in the same month (t) from at least two
differently exposed banks.
Second, the bank-firm matching is not random as banks choose their borrowers (and vice122

For more details regarding the construction of these measures see Internet 3.9.2.
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versa). Firm borrowing relationships can also be of a different quality across different banks
(i.e., due to different lengths of the relationship, existence and quality of collateral). We
address the potential bias related to the non-exogenous bank-firm matching by including
bank-firm fixed effects that absorb any time-invariant bank-firm variation. Additionally, bankfirm fixed effects nest inside bank fixed effects and absorb any observable and unobservable
time-invariant bank characteristics that could be potentially correlated with our exposure
measure. To summarize, our empirical specification relies on a combination of firm-time and
bank-firm fixed effects (equation (3.1)). The main results are presented for non-financial firms
and non-profits which we denote as Private NFCs. We also report results for a larger sample
of firms that includes self-employed entrepreneurs and public companies denoted as All firms.
We examine the existence of parallel trends by comparing lending dynamics of exposed and
non-exposed banks in the period leading up to the policy intervention using a dynamic
difference-in-differences specification:

log(crediti,j,t ) = αjt + αij +

X

βk (1i=exposed × 1t=k ) + ϵi,j,t ,

(3.2)

k̸=2011m9

where 1i=exposed is one if banks were exposed to the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty
(i.e. they benefited from a haircut subsidy) and zero otherwise. 1t=k is an indicator that
equals one in month t, and zero otherwise. To test for the absence of the pre-trend, estimates
of βk need to be statistically insignificant from zero until the policy announcement.

3.4. Loan-level results
3.4.1. Intensive margin: loan quantities
Table 3.2 presents the main result on the intensive margin using the specification in equation
(3.1). Column (1) shows the results using the full sample of loans (bank-firm pairs). Here,
we use bank fixed effects (to absorb any time-invariant bank characteristics) and time fixed
effects. From Column (2) onward, we restrict the loan sample to firms that borrow from at
least two banks at each month. We denote this as “multiple bank relationships”. In Column
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(3) we replace the time fixed effects with firm-time fixed effects to absorb any variation from
firm-level (demand) changes in line with Khwaja and Mian (2008). It is plausible that a firm
has a different relationship with different banks. To address this challenge, in Column (4)
we introduce a set of bank-firm control variables. In our preferred specification shown in
Column (5) we also saturate the model with bank-firm fixed effects to address any potential
threat coming from a non-exogenous matching between banks and firms.
The coefficient estimate of β for all specifications is positive and statistically significant
suggesting that the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty triggered by the vLTRO had
a positive impact on bank lending to firms.123 As aggregate credit to firms in Portugal
decreased during the period, we interpret the positive coefficient as a smaller contraction in
lending by more exposed banks. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient estimate
of 0.824 (Column (5) of Table 3.2) implies that a one standard deviation increase in bank
exposure to the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty (3.91 percent of total assets from
Table 3.1) is associated with a 3.22 percent increase in lending on the intensive margin.
Our results suggest that a reduction of LOLR policy uncertainty had a positive effect on
lending to firms. In particular, more exposed banks (i.e., those benefiting from a larger
haircut subsidy) internalized the reduction in policy uncertainty and consequently reduced
their lending by less. Our empirical evidence is consistent with the real option channel of
policy uncertainty (see e.g. Bernanke, 1983). The option value of delaying banks’ illiquid
investments is high when uncertainty about the future availability of LOLR funding is high.
Due to the lack of commitment by the central bank to provide unlimited liquidity for an
extended period of time, banks preferred to wait and be more cautious with their lending.
The introduction of the vLTRO reduced this uncertainty, decreased banks’ option to wait
and as a result incentivized them to no longer postpone their lending.
Comparing the estimates with and without firm-time fixed effects (Table 3.2 Columns (2) and
123

The “Within R-squared” reported in Table 3.2 suggests that the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty
entailed in the ECB’s vLTRO explains around 10% of the within bank-firm credit variation.
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(3)), we find that not controlling for the overall firm’s credit demand overestimates the effect
of the policy action on lending. The estimate decreases in magnitude when we introduce
the firm-time fixed effects but it remains stable, positive and statistically significant. This
suggests that changes in uncertainty simultaneously affected firm demand and bank supply of
credit. Thus, it is important to control for time-varying credit demand to disentangle the two
forces and estimate the causal impact of uncertainty through the bank-lending channel.124
Alternative exposure measures. Internet Appendix Table 3.8 presents the intensive
margin results using the other three alternative measures of exposure discussed in Section
3.3.1. The results are robust to the use of these alternative measures.
Robustness. We conduct a battery of tests to support our identification. Internet Appendix
Table 3.11 shows the results of the baseline specification in equation (3.1) rewritten as a
collapsed difference-in-differences (comparing average bank-firm credit in the pre- and postperiods) to derive estimates with more conservative standard errors.
Internet Appendix Table 3.12 presents a number of additional results. First, we show
robustness to changes in the credit and firm definitions. Second, our results are unchanged if
we only focus on the variation in the cross-section of exposed banks and are also robust when
controlling for bank characteristics interacted with the POST dummy. Third, around the
time of the vLTRO announcement, four banks were undergoing the stress tests conducted by
the European Banking Authority.125 Our results remain unchanged even when we exclude
these banks from the sample. Finally, to corroborate the importance of our ex-ante measure
of exposure in capturing the effects of the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty, we document
that estimates using the endogenous vLTRO uptake deliver results that are not significantly
different from zero. This is because, differently from the haircut subsidy, the endogenous
124

We report estimates using two-way clustered standard errors at bank-time and firm level, as it allows us
to address the threat that firm-shocks can be serially correlated and also bank-time shocks (our source of
variation) can be correlated across firms. Our results are robust to alternative clustering levels and we report
these estimates in the Internet Appendix.
125
A number of papers study the effects of the 2011 EBA shock on banks’ balance sheets and the real
economy (e.g. Blattner et al., 2019; DeGryse et al., 2019; Gropp et al., 2019).
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vLTRO uptake is not an ex-ante measure of exposure to the reduction in policy uncertainty.
Thus, it could reflects a variety of reasons for banks’ decisions regarding the newly available
long-term liquidity, that are unrelated to the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty.
Dynamic setup. Equation (3.1) provides a consistent estimate of β under the identifying
assumption of parallel trends. In equation (3.2), we modify the empirical framework into a
dynamic setup which allows us to examine the existence of pre-trends. Figure 3.2 presents
the results. Consistent with the parallel trends assumption, the figure clearly displays no
relation between haircut subsidy and lending dynamics until November 2011. After the
policy announcement (December 2011), we observe statistically significant differences in
lending behavior between exposed (treated) and unexposed (control) banks. The positive
difference-in-differences coefficients need to be interpreted in the context of the ongoing
sovereign debt crisis and financial deleveraging of the Portuguese banking sector. While
the credit contraction continued for non-exposed banks, banks exposed to the reduction in
LOLR policy uncertainty significantly slowed down the pace of the deleveraging.
Credit lines. One hypothesis that would lend support to the prompt lending response
presented in Figure 3.2 is that exposed banks allowed firms to draw down on their existing
credit lines.126 To test this hypothesis, we extend the specification in equation 3.1 with a
triple interaction term where CreditLinej takes the value of 1 if a firm had pre-approved
potential credit prior to the vLTRO policy announcement and 0 otherwise. Table 3.3 Panel
(a) Column (1) shows a stronger response to the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty for
firms with prior access to credit lines. Furthermore, Column (2) documents a decrease in
potential (pre-approved but unused) credit which is consistent with higher draw-downs. This
is also reflected in higher utilization rates of credit reported in Column (3).127
126

In the credit registry data, we observe regular (drawn) credit as well as potential (pre-approved but
unused) credit. As a firm draws from its credit line, the amount disappears from the potential credit category
and appears in the drawn category. This data structure does not allow us to directly examine the amount
and change in the credit line limits but it provides a reliable picture about the total utilization rates, amount
of unused credit and overall credit dynamics.
127
To avoid any confounding effect coming from the fact that as a reaction to the vLTRO banks could also
increase the limits on credit lines, we compute the utilization rates as a share of total credit drawn in month
t to total available credit in September 2011.
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Placebo test. Were banks more exposed to the 2011 vLTRO generally more prone to react
to any bank-specific liquidity shocks? Iyer et al. (2014) show that that banks that relied
more on the interbank borrowing decreased their credit supply by more, following the sudden
freeze of the European interbank market in August 2007. Thus, we use the 2007 liquidity
freeze as a placebo sample to investigate whether the banks more exposed to the reduction
in LOLR policy uncertainty in 2011 were also more sensitive to the 2007 liquidity dry-up.
We follow the dynamic setup specification from equation (3.2) and replace the left-hand-side
lending outcomes in 2011–2012 with the lending outcomes in 2007. Internet Appendix Figure
3.5 shows no evidence that the banks more exposed to the 2011 reduction in LOLR policy
uncertainty are generally more sensitive to liquidity shocks.
3.4.2. Intensive margin: loan maturities
According to the real option channel, in response to a decrease in LOLR policy uncertainty,
banks should invest more in illiquid and irreversible investments. In the previous sections, we
have already shown that with the introduction of the vLTRO, more exposed banks extended
larger quantities of loans. In this section, we test whether the reduction in LOLR uncertainty
also made banks choose to grant loans of longer maturity, i.e. more irreversible.
In the credit registry data, we observe the loan maturities reported using maturity baskets
(1–90 days , 90–180 days etc.). We construct a continuous measure of loan maturity in two
steps. First, we approximate the maturity of the loan as a mid-point of a basket interval.
Second, as a firm may have multiple loans outstanding with the same bank, we compute the
weighted average of the loan maturity at the bank-firm-time level using loan sizes as weights.
We estimate the effect of the reduction on LOLR policy uncertainty on loan maturities by
modifying the equation (3.1) in a following way:
Loan maturityi,j,t = αjt + αij + β(HaircutSubsidyi × P ostt ) + Qi,j,t + ϵi,j,t .

(3.3)

where Qi,j,t denotes bank-firm and loan controls. Table 3.3 Panel (b) displays a positive and
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statistically significant coefficient β suggesting that the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty
had a positive effect on the maturity of banks’ loans to firms. Consistently with the real
option channel, banks more exposed to LOLR uncertainty were more likely to offer longer
maturities on their loans in the post period. Thus, as the uncertainty about availability of
the future LOLR funding resolves, exposed banks invest more into long-term and irreversible
projects.
3.4.3. vLTRO and LOLR policy uncertainty
In this section, we provide evidence in support of our argument that the vLTRO was
associated with a sudden reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty. The vLTRO allowed banks
to access LOLR funding of longer maturity in times of a sizable gap between the ECB and
private market security haircuts. We argue that the presence of a high haircut subsidy is a
necessary condition for changes in the maturity of LOLR funding to reduce uncertainty for
banks and have real effects. In the absence of a high haircut subsidy, uncertainty about the
future availability of LOLR liquidity is not expected to have a large effect on the borrowing
capacity of banks and thus on their lending behavior. This is because borrowing on the
private repo markets is not substantially more costly than borrowing from the central bank.
Therefore, we argue that the size of the haircut subsidy is a valid measure of bank exposure
to LOLR policy uncertainty.
To test this argument, we study the bank-lending response to a long-term liquidity operation
(LTRO) introduced in 2009, in a period of low exposure to the LOLR policy uncertainty.
Similarly to the vLTRO, the 2009 LTRO offered banks to borrow from the ECB at a long-term
(one-year) maturity at the same conditions as if the banks continued to borrow short-term. In
2009, however, the ECB haircuts were closely following the private market haircuts (Figure
3.1 Panel (d)). The average haircut subsidy of Portuguese banks in 2009 was 0.01% of total
assets. This is of a negligible magnitude compared to the average haircut subsidy of 2.48% in
2011. As a result, even in the case of a sudden stop of the LOLR funding in 2009, banks could
switch to borrow from the private market without suffering a large drop in their borrowing
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capacity. Thus, in 2009 banks were substantially less exposed to LOLR policy uncertainty.
We examine the effects of the policy change on bank lending over the period January 2009–
Apr 2010. Table 3.4 summarizes the results. Column (1) shows that the lending effect of
2009 LTRO is not statistically significant from zero.128 The lengthening of the maturity of
the LOLR funding does not have an effect on bank lending in the 2009 period of low haircut
subsidy. This suggests that for a lengthening of the maturity of central bank liquidity to
stimulate bank lending, it needs to be associated with a large exposure of banks to LOLR
policy uncertainty. Thus, a high haircut subsidy is a necessary condition for the policy
change to have real effects.
3.4.4. Intensive margin and firm characteristics
Is the reduction in the LOLR policy uncertainty transmitted equally across firms? To address
this question, we exploit the matching of the credit registry data with the firm census data
and introduce firm heterogeneity in the baseline specification. Table 3.5 displays the estimates
of the heterogeneous impact of LOLR uncertainty using a triple interaction specification:

log(crediti,j,t ) = αjt + αij + β1 (HaircutSubsidyi × P ostt )
+ β2 (HaircutSubsidyi × P ostt × Fj ) + ϵi,j,t , (3.4)
where Fj denotes firm characteristics such as size, length of the bank-firm relationship
and ex-ante firm riskiness. Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows a stronger positive effect of the
reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty on small firms. This finding is consistent with the
existing empirical evidence that emphasizes that small firms are more affected by shocks
propagated through the bank lending channel (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Iyer et al., 2014).129
128

For comparison with our baseline, we report our main result in Column (2) and show all estimates
re-scaled using the respective standard deviations.
129
This result is in line with the idea that banks benefiting from the ECB policy change may find it more
profitable to loosen their credit standards and extend more credit to smaller borrowers, which are generally
riskier and pay higher interest rate on their loan. This is consistent with our result on larger credit flow
towards riskier firm and more broadly with the evidence on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (e.g.
Jimenez et al., 2014). In addition, with the intent to rebuild lending relationships, exposed banks may extend
more credit to firms to which they had previously cut it by more. This rationale is consistent with the finding
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Column (2) of Table 3.5 illustrates a stronger positive effect for firms with a shorter (less
than two-year) relationship with a bank. While the stronger results for firms with shorter
lending relations mitigates concerns of ever-greening, it does not exclude the possibility that
some of the credit went to bad investment projects. Table 3.5 Column (3) shows stronger
lending effects for risky firms. We denote the firm as risky (one) if its z-score is above the
median and zero otherwise.130 Section 3.4.6 further explores bank risk-taking for new credit.
3.4.5. Extensive margin
Did the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty entailed in the vLTRO affect banks’ decision
to terminate fewer loans? Is there any evidence that more exposed banks started to establish
new lending relationships with previously unconnected firms? To address these questions, we
study the effects of the policy action on the extensive margin.
Loan termination. To study the impact on loan terminations, we consider a collapsed
version of the difference-in-differences framework where we compare bank-firm pairs in the
pre-period (2011m6–2011m10) and post-period (2012m2–2012m6):
EXITi,j = αj + βHaircutSubsidyi + γBi + ϵi,j .

(3.5)

The sample includes all loans that were outstanding in the period prior to the vLTRO
(2011m6–2011m10). EXIT dummy equals one if the loan only appears in the pre-period and
it does not exist in the post-period.131
Column (1) of Table 3.6 uses a combination of bank and firm controls. Column (2) replaces
firm controls with firm fixed effects to investigate whether the loan exit results continue
to hold after we control for firm observable and unobservable characteristics. Both results
suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in the exposure to the vLTRO (3.91 percent)
decreases the exit rate by 8.76 percent (3.91×(-2.24)). This confirms the hypothesis that in a
of Iyer et al. (2014) who show that Portuguese banks experiencing an interbank liquidity crunch at the onset
of the global financial crisis cut lending by more towards small firms compared to large firms.
130
We utilize the z-score measure for Portuguese firms by Antunes et al. (2016).
131
We only consider a sample of loans for which the maturity would not naturally end in the post-period.
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period of crisis, banks more exposed to a reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty are less prone
to terminate relationships with firms which overall slowed down the pace of deleveraging.
New credit approvals. Were more exposed banks also more likely to start lending to new
clients? We address this question by augmenting our dataset with the credit consultation
data. Banks obtain records of new firms, by accessing the consultation database upon the
firm’s consent. We analyze all loan consultations after the policy announcement and match
them with the actual entries in the credit registry. We construct a dummy variable ENTRYi,j
which equals one if a bank-firm consultation entry is matched with a new bank-firm record
in the credit registry, and zero otherwise.132
In the main analysis, we focus on consultations made between December 2011 and April 2012
and we match them with the credit registry outcomes in the period December 2011–June 2012.
Roughly 10% of loan consultations are successful and appear in the credit registry as new
loans.133 We estimate the effects on the extensive margin using the following specification:
ENTRYi,j = αj + βHaircutSubsidyi + γBi + ϵi,j .

(3.6)

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6 show that the coefficient is very stable with or without
firm FE. The results suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in the exposure to the
reduction in LOLR uncertainty increases the probability of a new relationship by 4.65 percent
(3.91×1.19).134
3.4.6. Extensive margin and firm riskiness
New credit and ex-ante firm riskiness. How does new lending relate to bank risk-taking?
Did risky firms benefit more from the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty? To this end,
132
Our construction of the extensive margin is consistent with Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014) who study loan
approvals in Spain. Spanish credit registry (CIR) has a similar data structure to the Portuguese CRC.
133
If approved, the majority of the loans are granted within two months. We also perform robustness tests
for changes in the consultation window and the results are not affected.
134
The main results are based on the linear probability models widely used in the literature (see
Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jimenez et al., 2012). Logit and probit specifications provide very similar results.
Results available upon request.

193

we introduce triple interactions that capture differential outcomes for ex-ante risky firms:
ENTRYi,j = αj +β1 HaircutSubsidyi +β2 (HaircutSubsidyi ×RiskyF irmj )+γBi +ϵi,j . (3.7)
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.6 show that exposed banks are more likely to establish new
relationship with riskier firms. This is true whether we proxy for firm riskiness with z-scores
or with firms recent loan delinquencies, measured as loan delinquencies in the past year.
Do these new relationships default more in the following years? To answer this
question, we compare loan defaults in a full dynamic framework:
loanDefaulti,j,t+2Y = αi + αind,t + αreg,i +

X

βk (HaircutSubsidyi × 1t=k ) + γQi,j + ϵi,j,t .

k̸=2011q4

(3.8)

For identification, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in banks’ haircut subsidy and we
compare defaults of observationally equivalent loans issued in different quarters. The latter
are defined as loans of the same outstanding amount and purpose issued by the same bank
to firms of the same size, region and industry. In the baseline, we report loan defaults within
two years after the loan origination.
Figure 3.3 displays the differences in loan default rates between more and less exposed banks.
In 2011, there is no relation between exposure and default rates, consistent with parallel
trends. In the two quarters following the policy (Q1–Q2 2012), more exposed banks are more
likely to grant new credit to firms that default on these loans more within the next two years.
This difference dies out already in mid-2012, suggesting that more exposed banks loosened
their lending standards only temporarily after the policy action. This finding suggests that
the risk-taking channel previously documented for monetary policy (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2014;
Heider et al., 2019) is also present in the case of the LOLR policy.
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3.5. Firm-level results
3.5.1. Credit
In what follows, we explore whether the loan-level results presented above translate into
economically relevant firm-level credit outcomes. A valid concern is that as firms received
more funding from more exposed banks, their borrowing from other less exposed banks could
have been reduced by the same proportion (i.e. a zero-sum outcome). This would imply
insignificant firm-level credit effects.
Firm-level credit. In order to measure the net firm-level credit effects, we collapse credit
registry loan-level data to the firm level and estimate the following equation:

∆log(yj ) = α + βHaircutSubsidyj + γBj + δQj + µFj + ϵj .

(3.9)

The outcome variable is the change in the log value of total credit received by a firm j from
all the banks it borrowed between the pre- and post- period. For each firm, we compute
an indirect exposure to the reduction in LOLR uncertainty. The firm’s exposure measure
is given by the weighted average of the haircuts subsidy of each bank (to which the firm is
connected). The weights are based on the firm’ credit with each individual bank in the preperiod:
HaircutSubsidyj =

P

× crediti,j,t=pre )
.
i (crediti,j,t=pre )

i
i (HaircutSubsidy
P

We repeat the same procedure for computing indirect measures of bank and bank-firm
control variables (denoted as Bj and Qj ). Finally, equation (3.9) controls for firm size and
industry-district fixed effects. The firm-level estimates are consistent with the results reported
on the loan level (see Column (1) of Table 3.7). Firms borrowing more from exposed banks
experienced a less sizable contraction in credit than firms more connected to non-exposed
banks. In addition, the reduction in uncertainty had strong credit supply effects on the loan
level that translated into positive net effects on firm-level credit.135
135

Due to the absence of the firm FE, equation (3.9) does not absorb any firm-specific shocks which can
contribute to the bias in β estimate. To address this issue, we compute the bias-corrected coefficient as in
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Are the aggregate credit effects economically relevant? The reduction in LOLR
uncertainty reduced the pace of the lending contraction at the aggregate firm-level during
the period of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal. Within the partial equilibrium setting,
we plug the bias-corrected credit estimates into equation (3.9) and compare the predicted
aggregate firm-level credit with the policy (β = 0.644) and without it (β = 0). The reduction
in LOLR policy uncertainty triggered by the vLTRO contributed to approximately EUR 892
mil in lending to firms in Portugal. By comparing the credit dynamics to a counterfactual
world without any policy intervention, we can conclude that although the policy did not stop
the ongoing credit contraction, it significantly reduced its pace. We estimate that without
the policy, the credit would have contracted by additional 2.15 percentage points. This
means that while the observed credit contraction in the period after the vLTRO was -5.75%,
in the absence of the policy it would have been -7.90%.
3.5.2. Real effects: investment and employment
Are the lending effects to firms substantial enough to impact the real economy? We use the
specification in equation (3.9) to study the capital investment and employment effects.
Investment. We measure ∆investmentj as the annual log change of investment using the
firm census data. Column (2) of Table 3.7 shows that the average effect of firms’ indirect
exposure to reduction in LOLR uncertainty (HaicutSubsidy j ) is positive and statistically
significant. Further, Column (3) highlights that the effect on investment is stronger for small
firms.
The impact of this policy on investment is economically sizable. While the observed investment
between 2011 and 2012 fell by 18.5%, our estimates suggest that without the policy, firms’
investment would have contracted by additional 2.2 percentage points.
Employment. Following the literature on employment dynamics (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1999; Chodorow-Reich, 2014), we aggregate the establishment-level data from the employeeJiménez et al. (2019). The corrections cause the coefficient to drop by 35% but the final β estimate remains
positive (0.644), suggesting that the effect of the policy change remains economically relevant also at the firm
level.
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employer database to the firm level and create a measure of symmetric growth rate in
employment between 2011 and 2012:

∆employmentj =

(employment2012,j − employment2011,j )
.
1
2 (employment2012,j + employment2011,j )

Column (4) of Table 3.7 shows that the effect on the employment of an average firm is
statistically insignificant. As we however differentiate firms by size in Column (5), we find
that the policy had positive effect on the employment in small firms.
In the data, we observe that the year-on-year aggregate employment contacted by 9.7%.
Our estimates show that in the absence of the reduction in uncertainty, firms would have
reduced their employment by additional 2 percentage points. The real effects on employment
are entirely driven by the impact of the policy change on SMEs. Thus, thanks to the low
reporting thresholds on loans in the CRC and the granularity of the Portuguese data, we are
able to uncover the real effects of a reduction in central bank policy uncertainty in terms of
aggregate employment.136

3.6. Conclusion
This paper provides new empirical evidence in support of the lending and real effects of the
sudden reduction in uncertainty regarding central bank liquidity policy. We exploit the ECB’s
vLTRO as a quasi-natural experiment of a sudden decrease in LOLR policy uncertainty
and a novel granular dataset that perfectly matches the ECB monetary policy and market
operations data, private repo market haircuts data, firm credit registry and banks’ security
holdings in Portugal. We find that banks more exposed to the reduction in LOLR policy
uncertainty deleveraged at a slower pace. The reduction in policy uncertainty had a positive
136

Our results are subject to two caveats. First, our estimates are based on an aggregation of the effects
computed at the firm level in the partial equilibrium setup. Consequently, they represent a lower bound
on the actual effects. Second, the results may also underestimate the true effects of the reduction in LOLR
policy uncertainty as we only consider a period of 1 year after the vLTRO. We used this limited time span
due to other policy actions by the ECB post 2012. While it is plausible that the real effects might take
more time to materialize, it would be challenging to compute long-term effects that abstract from other
confounding factors.
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and economically sizable impact not only on lending but also on real outcomes.
Our results have several interesting policy implications. First, we show that policy aimed
at reducing policy uncertainty in times of crisis can be effective in reviving credit and real
economy. Second, we highlight the importance of central bank commitment and long-horizon
guidance concerning the future course of its policy actions in the context of the LOLR policy.
Third, we provide new insights into the transmission channel of LOLR policy to bank lending
and real economic outcomes.
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3.7. Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of bank characteristics

Main exposure measure:
Haircut subsidy 2011
% Assets
Haircut subsidy 2009
% Assets
Alternative exposure measures:
Total ECB liquidity
% Assets
Eligible securities
% Assets
Eligible securities (1-3Y) % Assets

N

Mean

S.D.

p25

p50

p75

30
33

2.48
0.01

3.91
0.05

0
0

0.05
0

3.78
0.001

30
30
30

5.9
9.2
2.2

8.4
11.5
3.6

0.0
0.0
0.0

1.1
5.1
0.1

9.2
13.9
2.8

16.9
0.7
47.4
33.3
13.6
11.2
0.4
13.8

32.7
0.9
27.6
29.5
12.1
16.3
2.6
15.8

0.6
0.0
25.5
4.4
6.6
8.8
-0.3
6.4

1.9
0.5
43.0
33.6
11.0
10.3
0.0
8.4

11.1
1.1
69.2
50.4
14.6
14.4
0.4
13.2

Other bank observables (as of September 2011):
Total Assets
bn EUR
30
Cash reserves
% Assets
30
Loans
% Assets
30
Deposits
% Assets
30
Leverage
Liab/Equity
30
Capital ratio
Capital/RWA
30
ROA
Profit/Assets
30
Equity
% Assets
30
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Table 3.2: Intensive margin: baseline version
log(crediti,j,t )
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.078∗∗∗

1.188∗∗∗

0.874∗∗∗

0.820∗∗∗

0.824∗∗∗
(0.154)

Time FE

Yes

Yes

Bank FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt

(0.202)

(0.194)

Firm-Time FE

(0.179)

Bank-Firm controls

(0.182)

Yes

Yes

Bank-Firm FE

Yes

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

2,914,218
0.0674
0.001

Loan Sample

Full

1,487,089
0.123
0.001

1,487,089
0.737
0.0615

1,487,089
0.916
0.609

1,487,089
0.996
0.101

Multiple bank relationships

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described in
equation (3.1). The dependent variable is log credit drawn by a non-financial firm j from bank i in month
t. Bank-firm controls include the length of bank-firm relationship, indicator whether the loan is secured
by collateral and share of loan size to total firm credit which controls for the importance of the lending
relationship. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.3: Intensive margin, credit lines and loan maturities
(a)

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt
HaircutSubsidyi × Postt × CreditLinej
Firm-Time FE
Bank-Firm FE
Observations
Overall R2
Within R2
(b)

Credit lines
Drawn credit
(1)

Potential credit
(2)

Utilization rates
(3)

0.663∗∗∗
(0.118)
0.215∗
(0.120)

-1.114∗∗
(0.500)

0.694∗∗∗
(0.123)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

1,487,089
0.996
0.103

1,487,089
0.959
0.053

1,485,260
0.829
0.084

Loan Maturities
Loan maturityi,j,t

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt
Loan controls
Time FE
Bank FE
Firm-Time FE
Bank-Firm controls
Bank-Firm FE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.061
(0.184)

1.561∗∗∗

(0.0889)

1.005∗∗

1.294∗∗∗
(0.378)

2.196∗∗∗
(0.299)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

968,463
0.568
0.122

967,555
0.970
0.098

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

2.056,111
0.114
0.062

Loan Sample

Full

968,463
0.114
0.047

(0.403)

968,463
0.556
0.084

Yes

Multiple bank relationships

Table (a) examines the role of credit lines. The dependent variable Drawn credit refers to the main outcome
variable in the previous analysis - log(crediti,j,t ) - the log credit drawn by a non-financial firm j from bank
i in month t. Potential credit is defined as (log(potential crediti,j,t + 1) where potential credit denotes a
sum of all unused credit lines between firm j and bank i at month t. Utilization rate is a share of drawn
credit to total approved credit (i.e. the sum of potential credit and drawn credit). Total credit in the
denominator is expressed as of September 2011. Table (b) presents coefficients from regressions described
in equation (3.3). The dependent variable is the maturity of drawn loans. Loan controls include bank-firm
log credit. Bank-firm controls include the length of bank-firm relationship, dummy whether the loan is
secured by collateral, and share of loan size to total firm credit. Standard errors are two-way clustered at
the bank-time and firm level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Lending outcomes in the periods of low and high haircut subsidy
log(crediti,j,t )
Low-haircut subsidy enviroment
2009 LTRO
(1)
2009 HaircutSubsidyi × Postt
2011 HaircutSubsidyi × Postt
Effect per one std. deviation

8.795
(7.868)

0.440

Main sample
2011 vLTRO
(2)

0.824∗∗∗
(0.154)
3.222

∗∗∗

Firm-Time FE

Yes

Yes

Bank-Firm FE

Yes

Yes

3,414,089
0.977
0.006

1,487,089
0.996
0.101

N
Overall R2
Within R2

This table presents coefficients from equation (3.1). The dependent variable is log credit granted to private
non-financial firms in Portugal around the LTRO periods. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
bank-time and firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Intensive margin: heterogeneous outcomes by firm type
log(crediti,j,t )
(1)

(2)

(3)

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt

1.077∗∗∗

1.309∗∗∗

0.631∗∗∗
(0.183)

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt × FirmSizej

-0.283∗∗

(0.192)

(0.236)

(0.131)

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt × RelationFirmj

-0.481∗∗
(0.199)

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt × RiskyFirmj

0.354∗∗∗
(0.107)

Firm-Time FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank-Firm FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,166,299
0.995
0.120

1,166,299
0.995
0.119

896,268
0.994
0.124

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level intensive margin and firm heterogeneities, as described in equation (3.4). All firm heterogeneities are dummy variables: F imsSizej is one
if the firm’s size is larger than a median firm, RelationF irmj takes a value of one if the bank-firm pair
exists for at least 24 months prior to the vLTRO, RiskyF irmj is one if a firm’s z-score is above median,
Def aultj is one if a firm had had any delinquent loan with any bank in the part year, and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Extensive margin: exit and entry
EXITi,j
HaircutSubsidyi

ENTRYi,j

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2.45***
(0.532)

2.24***
(0.497)

1.57*

1.19**

0.91

1.36

(0.865)

(0.538)

(0.910)

(0.864)

1.05∗∗∗

HaircutSubsidyi × RiskyFirmj

(0.299)

HaircutSubsidyi × DefLoanj

1.77∗∗∗
(0.617)

Bank controls
Firm controls
Firm FE

Yes
Yes

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

284,179
0.25
-

Yes
Yes
274,605
0.53
0.24

Yes
Yes
49,361
0.06
-

Yes
Yes
31,873
0.47
0.02

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

37,612
0.07
-

49,287
0.07
-

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level extensive margin, as described in equations
(3.5), (3.6) and (3.7). For a given loan, EXIT is classified as one if the loan is not renewed and the bank-firm
relationship ceases to exist in the post-period. ENTRY equals one if a bank-firm loan consultation entry is
matched with the new bank-firm loan in credit registry, and zero otherwise. RiskyF irm takes the value of 1 if
the firm’s z-score is above the median z-score, and 0 otherwise. Def Loan takes the value of 1 if the firms as
defaulted on any loan in the past year, and 0 otherwise. Bank controls include ln(T A), CapitalRatio, LiqRatio,
Equity/T A and Loans/T A. Firm controls include log of firm’s total assets and industry-district fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Firm-level credit and real outcomes
∆log(creditj )
HaircutSubsidyj
HaircutSubsidyj × SmallFirmj
Bias corr. HaircutSubsidyj

∆investmentj

∆employmentj

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.031∗∗∗

0.791∗∗

0.429
(0.393)
0.774∗∗
(0.394)

-1.365
(3.458)

-6.230∗
(3.353)
11.31∗∗
(5.032)

(0.114)

(0.320)

0.644

Bank controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bank-firm controls
Firm controls

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

138,225
0.0273

73,493
0.0291

73,493
0.0291

89,176
0.0129

89,176
0.0129

Observations
R2

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to firm-level intensive margin, as described in
equation (3.9). The dependent variable in Column (1) ∆log(creditj ) is a log change in total bank lending
on the firm level between the pre- and post- period. Following Jiménez et al. (2019), we compute the
bias-correct coefficient as :
var(HaicutSubsidyi )
0.03912
b
b
b
= 0.644
βbj = β
= 1.031 − (1.134 − 1.029)
j,OLS − (βOLS − βF E )
0.02042
var(HaicutSubsidyj )
Dependent variable in Columns (2)-(3) is an annual log change in firm investment and in Columns (4)-(5)
the annual growth rate in employment. Bank controls denote indirect measures of log(T A), CapitalRatio,
LiqRatio, Equity/T A, log(pre − LT ROpledging) and Loans/T A. Firm controls include log(T Aj ) and
industry-district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-district level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.8. Figures
Figure 3.1: ECB liquidity provisions
(a) Liquidity provisions (amount)
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(b) Liquidity provisions (maturity)
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(d) Security haircuts
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(c) Security pledging
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ECB

2014m1

2016m1

Private Market

Panel (a) shows the ECB liquidity by maturity. vLTRO includes the vLTRO (2011–2014) and T-LTRO (from
2014 onward), other denotes liquidity operations with a maturity below 3 years. Panel (b) plots the average
maturity of banks’ liabilities with the ECB. Panel (c) plots the evolution security pledging with the ECB
split by types. All marketable securities are reported in book values. Non-marketable securities use internal
ECB valuation. Panel (d) shows the evolution of the average private market and ECB haircuts for securities
pledged by Portuguese banks with the ECB. Vertical red (black) dashed lines denote the 2011 vLTRO (2009
LTRO) period.
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Figure 3.2: Lending outcomes using dynamic difference in differences
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2012m6
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This figure presents coefficient estimates of βk for each month from equation (3.2). Vertical bands represent
+/- 1.96 times standard error of each point estimate. Dashed lines indicate the vLTRO period. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level.
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Figure 3.3: Defaults of new loans
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This figure presents coefficient estimates of βk for each quarter from equation (3.8). Estimates in red color
refer to the periods of high defaults of new loans following the reduction in LOLR policy uncertainty induced
by the vLTRO. Vertical bands represent +/- 1.96 times standard error of each point estimate. The dashed
line shows the policy announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
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3.9. Appendix
3.9.1. ECB and Portuguese bank announcements
ECB speeches and policy announcements related to the uncertain future of fixed
rate full allotment
One of the critical institutional aspects why the vLTRO is associated with the reduction
in funding uncertainty is that the ECB did not credibly commit to keep the fixed-rate full
allotment (FRFA) for longer than eight months in the period between 2008–mid 2012. This
list of the ECB speeches and policy announcements shows how the regulators slowly moved
the FRFA time horizons. Around the time of the vLTRO announcement, the ECB has only
committed to keep the FRFA in place until at least the first half of 2012. The first long-term
commitment to keep the FRFA in place for more than eight months occurred in July 2012
(half a year after the vLTRO) around the same period as Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” speech
related to the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).
• “The Governing Council decided to conduct them in the second quarter of 2011 on the
same conditions as in the first quarter of 2011. This means that we will continue to
apply fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment in all our refinancing operations
at least until mid-July.” (Jean-Claude Trichet, March, 21, 2011)
• “On 6th October the Governing Council, in response to a worsening of liquidity tensions
in the market, has committed to maintaining the FRFA policy until the middle of
July 2012.” (Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo, October 21, 2011)
• “These measures address the risk that persistent financial markets tensions could affect
the capacity of euro area banks to obtain refinancing over longer horizons. [...] in all
refinancing operations until at least the first half of 2012 all liquidity demand by
banks would be fully allotted at fixed rate.” (Mario Draghi, December 19, 2011)
• “The Eurosystem decided to maintain the FRFA procedure in all refinancing operations
until at least the end of June 2012.” (Vitor Constancio, April 25, 2012)
• “The Governing Council decided in June to continue conducting all refinancing operations as fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment, at least until mid-January
2013.” (Mario Draghi, July 9, 2012)
• “The Governing Council decided in December to continue conducting all refinancing
operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment, at least until July
2013.” (Mario Draghi, December 17, 2012)
• “The Governing Council decided in May to continue conducting all refinancing operations as fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment at least until mid-July
2014.” (Mario Draghi, July 8, 2013)
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Announcement of Portuguese banks related to the vLTRO
• “We also took the opportunity to borrow from the ECB at three years, which made
funding more stable and took pressure off the use of weekly borrowing
operations.” (Caixa Economica Montepio Geral, Annual Report and Accounts, 2011)
• “By transforming the short-term financing with the ECB into 3 years, the Bank not
only maintained a very comfortable position regarding permanent liquidity but also
guaranteed the same position for the coming 2 years.” (Banco Carregosa, Report &
Accounts, 2011)
• “New ECB financing significantly increased the liquidity buffer and improved financing structure by replacing short-term maturities by long term funding.” (Santander,
Annual Report, 2011)
• “... structural improvement in the profile of maturities, substituting a part
of its short term refinancing requirements by resources with a maturity of 3 years.”
(Caixa Geral de Depositos, Annual Report, 2012)
• “Banco Popolare’s adhesion to ECB’s three-year LTRO auctions enabled the Group
to stabilise its structural liquidity profile.” (Banco Popolare, Annual Report,
2012)
• “This enabled the Group a very respectable liquidity profile able to withstand
the most severe stress tests, and made it possible for the LCR (Liquidity Coverage
Ratio), envisaged by Basel III for 2015, to record a percentage of over 100%.” (Banco
Popolare, Annual Report, 2012)
• “This [LTRO] will allow the cost of financing to be cut by improving its
structure.” (CaixaBank, Management Report and Annual Financial Statements,
2011)
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3.9.2. Details about the alternative measures of exposure
The paper exploits the ex-ante variation in banks’ exposure to the reduction in LOLR central
bank uncertainty. In addition the the baseline exposure to the uncertainty proxied by the
size of the haircut subsidy on securities pledged by Portuguese banks with the ECB, we also
consider three alternative measures of exposure. Finally, we will also perform a robustness
check based on an alternative haircut subsidy measure that takes into account all eligible
securities held by banks.
First, we construct a liability-side measure defined as the sum of all the short-term ECB
funding taken up by a bank as of September 2011 and normalized to its total assets:
Existing ECB liquidityi =

total secured ECB borrowingi,Sep2011
.
total assetsi,Sep2011

This measure captures the fact that the policy allowed banks to swap the existing short-term
funding provided by the ECB into the newly available very long-term (three-year) funding
while keeping all other margins unchanged (e.g., same eligible collateral, haircuts, interest
rates). Thus, banks were able to costlessly increase the maturity of their liabilities and hence
lower their uncertainty regarding the future stance of the LOLR policy. In the data, we
observe that banks swapped on average 86% of their short-term funding into the three-year
funding.
Second, we consider an asset-side measure that captures total bank’s holdings of securities
eligible as a collateral:
EligibleSec Hold.i =

holdings of eligible securities (ECB haircut-adjusted value)i,Sep2011
total assetsi,Sep2011

.

As banks need to pledge eligible collateral to participate in the LOLR funding, this measure
directly captures the total borrowing capacity of a bank.137 Exploiting the matching of the
ECB data on collateral and haircuts with the Portuguese data on banks’ security holdings,
we derive the haircut-adjusted value of all eligible securities in bank’s portfolio, regardless of
whether they had been pledged with the central bank before or not.138
Third, while banks can pledge any eligible security as a collateral, the main benefit of the
vLTRO is captured by securities that mature in the horizon of one to three years after the
policy announcement. By lengthening the maturity of repo operations to three years, ECB
implicitly decreased rollover risk for the funding backed by the securities that mature shortly
before the vLTRO expiration. In other words, banks do not need to be concerned about the
price volatility of these securities at the time of the vLTRO repayment and as a result, they
137

This approach is related to Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) who study the lending impact of QE in
the US.
138
We use ISIN-specific haircuts applied by the ECB and compute the haircut-adjusted value of all eligible
securities. In the data, we clearly observe over-collateralization. That is, bank utilize around 75% of their
borrowing capacity and leave the rest as a buffer against sudden changes in asset prices and related margin
calls. Importantly, we do not find any change in the over-collateralization rates around the policy dates.
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would not need to face fire-sale risk due to rollover issues.139 As a result, we narrow down
the previous exposure measure to the most relevant group of eligible securities:
EligibleSec Hold. (1Y-3Y)i =

holdings of eligible securities, maturity ∈ (1Y, 3Y )i,Sep2011
total assetsi,Sep2011

.

Table 3.8 presents the loan-level intensive margin results using three alternative measures of
exposure. Figure 3.4 presents coefficient estimates from the dynamic differences-in-differences
described in equation (3.2) for three alternative exposure measures.
Table 3.8: Intensive margin: alternative exposure measures
log(crediti,j,t )
Exposure definitions

Haircut
Subsidy

Existing ECB
Liquidity

EligSec Hold
(All matur.)

EligSec Hold
(1Y-3Y)

Baseline
(1)

(2)

Robustness
(3)

(4)

Firm-Time FE
Bank-Firm FE

0.824***
(0.154)
Yes
Yes

0.631***
(0.063)
Yes
Yes

0.521***
(0.053)
Yes
Yes

0.530***
(0.147)
Yes
Yes

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

1,487,089
0.996
0.101

1,487,089
0.996
0.106

1,487,089
0.996
0.095

1,487,089
0.996
0.087

Exposurei × P ostt

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described in
equation (3.1) for four measures of exposure. The dependent variable is log credit granted to private
non-financial corporations in Portugal. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

139
There are three reasons why we focus on securities with remaining maturity of one to three years: (i)
until the announcement the longest ECB operation had a maturity of one year, (ii) banks can repay vLTRO
early but no sooner than one year after the allotment, and (iii) the full vLTRO maturity is three years.
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Figure 3.4: Lending outcomes: robustness to other measures
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This figure presents coefficient estimates of βk for each month from equation (3.2). We divide banks into two
groups: exposed and non-exposed. Panel (a) denotes a bank as exposed if it was borrowing from the central
bank in repo operations prior to the vLTRO announcement, and zero otherwise. Panel (b) defines exposed
as one if a bank i was holding securities eligible as collateral prior to the policy announcement, and zero
otherwise. Panel (c) set exposed to one if a bank i was holding securities with that it will not have to fire sell
at the repayment date due to rollover issues (the remaining maturity of securities is between 1 and 3 years),
and zero otherwise. Vertical bands represent +/- 1.96 times standard error of each point estimate. Dashed
lines separate the vLTRO period. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level.
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Pledged vs Eligible Securities. We also examine an alternative measure of haircut subsidy.
While our baseline measure of haircut subsidy was computed for only securities pledged with
the ECB, as a robustness we consider a haircut subsidy based on all eligible securities held
by a bank (both pledged and not pledged with the ECB). Table 3.9 presents coefficients from
the baseline regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described in equation (3.1),
for two alternative measures of haircut subsidy. The results remain robust to the alternative
specification of the haircut subsidy.
Table 3.9: Intensive margin: alternative definition of haircut subsidy
log(crediti,j,t )
Exposure definitions

Haircut Subsidy
Securities Pledged with ECB

Haircut Subsidy
Eligible Securities Held

Baseline
(1)

Robustness
(2)

Firm-Time FE
Bank-Firm FE

0.824***
(0.154)
Yes
Yes

0.871***
(0.158)
Yes
Yes

Observations
Overall R2
Within R2

1,487,089
0.996
0.101

1,487,089
0.996
0.100

Exposurei × P ostt

This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described in
equation (3.1) for two alternative measures of haircut subsidy. Column (1) corresponds to the haircut
subsidy computed for securities held by a bank and pledged with the ECB. Column (2) corresponds to the
haircut subsidy computed for all eligible securities held by a bank (both pledged and not pledged with the
ECB). Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.9.3. Differences in bank observables
Table 3.10: Comparison exposed and non-exposed banks
Exposed banks
Total Assets
Cash reserves
Capital ratio
ROA
Loans
Deposits
Leverage
Equity
Security holdings

bn EUR
% Assets
Capital/RWA
Profit/Assets
% Assets
% Assets
Liab/Equity
% Assets
% Assets

Non-exposed banks

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

28.5
0.7
14.3
0.0
41.4
30.7
13.0
11.6
28.0

40.0
0.5
7.5
1.2
19.9
17.7
9.4
10.8
15.4

1.6
0.7
7.2
0.9
55.3
36.8
14.4
16.7
8.1

2.0
1.3
23.2
3.8
34.5
40.8
15.3
20.8
12.4

Diff.
26.87**
0.0
7.1
-0.9
-13.9
-6.1
-1.4
-5.1
19.9***

This table shows the means of the respective variables for the group of exposed and the group of nonexposed banks. We define exposed banks as ones which participated in the three-year vLTRO funding and
non-exposed otherwise. All variables expect for are reported as of September 2011. Stars denote p-values
for pairwise t-tests that test whether the mean is the same for the two groups of banks. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.10 compares averages of bank’s observable characteristics by splitting banks into
two groups: exposed and non-exposed. We find that exposed banks are on average larger
and hold more securities while they do not differ across other features such as cash holdings,
capitalization, profitability or leverage.
The difference in size highlights that all non-exposed banks are relatively small (mean
size is EUR 1.6bn with a standard deviation of EUR 2bn) while exposed banks are very
heterogeneous (mean size is EUR 28.5bn with a significant standard deviation equal to EUR
40bn). The size difference is directly related to the fixed cost of establishing an infrastructure
to borrow from the ECB (for example a trading desk). Smaller banks may not find it
beneficial to bear this fixed cost. Furthermore, it is important to point out that while all
large Portuguese banks fall into the exposed category (i.e., the dummy variable of exposed
is equal to 1), the actual magnitude of the haircut subsidy (i.e., continuous measure of
exposure) does not correlate with bank size.
Table 3.10 also shows that exposed banks on average hold more securities. The difference in
terms of security holdings confirms the fact that banks must hold securities to be able to
benefit from the haircut subsidy. In face, we exploit holdings of eligible securities as one of
the alternative measure of exposure presented in Internet 3.9.2 and in the robustness exercise
in the Internet Appendix Table 3.8.140
3.9.4. Collapsed difference-in-differences
We collapse the time series information from equation (3.1) into a pre- (June–October 2011)
and post- (February–June 2012) periods to derive more conservative standard errors :
140
Majority of securities holding of banks are in fact securities that are eligible for pledging with the ECB.
As are result there is very little difference between all security holding and eligible security holdings.
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(3.10)

∆log(crediti,j ) = αj + βHaircutSubsidyi + γBi + δQi,j + ϵi,j ,

where ∆log(crediti,j ) denotes the change in average bank-firm credit between the two
collapsed periods. Unlike the baseline specification used in the main paper, the collapsed DID
does not allow us to implement the rich set of fixed effects as in equation (3.1) and we therefore
include a set of bank controls, Bi , (total assets, capital ratio, liquidity rate, equity/TA,
and loans/TA) and bank-firm controls, Qi,j , (the length of the bank-firm relationship and
information about previous loan delinquencies in this relationship). We use firm fixed effects,
αj , to disentangle credit demand from credit supply and compare change in lending outcomes
for a firm borrowing from at least two banks.
Table 3.11: Intensive margin: collapsed version
∆log(crediti,j )
HaircutSubsidyi
Bank Controls
Bank-Firm Controls
Firm Controls
Firm FE
Observations
Overall R2
Within R2
Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.202∗∗
(0.499)
Yes
Yes

1.235∗∗
(0.480)
Yes
Yes
Yes

1.095∗∗
(0.506)
Yes
Yes

1.134∗∗
(0.477)
Yes
Yes
Yes

1.029∗∗∗
(0.348)
Yes
Yes

202,920
0.0460
-

114,116
0.0445
-

114,116
0.0650
-

114,116
0.467
0.0737

203,018
0.0283
-

Full sample

Yes

Multiple bank relationships

This table presents coefficients from collapsed regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described
in equation (3.10). The dependent variable is the change in average log credit granted to private nonfinancial corporations before and after the vLTRO. Bank controls include ln(T A), CapitalRatio, LiqRatio,
Equity/T A and Loans/T A. Firm controls include log of total assets of a firm j and industry-district fixed
effects. Bank-firm controls include the length of the bank-firm pair and information about previous loan
delinquencies in the bank-firm relationship. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3.11 shows that our findings are robust to the collapsed DID which compares the
average lending before and after the policy implementation following equation (3.10). While
the effects are quantitatively similar, we prefer to use the time-series specification as our
baseline estimation since it allows us to absorb any observable and unobservable time-invariant
bank-firm characteristics into fixed effects.
3.9.5. Alternative credit, firms and bank variables
Table 3.12 shows that our findings are also robust to changes in the credit and firm definitions.
Columns (2) and (3) show variations to the baseline. Column (2) reports results for the
dependent variable measured as the log of total credit. We define total credit as a sum of
drawn credit and potential credit (i.e., unused credit lines which are reported off-balance
sheet). Our results are also robust to different definitions of firms. While the baseline results
are reported for private non-financial corporations, we also extend the definition of firms to
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include public firms and individual entrepreneurs which leads to an increase of the sample
by 900,000 additional observations (denoted as All firms in Column(3)).
A possible concern is that the banks that did not participate in the ECB’s open market
operations could be significantly different from the exposed banks. As exposed banks are on
average larger and hold more securities.141 , In Column (4) of Table 3.12 we only focus on
the variation in the cross-section of exposed banks and the results remain consistent.
Finally, Column (5) shows that results hold robust also when controlling for bank characteristics (i.e., log of total assets, capital ratio, liquidity ratio, equity ratio and loan-to-assets
ratio) interacted with the POST dummy.
EBA stress tests
A potential threat to our identification strategy comes from other concurrent policy actions.
Around the time of the vLTRO announcement, four banks were undergoing the stress tests
conducted by the European Banking Authority. To examine if our results are robust to
this potential confounding factor, we exclude these banks from our sample as a part of the
robustness exercise. In Column (6) of Table 3.12 we drop these banks from our sample and
the results remain robust.

141

See Internet 3.9.3 for more details.
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Table 3.12: Intensive margin: robustness

HaircutSubsidyi × P ostt
vLTROuptakei × P ostt
Firm-Time FE
Bank-Firm FE
Observations
Overall R2

Baseline

Total credit

All firms

Exposed
banks

Bank
Controls

EBA shock

Endogenous
uptake

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.824∗∗∗

0.885∗∗∗

0.994∗∗∗

0.610∗∗∗

0.911∗∗∗

2.018∗∗∗

(0.154)

Yes
Yes
1,487,089
0.996

(0.146)

Yes
Yes
1,673,619
0.996

(0.130)

Yes
Yes
2,387,616
0.996

(0.222)

Yes
Yes
1,012,225
0.996

(0.258)

Yes
Yes
1,487,089
0.996

(0.243)

Yes
Yes
447,520
0.991

0.167
(0.411)
Yes
Yes
1,487,089
0.936
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This table presents coefficients from regressions related to loan-level intensive margin, as described in equation (3.1). Column (1) represents the baseline
specification as shown in the last column of Table 3.2. The dependent variable is log credit granted to private non-financial corporations in Portugal. The
exposure is defined as a sum of all available borrowing from the ECB as a share of total assets prior to the vLTRO. Columns (2)–(6) present variations to
the baseline. Column (2) shows results for the dependent variable measured as a log of total credit (a sum of credit granted and potential credit). Column
(3) extends the sample to all firms in Portugal, including not only private NFC but also independent entrepreneurs and publicly-owned companies. Column
(4) focuses only on the variation across banks that were exposed to the ECB open market operations prior to the vLTRO (in September 2011). Column (5)
introduces bank controls interacted with the POST dummy. Column (6) drops four largest banks which were subject to the stress test exercise conducted by
the European Banking Association (EBA) around the same time as the vLTRO. Finally, Column (7) illustrates the null effect when using the measure
of endogenous uptake of the vLTRO as a source of cross-sectional variation. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3.9.6. Placebo test
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Figure 3.5: Placebo test: freeze of the European interbank market in 2007

2007m1
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The figure uses an unexpected freeze of the European interbank market in August 2007 as a placebo test.
The negative effects of the interbank liquidity crunch on lending in Portugal were previously shown by
Iyer et al. (2014). This figure presents coefficient estimates of βk for each month from equation (3.2). There
is no evidence that banks more exposed to the vLTRO in 2011 were generally more sensitive to the liquidity
dry-up in 2007 (the plotted estimates of βk are not significantly different from zero). Vertical bands represent
+/- 1.96 times standard error of each point estimate. Dashed line shows the European interbank market in
August 2007. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-time and firm level.

Internet Appendix Figure 3.5 uses the 2007 liquidity freeze as a placebo sample to investigate
whether the banks more exposed to the reduction in funding uncertainty induced by the
vLTRO policy in 2011 were also more sensitive to the 2007 liquidity dry-up. We follow
the dynamic setup specification from equation (3.2) and replace the left-hand-side lending
outcomes in 2011–2012 with the lending outcomes in 2007. If the 2007 and 2011 exposures
were spuriously correlated, we would expect negative and statistically significant coefficients
βk after August 2007. Instead, we find that the plotted estimates of βk are not statistically
different from zero throughout 2007. We can conclude that there is no evidence that the
banks more exposed to the 2011 reduction in bank funding uncertainty are generally more
sensitive to liquidity shocks.
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3.9.7. Standard error clustering
Table 3.13 documents that our results are robust to alternative clustering either at the
bank-time (i.e. unit of variations), bank and time and bank and firm level.
Table 3.13: Intensive margin: robustness to standard error clustering
log(crediti,j,t )
S.E. Clustering

Bank-Time
and Firm

Bank-Time

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Bank-Firm FE
Firm-Time FE

0.824∗∗∗
(0.202)
Yes
Yes

0.824∗∗∗
(0.202)
Yes
Yes

0.824∗
(0.462)
Yes
Yes

0.824∗
(0.457)
Yes
Yes

Observations
Overall R2

1,487,089
0.996

1,487,089
0.996

1,487,089
0.996

1,487,089
0.996

HaircutSubsidyi × Postt

Bank and Time

Bank and Firm

This table presents coefficients from regressions relating to loan-level intensive margin, as described in
equation (3.1). The dependent variable is log credit granted to private non-financial corporations in
Portugal. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Level of standard error clustering is bank-time and
firm, bank-time, bank and time, and and bank and firm, respectively. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.9.8. Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.6: Cross-sectional variation in haircut subsidy at the bank level
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This histogram shows the variation of haircut subsidy at the cross-section of banks in September 2011.

Figure 3.7: Cross-sectional variation in pledging of securitized assets
post
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These histograms show the variation of securitized assets (as a share of total pledging) at the cross-section of
exposed banks. ‘Pre’ denotes average pledging of each bank in the period prior to the vLTRO, i.e. Jun–Oct
2011 and ‘Post’ denotes average pledging of each bank in the period after to the vLTRO, i.e. Feb–Jun 2012.
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Table 3.14: Summary statistics of loan characteristics
N

Mean

S.D.

p25

p50

p75

Baseline sample (Firms with multiple bank relationships)
Drawn credit (baseline)
All credit

1,487,089 452,218
1,673,619 534,242

3,878,045
4,985,075

15,008
13,802

49,000
48,214

186,308
193,284

30,761
29,062

118,783
116,491

Full sample of all firms
Drawn credit
All credit

2,914,218 349,502
3,276,700 383,756

3,413,031
4,051,314

10,143
8,559

This table reports the summary statistics of monthly loan-level credit data for the period June 2011–June
2012 in EUR. Minimum reporting threshold is EUR 50. Drawn credit represents performing regular and
renegotiated credit. All credit represents the sum of drawn credit and potential credit (i.e., unused credit
lines).
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